THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 110, 5 November 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

After patiently biding his time, M. Venizelos has thrown his majority against the Greek (Zaimis) Government, which, it is cabled, will in consequence resign. What will King Constantine now do? Will he summon to the Premiership the man whom, since the war, he has twice forced to vacate that post? If so, it will be a " climb-down " for the King and his Potedam Queon. M. Vcnizelos ha* been driven from his position but not from his principles, and in ;i third round with the German influence at Athens he would probably win. When the Anglo-French effort against the Dardanelles was planned, Premier Venizelos, openly pro-Entente, proposed that Greece should co-operate He went so far as to suggest that Greece should bring Bulgaria into the co-opera-tion against Turkey by making cessions to Bulgaria in the Kavalla district, Greece to be compensated therefor by receiving Greek-populated territory in Turkish Asia Minor. Then it was that the German leanings of the Greek King were first proved, for he got rid of M. Venizelos, and a quite circumstantial story arose that in some way plans concerted between the late Venizelist Government and the Entente, for the Dar-danelles-Gallipoli enterprise, leaked from Athens to Berlin, and thence to Constantinople, a leakage that caused Britain and France much trouble ■when the blow at Gallipoli was launched. Whether that is true or not, the King got rid of his Premier. But the subsequent elections gave M. V<>nizelos a majority, and after a time the King recalled him, only to render his position untenable again when the Serbo-Bul-garian war loomed up. We now know that M. Venizelos, 35 Premier, had affirmed that Greece should fulfil her obligation under the Serbo-Greek treaty to defend Servia against Bulgaria, and that he invited Britain and France to send 150.000 men to Salonika. Therefore, for the second time, the Kaiser's brother-in-law, like Pharaoh, hardened his heart.

The question now is whether the heart of King Constantine is still hard and his Germanophile tendencies still dominant. He must choose between the majority leader and another minority Government. It he chooses M. Venizelos, he must presumably accept that statesman on the latter's terms, for it is not likely that a man who has braved the storm twice wilJ bow to it the third time. Moreover, it is cabled that quite .recently, in a statement to a newspaper correspondent, M. Venizelos reaffirmed his policy, and carried it to the extent of declaring that when next in office he would make war on Bulgaria. So the two-faced monarch is confronted by a statesman who nails his colours to the mast, who refuses to be either reactionary or revolutionary, and who rests with dignity upon his undoubted claim, by virtue- of the Constitution and his position in Parliament, to guide his country's destinies. This duel between the German clique and the patriotic Greek .from Crete will one day form a most interesting page in history. At present we can only view it at short range, and speculate whether the Greek King will accept the Venizelist policy, cut his ties with Berlin, and march at the side of the Servians against the Bnlgars, the enemy of 1912-13.

The prospect of aid from a Greek army will hea.rten the Servian defenders, and so will the reports of a Russian army upon the Danube and a British force at the Greek port Kava-la. These reports are, however, not official, and must be discussed with reserve. They may be in the same category as the misleading report of a landing at Enos (Turkish) and seizure of the Dedeagatch railway. Kavala., the centre of a rich tobacco district, and a bone of contention between Bulgaria and Greece, is described by the Globe as possessing " only an antiquated quay, capable of handling four lighters simultaneously." This does not. agree with some other descriptions of the harbour facilities; if it is true, the disembarkation process will be protracted. As it is apparent, however, that the Salonika wharves - are already congested, Kavala would be of some advantage .as an auxiliary disembarkation point, though it is remote from Salonika, and its front is covered by the Demir-hissar-Seres-Drama-Skidie section of the railway connecting Salonika with Constantinople. This railway runs in Greek territory, and it would be interesting to know whether the Bnlgars are advancing into Greece to seize it; and, if so, whether the Greek troops are looking on passively, as at Salonika. A Berlin report that Greek troops in the Macedonian sphere fired on French, who were retreating into Greek territory from the Bulgars, does not necessarily, even if it is true, bear a wide meaning. It is known,that to some extent German influence has insinuated itself into the Greek army. Various units may be proGerman, but Greece herself cannot fly in the face of naval power without paying a penalty that would probably cost Constantine"his throne.

