SUBMARINE MINES THEIR NATURES AND USES

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 70, 19 September 1914, Page 3

SUBMARINE MINES THEIR NATURES AND USES

TERRIBLE EASTERN RECORD BAD FOR FRIEND, FOE, AND NEUTRAL. (For 'I'he Post.) The earlier chapters of the war, from the very beginning, have, been punctuated by a series of tragedies due to the explosion of submarine mines. It needed no far-seeing prophet to have foretold that the sowing of the high seas and the lanes of traffic with vast bombs would be more than a menace to neutral ships ; the unforeseen thing was that Germany would have committed such a breach of the ordinary decencies of civilisation. During ' the discussion of the ■subject at the last Hague Peace Conference, the German representative declined to bind his country not to use submarine mines of uncontrolled types, but left it to be assumed that his attitucTe was only based on a sort of dignified independence, and that, though leaving herself free, Germany would not arm herself in the common waterways. she filled the North Sea with mines, and the list of neutral ships, the loss of neutral property, and the toll, of neutral lives lost will tot up into a most formidable bill. Britain, at whose shipping (war and mercantile) the mines were aimed, set herself the duty of raking them up, and apparently she has rid the world of the greater part of the menace, for the accidents have been notably fewer lately. It is worthy of note that Germany, as the belligerent using the mines, has suffered along with other nations by their impartial action upon vessels luckless enough to strike tham. Submarine mines, of whatever variety they may be, consist of a steel or iron shell, usually spherical, and perhaps four feet in diameter, containing a large charge of explosive, usually guncotton. The size of the mine and the amount of explosive depends entirely on the 'taste and fancy of the user, whose object is to secure the maximum effect for -a reasonable cost. With a very big charge, the disaster is all the more certain, even if >the vessel attacked is some little distance from the mine. There is sufficient air-space in the body of the mine to make it buoyant, so that it has to be anchored. Within the explosive is the firing-gear, automatic or electrical, and the detonator which explodes the charge itself. THE VARIOUS KINDS OF" MlfrES. No nation has much objection to mines properly controlled. The trouble is caused by those which, once put into the water, remain a danger till they ara removed or exploded. It is worth while roughly to describe the various kinds of controlled and uncontrolled mines. • When it is desired to protect a harbour by mines, a "field" may be laid down either permanently or on the perception of approaching danger, and armed with observation mines. There are various kinds, ot course, but they are all controlled by electricity. In a somewhat primitive type, the firing alone is done by electricity. On the approach of a hostile vessel, observers take her bearings Until she comes within the known danger zone of some part of the field, "press the button, and the mine does the rest." This is a kind of mine which can be laid down for a comparatively long' period) and firmly anchored at such a. depth that no vessel, friendly ■or hostile, will touch it; and it thus constitutes no serious danger to anybody,. A second type, which is much more „ frequently used, is more elaborate. Within each mine is a cylinder containing quite a pretty set of gear, in which a. portion, very attractive to the eye, is a. shining steel ball which swings delicately on a spring. It is carefully connected to slender levers that operate an electrical contact. There is no need specially to watch the hostile vessel in this case, provided she is known to be hostile. Thg mine is its own look-out. It is anchored at a depth within the draught of the vessel, and when she touches it, the delicato pos& of the "inertia ball" is disturbn3, the electrical contact is established, and the identity of the mine affected is signalled to the men in the'observation station. If they desire to blow up the ship, their part is again the simple one of pressing the button — a trifling act quite out of proportion to the responsibility it involves. Such mines as these cannot, of course, be left long in a frequented waterway. They are liable to be cut open and exploded by the slicing of a propeller-blade ; and the delicacy of the observation gear within them makes them short-lived if they are not periodically cared for. That they shall remain in good order is provided for by the electrical devices, because each can be tested by the operators. A small current can be sent through the various parts of the electrical gear in each mine, and by the way each answers to the call the observers know whether it is alert and ready to respond to the more urgent summons to serious duty. BEYOND HUMAN CONTROL^ Of uncontrolled mines there are, roughly, two types, anchored and unanchored. Many respectable inventors and armament manufacturers have concerned themselves with anchored .mines, but there is a striking dearth of 'publicity regarding the free kind, just as there is concerning the bombs of dynamitards. As in the case of the bomb, almost anything will do, so long as it *s abominably dangerous. Usually the firing gear of a free mine is some simple but delicate mechanical arrangement, which collapses when, the mine is bumped, and operates a 'firing gear. Such loose mines are recognised by the Powers ah a means of driving a chasing ship from the wake of its prey, but they are after all ineffective for the purpose. But they are only openly recognised when they are made so that by the tune they have been in the ■water an hour they shall become harmless — a condition with which the German mines have certamly failed to comply. THE INGENIOQS ANCHORED MINE | Of anchored mines, there are various kinds, and it will be sufficient to describe a typical one of fairly modern j manufacture. The variations exist chiefly in the method of anchoring and the method of firing. The anchor is quite an interesting piece oi mechanism, because, whatever the depth of the ■water, within reason, and whether that depth,. is known or not. the mine is automatically anchored at tne proper depth. Tlie anchor is a heavy case containing a winch, on which is wound a long rope, one end of the rope being fastened to th« mine. _ The wmch is free to turn, but there is a catch suitable for stopping it suddenly. The catch is held, free of the winch by a second rope fastened to a smaller anchor, and that second rope is adjusted to a length — say, 10ft — equal to the desired submersion of the mine. Tha whole thing is pitched overboard, and promptly the anchor and the weight sink. The weight holds the catch away , from the winch, which unwinds, till at last the weight reaches the bottom ; and the catch, relieved of the strain, promptly stops the winch. No more rope is paid out, and the anchor, in sinking the remaining 10ft, drags the mine towards the bottom. As lor the

