THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 78, 30 September 1915, Page 6

THE WAR

Two points have been more than once emphasised in previous articles on the Balkan question : (1) that Bulgaria's immediate objective is Macedonia, and in this her people arc probably behind the Government, even to the extent of war, provided that the war is with Servia only ; (2) that Tsar Ferdinand — and possibly his Premier — has ambitions beyond Macedonia, is a pure opportunist, and would go to any lrngth to lorward his designs,, but is for the present curbed by the military risks of the situation, and by his people's unwillingness to enter upon, a war with the Entente. Bulgars believe sincerely and unitedly in their Macedonian rights, and the danger is that Ferdinand, being able to cjutv them with him against Scivia, may' be tempted to strike a blow and risk the greater coullagration that would spring out of the smaller, for a "localised" war between Bulgaria and Serviaappeals to he im possible. Ferdinand has latfth tort-ived three distinct warn-

ings: (1) the Greek mobilisation ; (2) the Allies' offensive in the west; (3) Sir Edwaid Grey's impressive statement in the House of Commons. ! .It may be taken for granted that one of the political results calculated on in launching the western offensive is the steadying of Bulgaria. Certain it is that Sir Edward Grey's rebuke to opportunism would not have been uttered without cause. While, in his opening remarks, diplomatically crediting Bulgaria's repudiation of aggressive design, the British Foreign Secretary does not hesitate ,to put, conditionally, the alternative. He says that if, behind the proclaimed attitude of correctness, there is an^ ulterior design, Bulgaria, on attempting to exercise that design, will find Britain fighting alongside her friends in the Balkans. If there was any possible doubt before as to the opportunistic policy of the Bulgarian Government, Sir Edward Grey's statement has dispelled that doubt. Will Ferdinand be deaf to the British Minister's reminder that a German victory merely means the converting of Bulgaria into a German causeway to the East? Will he be, blind to the Greek warlike activity, and to the blow in the west?. One reason for the Bulgarian temporising policy was the necessity of gathering in the harvest. This being done, mobilisation, as 'expected, followed. Just as there are two different, indeed contrary, aspects to Bulgarian policy — a popular claim on Macedonia, and a personal bid by Ferdinand for power — so there are two aspects to the mobilisation of the army. The Bulgar nationalist, having gathered his grain, will not object to mobilisation as a lever to help the diplomatists to coerce Servia into parting with Macedonia; but if Ferdinand carries him thus far in order to entangle him in a war waged, in Austro-German interests, against Russia and the Entente, the Bulgar nationalist will be sold. Already, in his dull way, he scents _ such a danger, and though he is coming to the colours, he comes not with the enthusiasm he showed in 1912 when Bulgaria's banner was raised against Turkey. He now knows that when once tiie war-machine is in fighting trim it is liable to be suddenly operated in unanticipated directions; proof of which fact is found in the disastrous Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria broke the Balkan League only to be herself broken in turn. It is significant to notice at this stage the pereinptoriness of the Bulgarian Minister to Vienna. Ferdinand, ex-officer in the Austrian army, has fed much on crumbs from Vienna. His declaration of independence from Turkey was timed with the Austrian seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without Vienna approval he would probably not have engaged in the Second Balkan War ; and he received that approval simply because Austria wished to break up the Balkan League. .That humiliating adventure should deter him from embarking on a similar one. but he is a Royal gambler. The safe limit* of his present policy are the use of all purely diplomatic measures (in eluding, in that sense, the mobilisation) to gain Macedonia from Servia, in which matter he has to reckon not only with Servia but with Greece. Directly he bx ceeds these limits and plays the Austro German game, trouble is certain, and it will in the long run lead to Bulgarian disaster; but in the interim Bulgaria would be a nasty thorn in the side 6f the Entente's military policy in Gallipoli and the Near East. If the Austro-Ger mans broke through Servia, it is quite conceivable that Ferdinand would cast the die and join forces with them. But the Franco-British offensive in the west aims at postponing the Austro-German Danube campaign, perhaps for ever. "To push the • immediate success to a really decisive issue" — that is now, in Sir John French's words, the task in the west. When the British, attacking on the La Bassee-Lens front, reached Loos, they had carried two lines of German trenches, for Sir John French says that the German second line ran -just west of Loos ; they- are now closely engaging the third line. At time of writing some doubt exists as to the height called Hill 70, which is an elevation 70 metres high a little east of Loos and due north of Lens. Sir John French reports: "We now hold all the ground north of Hill 70 which the enemy retook on Sunday." No doubt it will be contended that, in strict grammar, "which" refers to Hill 70, though it may have been meant to refer to "the ground north." To see this action as a whoje, it is necessary to consider the La BasseeLens sector (British) and the French sector, Lens-Arras (adjoining to the southward) as one^. Lens (German) is the dividing front of the British and the French attacks. North of Lens the British have broken the German lines at Loos, and are straining forward to finally gain Hill 70. South of Lens, the French, working from the captured town of Souchez (behind which is the height of Xotre Dame de ]x>rette, evidently Mr. Philip Gibbs's coign of vantage), are striving to capture the heights of Vimy. Possession of Hill 70 and the Vimy heights will count for a great deal. If the Allies hold them, the lateral roads and railways passing near Lens and connecting La Bassee and Arras will be dominated. In that case the Germans will have to fall back on the next lateral system of railways (connecting Lille and Douai), and that would mean certainly the loss of Lens, possibly of La Bassee and Arras also. And this would be, for the Allies, really important progress. It would mean the recovery of a very important strip (average width not less than ten miles) of North France. As regards British progress north of Lens 1 , Colonel Repington says that the ground held here* by the Germans is very defensible, and there will' not be rapid progress until the British heavy artillery is well posted south of Loos. (Note that Sir John French reports "further progress south >of Loos.'*) Colonel Repington emphasises the assistance given by our attack north of Lens to the French south of Lens, and slates that when the French have gained the heights of Vimy they will command the ground eastward towards Douai. [Note. — Since the above was written a cablegram has been received stating that the French have captured Hill 140, "the culminating point of the Vimy crest."] Mr. Philip Gibbs writes a reasonable description of the battle fought by the British in rain and mist, and says that many battalions of Kitchener's Army were engaged. On this occasion, unlike Neuve Chapelle, the British reserves were up to time and their services behind the firing line worked splendidly, though the communication trenches were clogged with the backward stream of German prisoners. If they had been British prisoners, how would Germany have acted in similar circumstances? i . It: the Champagne, the lateral railway which fueds the Gevman lino east of Reims is threatened in several places. At Auberive the French are within three miles of it. Further east they threaten it near Sommepy. Still further east an advance from Massiges is aimed at Challerange Junction. The Crown Prince's attempts to make a diversion further east in the Argonne appear to have ben costly failures. In FYance it is stated that in the ti\o groat operations (Chimpagne and North France) the German prisoners exceed 25.000. and the German looses are estimated at 120.000. Of the Allies' casualties nothing is yet said