ITALY'S NAVAL PROBLEM

Evening Post, Volume XC, Issue 42, 18 August 1915, Page 10

ITALY'S NAVAL PROBLEM

OFFSET TO FLEET SUPERIORITY AUSTRIA'S WELL-COVERED POSITIONS. EXPOSURE OF ITALIAN RAILWAYS., If naval supremacy were a mere matter of counting ships an 3 gunpower, and allowing for the personal qualities of the men serving in the ships, Italy would have no naval problem as against Austria. She has a very comfortable margin in ships, and her sailors and gunners are probably superior to the Austrians, whose short seaboard greatly reduces the general seaman quality of the bluejackets. She has, in addition, the direct aid of French and British naval detachments. But there are many other factors than mere chips and guns, and Italy's difficulties are much increased by them. In the consideration of these difficulties, a map. even of very moderate dimensions, showing the Adriatic Sea, is of great help. Since Italy declared war, a number of events of a naval character have taken place. A blockade has been maintained by a cordon of Allied vessels somewhere about the southern end of the Adriatic, with the main base probably at Taranto, in the gulf of that name, and a secondary base at Brindisi. Without a large action, Austria can scarcely disturb that blockade. There have been small and unimportant skirmishes between email craft, in various places. In the course of the policing operations, the Italians had the large cruiser Amalfi torpedoed on 7th July. Of more significance are the eeveral raids made by the two fleets for the purpose of shelling the enemy coasts. One of these was earned out by the' Italians on the 18th July, against Cattaro, where a, number of Austrian warships were in shelter; and the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi was sunk by a submarine at the close of the operation, of which otherwise the actual results are doubtful. The Italians have also carried out some minor bombardments at and near Monfalcone. On the^ other hand, the Austrians have several times sent detachments, most of which seem to have been of small, fast vessels, such as destroyers, to shell the east coast of Italy; and this work has cost little or nothing in the way of reprisal. The coastal conditions of the two countries lead naturally to some such result. It will be seen from the map that, on the whole of the east coast of Italy, there is not a single shelter port. The lagoon 011 wliich Venice stands, and several others further south, are of no value to a fleet ; the coast is practically unbroken, and the nearest naval harbour Tiranto. More than that, for over 250 miles southward of Ravenna, and again in a second short stretch still further south, the coast is closely followed by the great railway from Bologna to Brindisi and Otranto. Probably nearly the whole of this coastwise railway is vulnerable from ihe sea; and it is, from its length and ,the comparative poverty of network lines, of great value commercially and otherwise. It is this railway ivliich has from time to time been attacked by the enemy's ships, and though the actual damage done by any one attempt may be slight and easily repaired, the cumulative effect of repeated attacks is bound to be important and a <serioua handicap. Now consider that the Adriatic is nowhere more than 120 miles wide; that is, in terms of a high-speed destroyer, four hours wide; and that the chances in favour of a raiding squadron < evading detection on its way to mischief are by no means small; arid it will be seen that Italy's east coast is very vulnerable, while Italy's ships tend all the time to be tethered to the southern end of the Sea. The Austrian Coast (of Istria and Dalmatia) is of an entirely different character. Adding them altogether, there is but a short length of Austrian railway exposed to sea attack. Where the lines are so exposed, there are alternative routes (as in the Italian peninsula) or they are of minor importance. In addition, and very greatly assisting in the defence of the snore, the coast is everywhere indented with a multitude of bays, and over the greater^ part of its length it is > screened^ by the islands of the Dalmatian Archipelago. Even further, the military importance of the coast is concentrated at a few points, especially Trieste, Pola, _ and Fiume, and all of these are fortified and practically forbidden to attack. Where there are no fortifications the minor importance of a successful raid is offset by the risk that the attackers may be running into an ugly submarine danger. The naval problem of the Adriatic has resolved itself into much the same sort of situation as arose in the North Sea prior to the abandonment of German naval raids. The Austrian fleet, in recognition of the superiority of its adversary, has so far declined a serious battle, and has retired to tho safety of fortified harbours. The rest of the coast is too unimportant to be worth attacking against unknown risks. The hidden fleet is able for the present to content itself with wasp-like attacks, flying in, stinging, and flying away again. There is for the Italian navy the proBpect that it may be called upon to assist the army now fighting its way across the Isonzo in a.n attack upon Trieste; and here again the strength of the Austrian position, arising from the geography of the Adriatic, is undeniable. Pola, where the greater part of the fleet is probably kept, is about seventy miles away.* It and Trieste are both very heavily fortified. Even apart from the intervention, of Austrian warships, the work that the Italian fleet might do against the coast, in covering the advance of an army along the sea road to Trieste, is much limited by the outward fortifications of Trieste. The vessels carrying out *ach a plan would, if they were not immediately engaged by the Austrian fleet, be working for a, considerable time a long way from their baee. They would almost inevitably suffer damage, and their chances of reaching port for repair, as against those of damaged adversaries, is more or le6s in proportion to the distance they would have to go. Taranto is more than five hundred miles from Trieste. Such a distance is a serious handicap upon a fleet that is engaged upon a prolonged operation.