firing gear, several mines operate by means of a lever projecting from tho top or bottom. When a ship strikes the round case, the mine rolls along the vessel's side, and the projecting lever, having a paddle or similar device at the end, does not. By this means the" firing gear is released from a " safe " position, and the actual firing of the detonator is done by the partial release of the buoyant mine, which is -allowed to, rise a little while the firing gear is held by the mooring cable, and then suddenly released. The actual firing operation 'is just like the cocking and firing of a rifle. s IF IT SHOULD BREAK ADRIFT The ' great drawback of anchored mines is that they are very apt to be swept away by the currents of the water, or to be broken from their anchors and to go adrift, in which case they are no better than 'free mines. But it is usually provided that when this happens the mine, shall be safe ; and one having a firing gear of the kind described above cannot be exploded when it breaks adrift; because its explosion depends entirely on the pull of the cable. The safety of the mine-layers may be assured by having the whole firing gear temporarily locked by a seal of something which will dissolve slowly in the sea-water. Sal-ammoniac has been used successfully. MINE-SWEEPERS AND MINELAYERS. Anchored mines that are not exploded have to be gathered up again, and in some cases 'a clever arrangement exists to facilitate the work. The mine is attached to the anchor-rope by a complicated hook. When the sweepers come along they drag a length of rope through the water to catch the mines in the <bight; and as the sweeping rope runs up towards the mine, it catches in the hook, and unfastens it, so that the mine promptly bobs out of the water. It is then not only visible, but safe ; and the sweep lemains attached to the mooring rope, so that the anchor can be pulled up. Mines are now laid by special vessels. Usually a large opening is cut in the stern near the water-line, and a pair of rails is laid along the vessel, projecting through the opening, and curved down _to the water. Each ' mine ' rests upon its anchor, and the anchor is fitted with wheels that run on the rails. It is ■ therefore quite easy to launch the mine. It is juat put on the rails, freed of the fastenings that hold the mine and the anchor together for storage purposes, and sent overboard with a run. One vessel can put hundreds i of mines overboard in a short time. RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCE. In vie,w of the extensive use of sub.marine mines by Germany, "it is interesting to' notice what was 'done with ihem, 'and -what happened, in the 'RussoJapanese "War, which included the greatest naval campaign since the days of Nelson, who knew not mines. The following particulars are taken from the Naval Annual, 1905, which gives a very interesting survey of the naval operations in the great Eastern conflict : — On 11th February, 1904," the Russian mining transport Yenesei, which had laid 400 mines, was blown up at Dalny by the 401 st. Four officers and 92 men were lost. Many of the mines she laid were blown out to sea by a storm. The cruiser Boyarin was sent out from Port Arthur to inspect* the mine-field. She found many loose and drifting about, and, either struck one of them, or, in trying to 'dodge their dangerous company, ran ashore.. At all events, on 12th February she became a total wreck. TRYING TO BLOCK PORT " ARTHUR.) „ On the night of 11th April, the Japanese sent in the mining-transport KoryoMaru 'with three divisions of torpedo vessels, to lay submarine mines near the mouth, of Port Arthur, in the hope of blocking the entrance channel. (This was one of several attempts made, by, various means, to bot£le up the Russian fleet). The vessel succeeded in laying the mines; but as an attempt to block the channel it failed. Peace experiments had already shown that such operations were usually, if not invariably, failures, so that the result was not surprising. Some of the mines used were reported to be floating mines, connected together by ropes, so that if a vessel ran into the rope the mines would swing alongside, in the way it is presumed they did in _ the case of the British cruiser Amphion, sunk early in the present war. Others were j said to be of the Oda type, a Japanese invention in which the mine anchored, itself at a certain depth. THE TRAGEDY. At 8 a.m. next day the Russians effectively proved that the channel was not blocked. Admiral Makaroff put oufc with three battleships and three cruisers, which, after scaring off the Japanese cruiser squadron, retired when the enemy appeared in greater force. Going, in again, the fleet was not so lucky. The battleship Petropavlovsk struck a line of mines, and sank in two -minutes, drowning Admiral Makaroff (the Russian Comroander-in-Chief) and 550 others, among whom, as a passenger, was the eminent war-painter, Verestchagin. Only about 85 lives were saved. The Pobeida, too, struck a mine, presumably an anchored one that had broken adrift, and went on with a big hole above the water-line amidships. She was repaired. The fate of the flagship Was held afterwards to be good evidence that "««g vessels are as vulnerable as small ones to the effects of submarine mines, and other later instances support that view. As a matter of fact, it was never determined whether the mine which sunk the Petropavlovsk was a Russian one or a Japanese. If it was a Japanese one, it hod broken away, and so showed the fallibility of the mooring system, and indicated that such a weapon is as dangeious to friend as to foe — a lesson equally strong if it was a Russian mine. Certainly the. result proved that' the Japanese had failed to stop the egress of i ships, either by actually blowing up the Venturesome ones or by , erecting a barrier of terror along the line of the mines. SERIES OF DISASTERS TO JAPAN. On 12th May a number of Japanese torpedo Vessels tried to clear Tagao-kow, A bay near Talienwan, of mines. Two of them found a mechanical mine, which j one of them (No. 48) tried to . destroy with gunfire. She failed, and apparently ran against it. It cut her in two, and she 'went down in seven minutes ; .seVeiv lives were lost, and seven men were wounded. On 14th May the Miyako was blown up by a mine, and sank in twenty-three minutes ;• two were killed and - twenty-two wounded. Next day a worse disaster befel the Japanese. The Kasuga ran into the Yoshimo and sank her", only 90 of the crew of 460 being saved. Then the mines got to work again. The Hatsuse, a 15j000-tori battleship, ( considerably biggei than * the Petropavlovsk, struck a mine outside Port Arthur. Her steering geai was injured, and she signalled for a tug. Half an hour later a second mine exploded beneath her, and she sank immediately in i thirty-two fathoms of water.. Of her crew of only 300 were saved. The Russians claimed that she was blown up by mines deliberately laid for the purpose. The battleship Yashima also struck a mine, and was so seriously injured that if she did not sink outright she at all events disappeared from the fighting line. SEVERAL OTHER LOSSES. Other losses of Japanese ships due to ttnines occurred. On 13th June the steamer Taiokumaru, whilst laying mines iiear Port Arthur, was injiired toy on§

