NAVY AND NATION-BUILDING

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 29, 4 February 1914, Page 6

NAVY AND NATION-BUILDING

The main difference between those who support a New Zealand Navy, and those who oppose it, lies in the question of looking ahead. The faith of the pro-naVyites is founded on the future growth of New Zealand's resources and national spirit ; the pessimism of tho opponents rests upon the improbability that we will bo able to afford to buy a formidable fleet within one or two decades. So short is the vision of the negationists that they base their case largely on the AngloJapanese Alliance, which expires in 1921. What they will say if thai document — the charter of our immunity in the Pacifier-is not lc-signed lor another term, The Post does not know ; but probably they will ttvgus that «. nnval defence centralised iv tho North Sea will still

be the best possible for the outlying dominions. There is, however, no necessity to disprove that contention ; for the case for a New Zealand navy can be based upon broader grounds. If the earmarking to the Pacific of Australian and New Zealand defence contributions (in cash or in kind) was going to reduce Britain's naval power i» European waters, that would be a serious objection. But the Minister for Defence, Mr. James Allen, who has been in confidential consultation with the Imperial Defence authorities, has definitely disposed of that point by stating authoritatively that the Mother Country, by the efforts of its own taxpayers, can and will do all that is necessary for the protection of the North Sea and the Mediterranean. That being so, to give tho Admiralty a battle-cruiser, and to have it absorbed (as the New Zealand has been) into the British programme, is to relieve the Home taxpayer of part of a burden necessary to his own defence ; but it does not increase the British Navy cither in European waters or in the Pacific. On the other hand, the Australian Unit has proved an accession in two ways. It has created special provision for the Pacific, and has added to the strength of the Empire as a whole. The Motherland's assumption of sole responsibility for the North Sea and the Mediterranean, and her centralising of naval power in European seas, leaves Australasia free to make • a beginning towards defence in the Pacific. Our beginning will be based on what money we care to spend over and above the £140.000 a year (represented by the New Zealand) which we have voluntarily undertaken to pay towards the defence of British waters. At present we are committed to spending not more than £100,000 annually on a training ship, on the Royal Naval Reserve, dock works, etc. ; and the Government suggests, failing some new arrangement with the Admiralty, that we should purchase a Bristol cruiser at a cost of about £400,000. Opponents of a New Zealand navy suggest that, if we did this — which is within our means — and for the time being did no more, the result would be "tinpot" and ridiculous. On that point The Post differs from them. However small the beginning, the time has arrived when a start must be made, even if its main effect for years to come is merely to concentrate and crystallise the dawning national spirit of New Zealand. This embryo nationalism, now barely articulate, is really the greatest factor in the issue. We have to plan not for to-day, but for a future that may be full of revolutionary changes. We have to build not only a navy but a nation. "We cannot," says Mr. Allen, "neglect our own country's ideals and sentiments; we cannot neglect the necessary provisions to protect our own country." There is nothing narrow or parochial or non-Imperial in saying that the kindling-power lies in the words " our own." The outlying dominions will never rise to their highest sacrifices without an appeal to their national spirit. Their interest must be quickened by seeing ships and men that they own and employ and generally administer themselves. Their mettle must be tried by definite and direct responsibilities. The closer and stronger the appeal to national spirit, the more easily the money will be found. By linking defence and nationhood, more will eventually be accomplished than could ever be done by simply sending money to London ; and this, notwithstanding the fact that the British Admiralty, with its vastly greater aggregation of ships and men, will for many years to come be able to get much more immediate value for each pound sterling than we can. As has already been observed, the main matter at issue is the question of looking ahead. If Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are ever to fulfil their natural destiny of joint defenders of the flag in the Pacific, the time to begin is now.