PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 132, 5 June 1915, Page 5

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

ARMIES MOVE ON SHELLS LLOYD GEORGE'S SERMON. THE ANCHORED BRITISH LINE. The striking speech 6"f Mr. Lloyd George to the maker* of war munitions at Manchester tells plainly enough why) the Germane have not been ousted fi'bin France. It is for tho samd reason that the Russians have' lately been driven back in Galicia. The P.Ussiaiiß did not give all that ground for strategic reasons ; there were no strategic reasons. They Were utterly unable to hold it against the German fire. .The moro clearly it ie understood that this is tba caep. that German superiority of fifo »• Galjcia means German advance, and that the lack of a groat superiority of fire among the Allies means standstill in thei west, the sooner the people \vi\t grasp Hie reality of their task. The sooner they realise just what is needed to win. and supply it, the sooner the war will end. Much has been said at various times of the Allies having shown a marked superiority in artillery. They have gained the upper hand by the constant addition of new guns of all calibres : and they have enormously increased the' value of those guns' by a superiority in the air about which there can be no doubt. But the value of superiority in guns can only be realised it the guns are fed with ammunition at a rate which will enable the commanders to put out of their mind all question of what resources are behind them. It has appeared at times that tho French Army has had large 'reserves of artillery ammunition; and it may be free from much of the anxiety which is actuating the British. Bui even if the French are well supplied, the, position cannot bo strategically sound till the British arc. too. 'Past events have shown that it iff ni the northern sector, the Flanders front, that a decision may be expected ,m the west. The French hammered for weeks on end at a few miles of front between Reims and the Forest of the Argonne. They made slow progress, but* there was no sign of a German collapse. The St. Mihiel pocket has been speci. ally attacked with considerable success, but even if it collapses, the German' line is not necessarily broken. The French have lately made a marked advance south of La Bassee, but they cannot pursue; it indefinitely till the British on their left are able to move on, too; in fact the one must support the other. The British army holds only about tinny miles of front, but it, is 'thirty miles of the most important part, and the British army, in its post of honour, must be helped to carry out its import-ant work not merely as a support of tho French, butas an equal collaborator. It has done wonders, as the records of the Yser, Neuve Chapelle, Hill 60. and many other fights show ; but the wonders have been performed with the magic of the big gun, and the nevev-f ailing shell. Tho 1 Army will do more wonders when Air. Lloyd George's requirements are carried out. In the meantime, it can fight nobly for an indefinite period, holding" its ground, sapping and mining, digging its way towards Germany, and eelliilp every life for a price much higher than tho enemy cah afford. But, it cahnot' get up and walk ahead. / WHY PRZEMYSL FELL. " ' The loss of Przemysl to the Russians robs them, as was pointed out yesterday, of a powerful support for their- centre, which happens, also, .to bo the weakest part of the line. North of Przemysl the Russians have over mo&t of their front tho advantage of a large jjyer, which they expected to be able to hold with comparative ease. The fact that t,he passage of the San was forced only proves the,, terrific weight of the German attack. Eastward of Przemysl, except in its, immediate vicinity, the Russians ha\o behind them tho long defensible obstacle of the Dniester, upon which they onn.ivtii'e whenever* it becomes necessary. Przemysl helped to hold tho gap between the rivers, and acted as a straining-post which could take much of tho tension oxci'ted by thn enemy on the Russinti fronts, now that tho fortress is lost, its importance lends to be minimised ; and the Russian authorities suggest that the fortress cp;»ld not lituc been held. From n co-ordination of the various reports, Russian and ftiemy. it can be gathered that the fall of Przemysl was due to the defeat of the Russian field armies, enabling the enemy to get within efficient gun range bf-Bomc of the northern forts; the bad repair ot tneso forts, which the Russians had not had time to repair since the Auetnans wrecked them before their surrender in March; the exhaustion, in the case of some of the forts, of the Hudelan ammunition, and the threatened cutting off hi Przcmysl from Lembct-g by the shelling of the great eastern railway and road — the .only line of colnmnntration left to tho Russians. According to tho Russian account received tin's morning, the west and north front wove actually evacuated on Wednesday night, after the Austrian booty captured ttlicn the siege ended had been removed. The enemy entered the town that night and the following morning. t It is highly probable that if the Russians had expected the sudden turn of cyeiitfi which, in Irs3 than a month, hurled them back upoii tho San, tljey would ha\o been able, to defend Przemysl longer. aj|d to have secured the advantages which it undoubtedly possessed.' 1 To do that they need have organised extended temporary fortifications T)eyoad

the outer line of the forts — a system of defence which has been thoroughly tested and proved, in the case of Verdun. It seems to be the only system which can save permanent forts from big guns — the very things which struck the first and heaviest blows at Przemysl. A very important difference exists in the circumstances of this fall, and that of March. At the close of the Russian siege, when the Austrians surrendered, the fortress yielded over 100,000 prisoners of war and a very large number of guns ; and, still mca-e important, the surrender released perhaps a full quarter of a million Russian soldiers to pursue their work ir a new sphere. On this occasion, the Russians seem to have lost little besides the position ; and the enemy have not added a new force to their own armies. $}Ie events in the Balkan "provinces Jlßve not been clearly presented > in the (table messages, because at no time has «p adequate idea been given of tho importance of the German objective or of the forces engaged. .Petoograd has latterly reported, however, a considerable recovery, and the latest news is that the Germans in th© recently captured port of Libau have been cut off from the rest of the land forces by a Russian amy in the south, and can only escape by sea. Providing that the enemy have not large land forces available elsewhere in the Baltic Provinces, the German garrison ''of Libau— probably not very large — is in a bad way. • RUMANIA AND BULGARIA. If Rumania and Bulgaria really hay© agreed, as the Petit Parisien reports, to enter 4 the war simultaneously against Austna and Turkey, a /most important decision, with a deen influence on future events, has been quietly arrived at. It means that the huge spectacle afforded ;by the Austro-German flood pouring' from the West to the San has failed to impress the Rumanians, just as it failed to impress Italy. Since the great retreat from the Dunajec, little has been heard of the Russian campaign in Bukowina, where for some time there was a flourishing advance described in certain quarters as setting off the, German gains in the west. This advance has had to be abandoned, thougn apparently the 'Russians have held their ground. It is probable that the Russians in Galicia can just about join hands with Rumania without leaving the enemy's country, or could do so with an effort. The Rumanian entry, followed by a vigorous advance into Bukowina and Transylvania, is a shock which the Austro-German combination is not at all likely to relish. As for Bulgaria's part of th© contract, it will not concern Germany or Austria very seriously in the direct sense, for* neither of t these nations .has been. able to do much for Turkey ye£, and nothing more can be done. Bulgaria has an army which in the present circumstances ought to be able to overwhelm Turkey-in-Europe in short order. Turkey, is -already so occupied in many quarters — the Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkish Transcaucasia, and Mesopotamia among them 1 — that a new campaign ought to set up an intolerable strain. There has been talk of making peace already; peace is likely to be a very insistent cry" if Bulgaria comes into 'Turkey as an enemy ; and, the price is not likely to cause much hesitation. Joint action between ,Buljaria and Rumania would give the Allies at least four times as much help as th© intervention of either without an understanding. Neither could take up arms for a foreign war without at th© same time leaving a hug© frontier guard against the other; for thee« Balkans are not philanthropic States. With an agreement, however, virtually. the whole of both armies is available.