Reuter news; and various reports other than enemy ones, suggest that the French, based on Salonika, are holding in Macedonia the same defensive position as before, from Demirkapou (on the Vardar) eastward towards Gradetz and Robova (south of Strumnitza). South of this line, the railway from Salonika turns eastward towards Demirhissar and the other 'towns (mentioned above) lying inland of Kavala. The Entente, line In Macedonia cannot, for some time to come, hope for any co-operating aid from Kavala, and it evidently cannot assume a general offensive until it is reinforced from Salonika. In that connection, i£. is interesting to note (vide to-da/s cabled news) that the first British contingent from Salonika was railed to the advanced base Ghevgheli (in Servian Macedonia) on 29th October. When the Entente army is able to advance, its first substantial result should be to force the Bulgars out of Uskub. To hope that in the meanwhile the Servians will be able to defend Nish seems to be to hope for the impossible. Meanwhile the Entente army, though it cannot communicate with Uskub and Mitrovitza (which is.now, as anticipated, Servians administrative centre), can send supplies to Monastir and Ochrida (near the Albanian frontier) by the SalonikaMonastir railway. Otherwise, its severance from the main body of Servians appears to be complete. They, for their part, are struggling hard against the Austrian-German-Bulgar cordon. Enemy reports say that the Servians destroyed the Kragujevatz arsenal before retiring, but Servia has riot yet admitted the loss of Kragujevatz. On the west the occupation of Ushitzs, (the rail-head of the branch line running up the valley of the Western Morava) marks another step in the Austrian turning movement.

German newspapers state that Russia is railing troops to Reni, the Russian, town near the angle of the Danube, and the best point from which to launch a Russian expedition, either by land or water, up the valley "of that river. Reni confronts Rumanian Galatz; and, according to the Salonika correspondent of the Petit Parisicn, Rumania is passive to belligerent Danubian operations now being carried out by Russia within Rumania's borders. What the operations actually aro will not be known with any .certainty till nxastt, information,

and authentic information, is to hand. Under the state of things existing prior to the Balkan wars of 1912-13, a Russian expedition advancing up the Danube would have met with opposition at Silistria, formerly a Bulgarian fortress. But Silistria is included in the territory taken from Bulgaria by Rumania, and the first considerable Bulgarian town on the Danube is Rustckuk, which is connected by railway with' the Black Sea at Varna. To make a Russian expedition against. Bulgaria practicable, the Russian southern armies must hold its flank in East Galicia and in Bukovina. The Sereth and the Pruth, which figured in the Austrian fighting, are tributaries of the Danube; and an enemy advance down the Dniester valley, if it broke through the Russian southern armies, -would uncover Odessa itself, Russia's great Black Sea base. ""

On the Strypa, which is a tributary of the Upper Dniester, the enemyttook the offensive against 'the Russian "southern armies, and penetrated the Russian front, but Petrograd claims that they were repulsed and lost 5000 prisoners. German admissions of withdrawal, and other signs, are construed in Russia as an admission that the northern offensive ■will stand over till the spring. There is confidence in the safety, at any rate till then, of Riga and 'Dvinsk. " Decisive fighting either on the Eastern or the Western front is hardly to be expecteu this winter. Winter conditions may also modify the operations in the Balkan theatre, but recent Balkan history shows that the Balkan States make war almost at any time.

France has lost a submarine in the Sea of Marmora, but a Liverpool paper counter-balances thi.s with a report of the trapping of a *snd-new German super-submarine. Another German sub marine appears to have found internment in Holland. Considering the success of the British Navy in making narrow waters immune from submarines, it is subject for comment that the Germans have not been able to show the Tnrks how to close the Narrows of the Dardanelles against the under-water craft of Britain and France. Both in the Baltic and in the Marmora German naval officers have a problem in antisubmarine tactics, and the former would appear to offer much the greater difficulties, because the north-western coastline is neutral.