THE COMMONS AND THE ARMY

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 74, 28 March 1914, Page 4

THE COMMONS AND THE ARMY

I The British Cabinet's refusal to accept the self-sacrifice of the Secretary for War (Oolonel Seely) has not checked the flow of resignations, but has rather increased it. The v sequence of events is remarkable. Brigadier-General Gough and his officers "misunderstand" the Commander in Ireland, and send in tKeir resignations, or threaten to do so. The, Cabinet and Colonel Seely "misunderstand" each other as to the nature of the "assurance" given to BrigadierGeneral Gough, and Colonel Seely adds something to the document without the sanction of the Cabinet Council. Colonel Seely then \vishes to resign, but Cabinet will not allow him to do so, although it expressly repudiates the 'vords added to the "assurance." Lastly, because of that repudiation, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John French, resigns ,- and with him, it is stated, other leading Generals. If a military landslide does force a dissolution — a possibility now occupying some space in the cablegrams — the Government will, according to Mr. Churchill, go to the country on the issue of Parliament versus the Army. The Times' accusation against Mr. Churchill, for daring to mention such a thing, does not alter the essential points of the situation. Nothing cau be clearer tfean that the

Army is being used to thwart the carrying into effect of the will of a majority of the House of Commons. Accusations of intrigue, and deception, and plotting have, however, become a commonplace in the ordinary exchange of amenities between Liberals and Unionists. Mr. Churchill, until recently one of the pleaders for a settlement by conciliation, is charged by Sir Edward Gaison with being involved with Mr. Eloyd George in a "plot against Ulster." 1 He probably refers to the previously ! cabled story .about a movement of the Regulars for the purpose of disarming the Ulster volunteers ; a story of which no atom of proof has been sent, but which serves a. purpose in the direction of tending to excuse the precjpitafe action of the officers in Ireland. If the Liberal Government appeals to the people on the military issue, its action will bear some resemblance to that of the Unionist Ministry which, inspired by Mr. Chamberlain, engineered the "khaki" general election at the time of the Boer war. In that case the Government sheltered behind the Army ; in this it challenges the Army, or rathea the elements of privilege represented by the officers. For the Unionists, the "khaki" election brought a new lease of office. Can the Liberals, by reversing the tide of sentiment, achieve a like result? If the party managers think they can see an affirmative answer to that question, the June general election may be taken aa assured.