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TORPEDOES IN PRACTICE

— IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR REMARKABLY INEFFECTIVE. In view of the prominent part already played by torpedoes in the war, it is of interest to survey tho -work they did in the Russo-Japanese war. It is well known, of course, that the range and accuracy, and perhaps the destructiveness, of modern torpedoes are far greater than was the case in 1904-05 ; but some ■conclusions, not altogether discomforting, are to be drawn from those Eastern battles. Russia did absolutely nothing with her torpedoes ; and until the final battle, Japan accomplished very poor results with tho costly arm, though she did exercise it to some extent. ' At Tsushima, as will be seen, some ships were sunk ; but the facts do not at all accord with the vivid idea many people have of the terrible havoc caused by the torpedo. The truth is that a torpedo is a marvellous weapon, and ? terrible one when it strikes ; but the difficulties of bringing it into effect can hardly be [ realised without much study. The naval operations of the war must be divided into two parts, one before and one after the arrival of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's fleet from the Baltic. During the first campaign, the Russian eastern fleet was practically wiped out. In this first campaign the Japanese had one torpedo vessel with five tubes, 19 destroyers with two tubes each and of from 29 to 32 knots speed, 58 firstclass and 27 second-class torpedo-boats with two and three tubes each ; and tho battleships and cruisers among them had 128 tubes— a total of about 350 torpedo tubes. The Russian fleet included 25 destroyers and an undetermined number of other torpedo-boats. The destroyers had two and three tubes each, and the battleships, cruisers, and other vessels had among them 84. In addition to those of the uncounted torpedo-boats there were 142 Russian tubes. These figures are not quoted as proving anything more than that there was ample material for torpedo attacks if the opportunities had presented themselves or been put to good use. It was repeatedly reported that both sides had submarines, but there was no sign of any. being used at any time during the war. . AN ADMIRAL'S CONCLUSIONS. The net result of the first campaign, from the torpedo point of view, was summed up by Admiral Sir- Cyprian A. G. Bridge, in the Naval Annual. "Perhaps nothing stands out more clearly in the campaign," he says, "than the insignificance of the results effected by the locomotive torpedo. The many torpedocraft of the Russians did not discharge one torpedo among them. Their ships discharged several, but not one took effect. . . . The destroyer Lieutenant Burukoff was reduced to a sinking state by a Japanese torpedo, and it is the single case in. which the many attacks made on effective fighting vessels succeeded ; and .the fighting vessel which eventually sank, after being torpedoed, was, it should be noted, a small destroyer. The case of the Sevastopol (which will be referred to later) shows that to destroy even, an injured or waterlogged, ship in a fixed position a. great many torpedo attacks are necessary. "We are not to conclude that the locomotive torpedo is useless and a thing to be discarded entirely from naval equipment. The conclusion should be that it is a weapon >of limited efficiency, to be depended upon only in 1 special circumstances of infrequent occurrence. ' To found on it a system of tactics, & plan of campaign, or even a type of shiji design would be paralleled by founding a system of artillery tactics on the probable employment of the eabres carried by the gunners. It ie not too much to say that experience of the late campaign, confirming ac it does the arguments of students of tactics in these days of longrange guns, justifies a demand that torpedoes should be withdrawn from the. armament of cruisers and battleships." THE SEVASTOPOL'S SUFFERINGS. The Sevastopol,- to which reference is made by the Admiral, was twice damaged by mines, and was repaired. In the early part of December, 1904, she took refuge, in an injured and helpless condition, under Cheng-ten-Shan, where the Japanese shore guns, could not reach her. Here she was attacked by torpedo craft on 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th December. Her nets were lowered, and only 100 men were on board, and all her small quick-firing guns were landed. The torpedo-boats steamed past under heavy fire from the Russian forts., and at range of about 1200 yards fired their torpedoes, and firing their guns. Most of the torpedoes exploded in the nets, but after many failures a torpedo was at last got home. On the following day the captain took her out under her own steam and sank her in deep water. The Russians made no attempt to frustrate the attacks. The fact that a ship in a known position and in a helpless state could stand repeated torpedo attacks on successive days showed clearly that that form of assault is of limited efficiency. TOGO AND THE DESTROYERS. In the second campaign, in which Admiral Togo finally i crushed the Russian navy, torpedoes were used more effectively. The disabled Russian flagship Souvaroff was struck by a torpedo in the later stages of -the Battle of Tsushima, in the second of two dashing attacks by destroyer flotillas. She was kept afloat for some hours with great difficulty, and was found about 7 p.m. by cruisers and destroyers. A steamer which was with her was sunk by gunfire, and the destroyers attacked the disabled warship. In spite of her attempts to ward off the attack, .she was struck near the engines and also aft by two torpedoes from the destroyer Harusame, and sank at 7.20 p.m. She had floated five hours after being driven from the line, and two hours after the first successful torpedo attack. That night twenty Japanese destroyers and over sixty torpedo boats sallied out to destroy the pitiful remnants of the Russian fleet. Admiral Niebogatoff had nine ships with him, and said afterwards thatthe night fighting consisted of uninterrupted attacks by the flotillas, but they were long unsuccessful. By II o'clock, however, the' battleship Sisaoi Veliky and the armoured cruiser Admiral Machimoff were torpedoed, fell astern, and sunk in the forenoon; and at 2 o'clock in the nioming the coast defence ship Admiral Ouchikoff and tho battleship Navarin, which had been separated from the others, were found by destroyers. The Navarin, torpedoed twice,- sank quicftiy, but the other ship escaped, and was later sunk in an encounter with cruisers. The big cruiser' Vladimir Monomach was also torpedoed during the night, but continued to float.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19140925.2.12

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 75, 25 September 1914, Page 2

Word Count
1,105

TORPEDOES IN PRACTICE Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 75, 25 September 1914, Page 2

TORPEDOES IN PRACTICE Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 75, 25 September 1914, Page 2

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