of them, twenty men being killed and nine wounded. On sth July the small cruiser Kaimou ran on a mine in a fog near Talienwan and sank ; sixteen were j drowned. On 3rd September the cruiser Itsukushima was damaged by a mine. On 18th September the ex-Chinese warship Heiyen, classed as a coast defence vessel, was sunk in Pigeon Bay, only four out of 210 men being saved. On 3rd September the cruiser Saiyen, also an old Chinese ship, was sunk, most of the crew being saved. The loss of tdipedo craft' by mine explosions was also reported. Besides the Petropavlovsk and the Yenesei, the Russians lost the destroyer Skory by a mine explosion on 16th March. The armoured gunboat Otvazny van on a mine and was blown up on 18th August. On 24th August two destroyers ran on mines ; one, the Boevoi, was sunk. On 21st August and 20th September small steamers, which were searching for mines were blown up. The Gilyak was also blown up at Port Arthur on 4th June. WHAT GERMANY DID NOT LEARN. In most of the cases of destruction of ships by' submarine explosion, it is impossible to say by whose mines they were destroyed. Both sides laid mines in large numbers, and some, if not many, broke loose, while some may have been put down as drifting mines. Possibly 'all the Russian ships struck Japanese -mines and all the Japanese owed their destruction to explosives of Russian origin — but it is not likely. The experiences of the war taught nothing new about mines except that some lurking hope that big ships might be less vulnerable than small ones was effectively swept away. The lesson remaining — a lesson which was made plain at the subsequent Hague Conference, and which Germany clearly disregarded — was that a nation should resort to the laying of mines only in quite exceptional cases, cases so exceptional and Unimportant relatively to the main issue of a great war that to omit them altogether would npt seriously diminish belligerent efficiency. The risk from errant mines incurred by neutrals engaged in the legitimate pursuit of their occupation, and the consequent liability of the minelaying combatant to / become involved in serious complications, should be borne in mind, and may well lead to doubt if the advantages , due to laying submarine mines are as great as the disadvantages.