Evening Post. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1915. BULGARIA MUST CHOOSE

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 82, 5 October 1915, Page 6

Evening Post. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1915. BULGARIA MUST CHOOSE

The Balkan situation really binges on the German-Austrian desire to obtain right-of-passage overland from Austria, to Turkey. There are two kinds of right, of -passage: one refers to the transport of munitions, th« other to th« passage of armies. In neither case can Bulgaria herself confer complete right-of-paeaage, because Bulgaria, though she adjoins Turkey, does not adjoin 'Austria. Therefore, any truck of ammunition or, any army, before it can pass from Austria to Bulgaria and Turkey, must travel over the territory of Servia, or over the 'territory of Rumania, or through, the river (Danubian) waters thereof. Servia. being from the outset an active enemy, it wa» out of the question for the German-Ans-trianfi to expect from Servia any voluntary passage of either ammunition or troops ; the Servian gate to Bulgaria and Turkey could be opened, not by intrigue, but only by force. It was equally out of the question, as far as practical politics is concerned, to induce Rumania to give right-of-way to a German- Austrian army ; but it was by no means out of the question to expect Rumania to give passage over her railways to German-Austrian munitions consigned to Turkey. Rumania -was, and. still is, a. neutral, and there is nothing in the laws of neutrality to prevent a neutral nation from ' sending, or permitting the sending of, munitions to a belligerent. The United I States, as everyone knows, has done tha* i for us ; and Rumania could, if she wished, have acted as a medium of supply between the Central Alliance and Turkey. Germany, who has shrieked at the United States for sending war material to Britain^ has also shrieked* at Rumania, for not sending/ German munitions to Turkey — a logical somersault of which the Teuton is always capable. Still, Rumania's refusal to act as medium of supply is based, not on law, but on favour. If, as would appear, that refusal has been uniform and effective, Rumania has rendered, negatively, a notable service to the Entente, and a. signal disservice to the Central Alliance. Germany, then, has been forced with alternative route questions, each presenting its own features. To effect a forcibie breach • through Servia, she strove to secure the aid~of Bulgaria, knowing that the Bulgarian army could be swung much moro easily against Servia than against Rumania, because the Servian territory (Macedonia) coveted by Bulgaria in the west is much more import ant than the Rumanian territory ("Dobrudja) coveted by Bulgaria in the northeast, So Germany felt that if it was to

could depend on Bulgaria. At the same time, she did not cease to endeavour, through her ally Austria, to exert diplomatic pressure on Rumania in order to secure the transport of munitions. Almost simultaneously -with the sending of German officers to newly-mobilised Bulgaria (the match to the magazine), Austria made a firm demand on Rumania to act as a carrier of war material. It is at this critical stage that the Entente has delivered its counter-blow. Neither the raising of Bulgaria against Servia, nor th© coercion of Rumania, is consistent with Entente interests, and Russia has very rightly been deputed to come into the open and deliver an .ultimatum to the Bulgarian Government. As the head of Slavdom, Russia is the most qualified among the Entente partners to utter a warning to Bulgaria, who owes her freedom to Russian armies. Moreover, seeing that Russia is at the moment the hardest-hit among the Allies, ajid considering that the German offensive in Russia has the obvious political object of compelling the Tsar to sue for peace, this Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria is the very best counter-blast to the German political design. It means that Russia and the Entente are prepared to take the initiative in the Balkans. They will not be so foolish as to allow the neutrals there to drift into a state of demoralisation owing to the rattling of the German sabre. If "King Ferdinand and his Government" (the ultimatum does not aay the people of Bulgaria) are prepared, by accepting German officers and German money, "to place their country's fate in the hands of Germany," then Bulgaria must take ,the consequences^and unless the German officers are dismissed the Russian Minister will j leave Sofia within twenty-four hours. The ultimatum is worded with the utmost plainness, and such strong action ■was absolutely necessary to impress Bulgaria with a full sense of responsibility, to stiffen the Rumanian Government, and to reassure Servia and Greece. What will happen now depends on the issue of the ultimatum. What is certain is that the time is ripe, perhaps overripe, for Entente action. If Bulgaria is to be a foe, it is better to hurry her into action at once. Her belligerency would mean that the Turkish frontier would be advanced from the t Maritza to the Vardar ,• but it would also be true that the defeat of Bulgaria would uncover Turkey. If Bulgaria is the road to Constantinople, it is possible for 'Saxon, Frank, ItaKan, and Greek, as well as Teuton and Austrian, to pass that way. One thing is clear : the day of Bulgarian temporising has gone by, and the last trap carefully prepared by German "specialists in intrigue" will now be either sprung of placed out of action.