WAR RE-CREATES THE FRENCH ARMY

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 138, 8 December 1914, Page 6

WAR RE-CREATES THE FRENCH ARMY

The French Corffmander-in-Chief is reported to have said, in conversation with an officer, that "the coming victory is a mathematical certainty." If this conversation is authentic, it is encouraging to the Allies' side, and, we may Venture to hope, not unreasonably so. Provided it is a fact, as is freely alleged, that the French army, for various reasons, failed to do itself justice in August, it is equally true that the same army has now beon knocked into' shape, and is coming into the ascendant at a, time when the wonderful German military machine has passed its zenith In the disastrous August days the on-rushing Germans conspicuously failed to destroy the tottering army of France, and they are very much more unlikely to achieve a decisive success at this stage, when the clock for them is receding, while for Franc© it is advancing. In the official French report of the war, published yesterday, a significant veil covers the August fighting, but General Joffre's remark that reliable Generals have been substituted for those "found wanting" tells all that is needed. In very truth, the French Commander-in-Chief's heavy task has been to forge, in war, the weapon, with which he has to fight For a wliile it appeared as if the whole foundry would be overturned in tho forging, but now it is plain that tho crisis has been passed and that France will not again fight at such a disadvantage. The French military machine is to-day, says General Joffre, in »ucb. * state that "the German attaqlc will dash itself against it in vain" ; whereforo Ihe Fitincb higher command will got fed djfljoftyM ksJk £eHWY,*J ol &».

Flanders battle, but will rather prefer to see the German corps driven against impregnable lines than diverted to Poland, where the Kussians are fighting a full and free encounter battle, with a, mihimum of trench and a maximum of shock. The relation of the two war-bheatres is too intimate to allow of their being considered apart. The western Allies are prepared to stand firm while Russia advances; but if Germany continues to transfer troops eastward, a converse position may arise, and the French are no longer to be regarded a* incapable of taking th« offensive. The bulk of the evidence is that Prance started the war badly, with her main concentration in the wrong place, and that, where her plans were good, the execution was bad. Concentration was slow, and the Belgian frontier waa in the first instance neglected, possibly because France, regarding British intervention as certain in the event of a violation of Belgium's neutrality, calculated that Germany would, for that reason, not attempt to march through Belgium. But while France knew that Britain would intervene in Belgium's cause, Germany seems to have persistently refused to believe that peaceful Britain would embroil herself for "a scrap of paper." Dr. yon BethmannEollwdg's interview with the British Ambassador is not the only evidence of this A Reuters message affirms that there is official correspondence in Rome showing that Italy vainly warned Austria that Russia would fight, and later told both Germany and Austria that Germany's intervention would inevitably mean Britain's participation in the war To this Berlin and Vienna both replied that "they were convinced that at the last moment Britain would not assume the risk of undertaking a European war." Gambling on that last moment, German diplomacy committed itself too deeply, and France' theii found herself with a British 'ally at het side and a Belgian campaign confronting her. The statement in the French official report that "We were, unable to engage the enemy until the British came into line, and we therefore sought to retain as many army corps as possible in Alsace-Lorraine," is unconvincing, but that point need not be pressed The main fact is that at the outset "the French army fell short both in efficiency and in numbers, and now it 'iromises to make good in both. Re,3atedly the question has been asked why it is that France, with four million trained men and the support of Britain and Belgium, has hot expelled from France a, million and a-half or two million Germans? Seeking to answer this question, the military correspondent of The Times, who has reasons for not digging too deeply, says that "probably, though France had the trained men stated, neither France, nor Germany, nor England ever seriously contemplated that it would be necessary to place such vast forces in the field as wo are dealing with to-day. . . In time, the weight of France will be brought to bear, but for the time our AJly has just as many men in reserve as we have here, and partly for reasons which are more or less identical." In short, Germany was in a state of reasonable readiness; France was not. Of course, it is a big advantage, in the matter of military preparations, to know when you are going to war; and Germany settled this, and many other things, beforehand.