A DAMNING INDICTMENT

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 106, 31 October 1914, Page 6

A DAMNING INDICTMENT

It would be hard to imagine a more wholesale indictment of a mine-manageme-nt than that contained within the twelve pages of the report of the Royal Commission on the Runtly disaster. "A manager," reports the Commission, "has not only to comply with the requirements of the law, but he has a duty to his fellow man beyond mere statutory obligations." From both standpoints, the legal as well as. the moral, the management of Ralph's colliery stands utterly condemned. Where the law— -a notoriously weak one — did not reach, the management did not seek to make up for statutory shortcomings by voluntary actions prompted by the higher .motive of duty. And even where the laAv did reach, it was broken in a manner which, to the uninitiated, may seem almost incredible. For instance, non-inspection of the old workingß, and non-locking of the doors lepaxating them from the

working places, were both neglects in contravention of the Act or the Rules, without, which "the disaster in the mine could not have happened." As to the failure to provide safety lamps, that may or may not be a direct breach of the quite inadequate law governing the mining industry; but here again the Commission finds occasion to remark, intone equally damnatory: "If Mr. Fletcher had performed his obvious duty in causing safety lamps only to be used in Ralph's colliery, the disaster would never have occurred." Also, Mr. Fletcher had had "ample warnings by previous explosions." As a result of neglect of these warnings, an explosion originated by a naked light in No. 6 bord in the old workings in Ralph's colliery swept 43 miners into eternity. What more need be said I Law, or a sense of duty, requires a mine manager to prevent, by means of ventilation, the accumulation of magazines of explosive gas. In case it may accumulate without his knowledge, he or his agents are required to regularly inspect and test the mine in order to detect its presence. As a second safeguard, he should fence off and securely lock old workings, specially liable to gas-emissions. As a third and very vital safeguard, he should compel the use of safety lamps when there have been "ample warnings" of the presence of dangerous gas.. On the same principle, if a man unlawfully keeps an open barrel of gunpowder in ' his bed' room, and heglects to close the door, he will at any rate not allow his neighbour to enter with a naked light. Bub what happened ir Ralph's mine? "In contravention of Special Rule 1," reports the Commission, " the manager did not sec that the mine was properly ventilatrd in all parts, and did not see that the working of the mine was carried on with all reasonable provisions for the safety of the persons employed. In contravention of Special Rule 16, the door for ventilation and safety purposes connecting bord No. 6, in which the disaster occurred, with the working portion of No. 5 district, and which was only used occasionally, was not locked, or even provided with a lock. In contravention of Special Rule 18, the old workings and return air-courses of the mine, also bords 4, 5, and 6, No. 6 district, were inadequately fenced, persons being therefore liable to inadvertently enter the same. Notwithstanding re- j peated ignitions and explosions in Ralph's and the adjoining Extended colliery, any | one of which might have created a disaster, the manager continued to permit naked lights to be used, although under Special Rule 14 it was his duty to direct the underviewer to see that locked safety lamps only were used, and naked lights excluded, wheresoever and whensoever danger from firedamp was apprehended." What stronger censure was ever passed upon any employer ! * Tlie quoted passage summarises the case against the management in the matter of inadequate ventilation, insufficient fencing of old workings, and lack of safety lamps. With regard to inspection (that is, by inspectors other than Government inspectors) the Royal Commission is equally emphatic. As far as old workings are concerned, the Commission finds that, generally speaking, inspection was inadequate, and ladders were not provided for testing high bords ; also, that, on the morning of the disaster, the part of the old workings where, the explosion originated was not inspected by any person before the workmen were permitted to enter. " The frequent occurrence of gas in the old workings was, in our opinion, a source of danger, and there is no evidence that No. 6 bord was examined on the morning of 12th September.' Had the provisions of the Act been strictly adhered to on that occasion the explosion would have been averted." In fact, the management failed to guard against the gas danger by (1) prevention— that is, ventilation; (2) detection— that is, inspection and efficient testing; and (3) protection— or, in other words, fencing off and locking. Having failed at all these three point*, the management also neglected to give the miner the equipment (safety lamps) that would have enabled him to enter the gas without forfeiting his life. There are other counts in the indictment, but these are enough. Surely the Commission has. laid at the door of tho Company a heavy reckoning. That section of the report dealing with the duties of Government officials will be considered in another article. t