AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 28, 3 February 1914, Page 6

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

A notable tribute to Great Britain's Imperialism was paid the other day at Toronto by Mr. W. H. Taft, exPrcsidenfc of the United States, who said that but for British enterprise, courage, and sense of responsibility in governing other races, civilisation would have been greo'tly retarded. Such an utterance, coming from "such a source, at once suggests the contrast ' between British Imperialism and United States Monroeism. Briefly,, the British way is to govern races that have shown their inability to govern themselves. Tho American way is to put a ring fence round them, keep everybody (including tho Unitpd States) outside it, and insist on then* governing themselves whether they can or cannot. While warning other Powers off, tho United States has never beten quite sound on the assumption of responsibility which such a policy should connote, because its "stand aloof" principles tie its own hands. " You shan't and I can't " roughly expresses the attitude of the United States to other Powers; and whereas Britain cures misgovernment by going in and governing, the American method is to stand off and watch the blaze. That has been happening in Mexico for over a year. In that distracted country the inherent weakness of jgsilyii States l2 r i£g,!L E°JslU j^A^

complicated by the peculiar attitude taken up by President Wilson to Provisional President Hueita. While Mr. Wilson will not recognise tho illegal election of the blood-stained Huel'ta, he can find no other Mexican capable of being de facto ruler and pacifier, and he will not send American troops over the border. In fact, it looks remarkably as if he was simply waiting for something to turn up. Meanwhile, according to a sane and well-informed paper like the San Franciscb Argonaut, " there is. no form of outrage upon persons or property that is not of hourly occurrence"; and the Argonaut, with its eyes wide open to the Huertan crimes, wishes the Provisional President success as the only pacifier. But while the present American policy continues, Htlerta pleads, with much force, that he cannot pacify the country because Washington ties his hands: Non-assumptiort of responsibility is a weakness of the Washington policy riot only without the Union but even within. On 30th January President Wilson announced the closing "for the present" of the abortive negotiations with Japan regarding the Californianland law, and the reason he gave was the Federal Government** inability to coerce California. Thus he takes refuge behind a non possum; and at the same time Rear-Admiral Vreeland advises the Naval Affairs Committee that Japan could easily take the Philippines and Hawaii in the event of an outbreak of war, and that a stronger United States navy (which is hot Democratic policy) is essential. Mention of the Philippines recalls the fact that even in its nonresponsibility aspect United States diplomacy is not consistent. For years it has attempted to govern the Philippine Islands, but a cablegram dated last Friday suggests that a withdrawal is contemplated, in which case there would be internal conflict between the Filipinos and the Unsubdued Moro tribesmen; just a faint echo of the internecine strife that would follow a British with' drawal from India. Even 'on their own borders and in their own waters Americans have not cured misgovernment, for, in addition to Mexico, there is the periodic uprising in Hayti, and the Cuban situation is neVer too sound. Not long ago President Wilson extended the Monroe Doctrine to prohibit concessions that gave the eoncessiohnaires too much influence in the government of LatinAmerican republics; but he gave no guarantee to legitimate bondholders whose interest is defaulting, as is now the case in Mexico. The main dividing line between American Monroeism and British Imperialism is the former's repudiation of direct responsibility. Two United States ex-Presidents, Messrs. Taft and EooseVelt, have testified that the Pax Britamlica is a real force. Can the foreign policy of the great American nation show results ■similar, or even remotely comparable?