THE GERMAN ARMY A MILITARY BUBBLE

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 70, 19 September 1914, Page 8

THE GERMAN ARMY A MILITARY BUBBLE

CAN BE EASILY PRICKED. DEFICIENT IN MANY WAYS. That German military power is a, highly-inflated bubble, of brilliant hues, but susceptible of being pricked and burst, because the German soldier is merely an automaton, incapable of adapting himself to circumstances to which he is unaccustomed, is the opinion of "En Avant," who contributes an article to the September issue of the London Magazine. The writer says lie is one who is no believer in the invincibility of the German Army. "I admit," he says, "that on paper the German Army is not only the greatest, but the most perfectlyorganised, army in the world ; but battles are not won by flourishing sheaves of statistics in the enemy's face, nor is there any sound criterion by which the worth of an army lor war can be judged in time of pt<*ce. There are a hundred and one qualities which are supposed theoretically to make for efficiency in an army, such as numbers, material, discipline, leading, physique, training, organisation, and so torth, but the great deciding factor — anil those who have as much modefn battlefield experience as myself will doubtless agree with me — Is the capacity o,f the individual soldier to endure "hardship, and bis individual determination to win through. Now, the German system of life and of military training is not designed to encourage individual effort, but rather to stultify it, and to reduce the individual man or unit to the state of a disciplined automaton. ORGANISATION BAD. "In most professions and trades such a training ie excellent, for by dint of much practice each individual and unit becomes 'past perfect' — each learns to fit into his appointed place, just as do the component parts of nicely-adjusted pieces of mechanism. The business of an army, however, differs from any other, but it cannot be practised in peace-time. What men do at manoeuvres is no criterion whatever of what they will do in war. An army can never really practice war until it is in the presence of the onemvl The army that has not been provenj in' war is like' the piece of machinery that has never been se.t in motion. Now., the more nicely-adjusted the machine, the more fatal will be the catastrophe when anything unforeseen; occurs— take 'the Titanic as an example — and it is common knowledge that it (i&( i& always the unexpected that does occur in war-time. Wherefore, an army should be as elastic as possible in its organisation and training. This is precisely what the German Army is not. . "The German Army is' obedient to' a' rule of thumb. To the German tactician the science of warfare is cut and dried. Officers and men alike know what they ought to do under., a hundred different conditions; they learn it all bjf heart, and when those conditions arise they act correctly, because they know their work by heart. But, supposing, as will invariably happen, other conditions arise, conditions the antidote to which has not been studied, what will happen? Untaught to think or act for themselves, they will ransack their memories for the correct reply. Under modern conditione pf warfare, the best soldier is he who knows how to 'muddle through,' and how to 'carry on' when, in a tight place, without waiting for instructions. , ERADICATING INDIVIDUALISM. ' ■ ■"The whole training of the German I soldier is designed to eradicate individualism, and -,to reduce soldiers, battalions, regiments, and brigades to a state of iron-bound automatism. If the enemy's action' cdtild 'bo equally reduced," then such training would be perfect; but, as things are, I maintain that it is fatal, for it entirely destroys the personal factor, and it is only the personal factor of each individual in an army which will carry that army to victory under modern conditions of warfare. The German officer relies only upon discipline, and he runs the risk of being let down at the crucial moment. Courage, determination, 'amour propre,' and individual enterprise are all stronger than the fear of death, but it has yet to be proven that the modern. educated man will risk death rather than contravene discipline. Wherefore I maintain that in our prepent state of civilisation the German system of organisation and training is fundamentally wrong." IMPOSSIBLE EVOLUTIONS. , The writer says that .seven, times in the past ten years he has been present at the German grand manoeuvres, but he never saw elsewhere manoeuvres carried out with so little regard to the possibilities of modern fighting. At manoeuvres the German soldier or officer was taught to do things which he could not possibly perform it the enemy were using ball cartridge. Whole brigades of cavalry swept down upon unbroken infantry in most gallant fashion, and the umpires .encouraged the sport. It was, perhaps, ''magnificent,, but it was not War." What wouldbe the mental attitude of poor fellows when they tried those child's tricks in real battle against an" enemy? The first result would bo a heavy deathroll, and then a dead stop of the machinery whilst the officers reconsidered the position. As regards the soldier, the bolts that held the military machine together would" be loosened, the machine would Tattle and refuse to work. TECHNICAL WEAKNESSES.' The German cavalry were to be seen at their best when delivering an impossible charge, -but the German was neither a horseman nor a horsemaster ; as a scout he was beneath contempt. The German iufantryman had two great faults: He was too fat, and tried to carry too much weight on his back, with the result that he could neither march far nor fast. When in close formation the work of the infantry was distinctly good, and their drill was splendid, but once the men got into anything approaching open order all initiative ceased. The German infantryman lacked the clash of the French, the doggedness of the Russian, the fatalism of the, TuTk, or the practical adaptability of his British rival. As regarded the artillery, it was very difficuk to speak, but at manoeuvres it Was impossible to judgo the vital points of picking up tho target and hitting it, and such statistics as from time to time leaked- out were meant for foreign consumption, and were unreliable. The German engineer was too theoretical. Given the necessary material and unlimited time, he would construct the moat model works imaginable, but in warfare what was wanted was a man "who would contrive the essential out of the most unpromising material, and in the shortest possible space of time. "I have likened the Gorman Army to a machine," the writer adds, "but it is one in which all the parts are in an everlasting state of un-oiled friction against each other." The New Zealand Club will entertain Mr. Frank Hurley at luncheon on Tuesday next. Mr. Hurley was the official photographer of tho Mawson Expedition, and is going in the samo capacity with tho Shackloton -Expedition. Miss' Ro'we announces in our advertising columns that her assemblies are held every Monday and Wednesday in PonBonby Hall, Abel Smith-6treet. This hall has been enlarged; tho supprr-room has seating capacity for a hundred people..