Evening Post. MONDAY, JUNE 7, 1915. THE DARDANELLES PROBLEM

Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 133, 7 June 1915, Page 6

Evening Post. MONDAY, JUNE 7, 1915. THE DARDANELLES PROBLEM

Mr. Winston Churchill is impulsive, and sometimes dictatorial, but he is not a petty egotist. An egotistical man might have sulked in his tent on having to quit such a, post as that of First Lord of the Admiralty, and might have refused to accept any subordinate rank in a Ministry of which he had so long been a leading member. Not so Mr. Churchill. He has stuck to the ship, has resolutely kissed the rod of adversity, and to that extent has shown himself to be possessed of courage and dignity of a high order. It is quite easy for him to make out a case for his Admiralty Administration. Assuming for argument's sake that the attempt to force the Dardanelles with the " surplus fleet " was a first-class blunder ; assuming that Mr. Churchill was responsible for this blunder and the loss of pre-Dread-nought battleships, and also that he exceeded his duty in connection with such dubious expedients as the naval expedition to Antwerp, the fact still remains that his mobilisation of an instantlyready fleet, on the -eve of war, was a stroke which in magnitude of results would counterbalance all the other errors. Warned by , the Agadir crisis of 1911 (when Germany nearly went to war, but decided to wait till the Kiel Canal was deepened), Mr. Churchill, succeeding at the Admiralty the unbrilliant Mr. M'Kenna, bentf all his energies to securing real preparedness in the fleet, in what he claims with some reason to be '"the most important period in our nava^ history.'* While most people will concede him the measure of justification which is his. many will not accept his contention that it is the duty of the press to abstain fiom criticising leaders and "to sustain public confidence." Tf

creating an atmosphere of false optimism, it is a policy that has been tried and found wanting. Had criticism been more free, the British Ministry would not have waited till the tenth month of the vtir before pruning its dead branches, and the munitions supply would probably have been in a better position. It is true, as Mr. Churchill says, that the nation, both in the factory and in the field, must organise. But first of all the people must be made to see the vital necessity of organisation. On the subject of the campaign in ! Turkey-in-Europe, Mr Churchill spoke with his accustomed eloquence. It is true that there has seldom (if ever) been a. subsidiary operation which stood in closer and more important relation — strategically, politically, and economically — with the decision in the mam theatre. Strategically, the conquest of Turkey-in-Europe means opening the Black Sea-Mediterranean waterways for the passing either way of men (which Russia- has) and of munitions (which she lacks). Economically, it means the release of Russian exports and the replenishing of the grain supplies of the. Western Allies. Politically, even a. small advance in Gallipoli — carrying with it the destruction of the Narrows forts — ma.y mean the gaining of powerful allies in the) Balkans, which would in turn involve the speedy collapse of T^nrkey-in-Eui'ope. It is this possibility, greatly shoi-tening the Turkish campaign of the Anglo-French, armies, that offers the greatest prospect; it is a more tangible advantage than "the destruction of the enemy's army," for Mr • Churchill does not mention the fact that the Turkish army will almost certainly, in the last i resort, concentrate in Asia, and the conquest of Asiatic Turkey is another story altogether. Where the real gain lies is in the ousting of the Turk from Europe ; thft reopening of the Black Sea.; the resumption of the Russian trade in food and arms ; the release of British, French, and Russian troops for their main work in the central theatre; the possible transport of a Russian army to places outside Russia, such as Servia.; and the consequent concentration of properly equipped armies against all sides of the German-Austrian position. In this sense it is true that (he conquest of the few miles of ridge and scrub — now separating the -Anglo-French armies from Kilid Bahr and tho other forts at the Narrows—is one of the shortest paths to triumph and peace. It is certainly the shortest path to securing Balkan allies., and the other things will follow in tb^ir due sequence. Therefore, the operation in which so much New Zealand and Australian blood has been shed will, if successful, result in no mere newspaper victory, but in "a formidable fact shaping the destinies of nations and shortenirfg the duration of the war." It is good to think that, though in a subsidiary theatre, our soldiers are part of a mighty leverage operation affecting the whole great conflict; and when, in 6pite of submarine at sea and counter-attack on shore, "the few miles of ridge and scrub" are won — even if it requires trench and sap to do it — the Australian and New Zealand forces will have had their share in a success of the first magnitude.