PROGRESS OF THE WAR THE THORN-PLOCK BATTLE

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 122, 19 November 1914, Page 8

PROGRESS OF THE WAR THE THORN-PLOCK BATTLE

ALLEGED GERMAN VICTORY OVER RUSSIANS. ' In what may be called the Thorn or Vistula section of the Polish horseshoe, the Germans continue to claim a victory. Here the German main position may be summed up as running from the neighbourhood of Soldau to Thorn (on the Vistula) and south-west to Gnesen. Taking the same order, the Russian lines were based recently on Ulawa, Plock (on the Vistula), and Kutno. On both sides' of the Vistula, but particularly between that river and the Warthe, a great battle has been in pro gresß. Whether the Kaiser's congratulations of the enterprising General Yon Hindenburg are premature remains to be seen. Even if the Russian advance guards have been driven back on Plock and Kutno, such an event would probably not amount to a decision ; certainly it would not be nearly so decisive and sweeping in character a-s the Germans' recent retreat from tne middle Vistula to Kalisz, the Sile&ian front, and Cra«ow. The | importance of the fortunes of the Russians on the Vistula between Plock and Thorn is that they are there covering the right flank of their central armies. General Yon Hindemmrg's success would hamper the Russian attacks upon the , Warthe and the OderATTRITION THE DECIDING FACTOR. One of the indications of the war is that a huge modern army is almost indestructible if fairly well handled. In older times, when the forces were less numerically, there was always a chance that a healthy panic would affeel all hands. Nowadays the numbers are so large, the reserves so numerous and bo strongly escheloned, and the contingent lines of defence so well prepared in ad- ] vance (exemplified by the German rally on the fortified Aisne after the retreat from the Marne) that to destroy a whole ! army is a very difficult thing indeed. A disorderly retreat of five or even fifty j miles may be costly in life and prestige, ! but the huge army as a whole never seems to get beyond a rallying-point. The deciding factor appears to be .attrition ; and that, with millions in arms ? tneans a long time. On the Russian frontier, according to an estimate' by the military .correspondent of The Times, Germany has two million troops, Russia three and a-half millions. Even if the Russian right wing has been bent back on the Vistula — and Petrograd has not admitted it— the battle wil' still ba to the strong. GERMANS' "SOLE ADVANTAGE." Though recent cablegrams make more mention than has hitherto been made of the destructive power of the British and French .big guna, most of the letters from the front agreo as to the superiority of the Germans in heavy artillery and in machine guns. Writing in The Times, "A Neutral" (who spent a period -with the German army in Belgium) says:— "To every infancy regiment there aTe attached come ten or twelve machine guns that are kept concealed in light regimental transport; they- are without wheels, are carried by hand, and can be quickly moved from j one position to another in the firing line. 'The preponderance in numbers of this important defensive and, ac the Germans use it, offensive arm of the service cannot be over-estimated. Their possession has changed German infantry tactics. Accuracy of individual rifle fire has been subordinated to showers of shrapnel, to sweeping streams of lead and to continued levelled volleys of musketry at given ranges. Trusting to clearing the way in this fashion, infantry are moved forward in great masses. The , carnage suffered in their advances is thus explained." "A Neutral" goes on so far as to say that the German foot, soldier is now but a support to machine gun and artillery fire. He sums up : "To put the matter in a few words, the sole advantage possessed, at the present by the German army is the possesion of the heavy artillery, the great siege guns, and the preponderance of machine guns. Their individual rifle fire is, as a rule, inferior to the French, and cannot for a- moment be compared to the accuracy or efficiency of the British." AN EXPERT'S SUMMING-UP. In a batch of letters from British combatants at the front, published in The Times, a number of references to the German big guns appear, but there is no striking evidence as to "actual damage. One letter refers to the war as "nothing but an artillery duel." In the same issue of The Times, the military correspondent of that paper remarks : "It is true that the heaviest German ordnance outranges ours, as the Boer Long Toms did at first in South Africa, but it has been found that the projectiles of the German heavy guns, useful as they are for destroying villages or permanent defences, have little effect upon field fortifications, and when the shells burst they do as little damage in the field as those of the Boer heavy guns." The medical evidence is that most of the wounds, and the worst wounds, are caused by shrapneL but this, of course, is largely the work of field artillery, in which the Germans are probably inferior. "From a doctor's point of view a bullet wound is almost negligible, unless it has shattered a bone or passed through some organ. But a shrapnel bullet, wherever its hits, is bound to be serious. Its velocity is that of a bumble-bee as compared with a swallow, and it will do its best to carry a mass of extraneous matter, such as a , large portion of trouser leg or dirty sock, into the jagged wound. Add to this a long spell of waiting in the trenches, and you have all the makings of a case of tetanus." GUNS MAKE "SIEGE-BATTLES." Artillery, it is scarcely necessary to add, played a great part in the defence of the position which the Germans took up on the Aisne, after the retreat from the Marne. The utmost was got out of the artillery because the Germans had prepared the Aiane position, and this side of their plan speaks much for their prudence, as it shows that in making their rush to the Marne they provided for failure as well as for success. In the words of the observant "eye-witness present with British General Headquarters," "there is no doubt that the position on the Aisne was not hastily selected by the German staff after the retreat had begun. From the choice of ground and the care -with which the fields of fire have been arranged to cover all possible avenues of approach, and fiom the amount of work already carried out, it is clear that the contingency of having to act on the defensive was not overlooked when the details of the strategically offensive campaign were_ arranged." Referring to the approximation of the Aisne "battle" to siege warfare, the "eye-witness" remarks that this is due "first, to the immense power of_ resistance possessed by an army which is amply equipped with heavy artillery and has sufficient time - to fortify itself; and, secondly, to the vast size of the forces engaged." JAPAN AND TURKEY. The Japanese Ambassador has left Constantinople, and this apparently means war between Japan and Turkey. Though there may be two readings of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was quite within her rights in interpreting the Alliance ac against Germany, for German Kaio-chau is

within the geographical area,, Eastern China and India, mentioned in the Alliance. Turkish hostilities have 60 far not entered that area, but it is quite competent for Japan, in such a world-conflict, to declare war against her ally's enemies, whether under the express terms of the Alliance or not. If Turkey moved the Afghans to attack India, then the expreßS- occasion would at once be provided. In the wider aspect, there is yet no certainty that the Japanese .will not take their place with other Asiatics in the European battle-field. However, Persia, Asia Minor, and Egypt are nearer to Japan, and would therefore be more convenient fields of action if the Turkish conflagration spread. The Japanese may De regarded as a fire brigade held in reserve. How far away was the Canopus when the late Admiral Cradock wirelessed to her his ill-fated resolve to fight the superior' enemy? That important que* tion is so far unanswered., but it would appear that the Canopus was not near enough to take part. The armour of the Good Hope and the Monmouth was clearly vulnerable to the fire of the Binch guns of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau; the light cruiser Glasgow was countered by the Nurnberg ; and the converted liner Otranto hardly counted j so the battle which the British admiral sought offered but the smallest prospect of success. Too much was expected from personnel.