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OIL IN THE NAVY

WHERE IT EXCELS COAL EXCEPTIONAL SPEED AND HITTING POWER ADMIRALTY AS OIL PRODUCER. I The recent speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, on the subject of oil fuel, marks a new era in the history of the Navy. Though coal will for years remain the basis of our sea power, oil fuel has become so important for the Navy that the Admiralty proposes to set up in business for itself in oil. "Mr. Churchill announced the passing of coal" says the Daily News. "The Admiralty has made up its. mind that the future is with oil in the case of tho "large ship of war not less than in the case of the sniall. Oil fuel means greater speed, a radius of action larger by 40 per cent., more bunker space, quicker, easier, and cheaper replenishing, rapid increase of steam production, greater military power with a smaller ship. All these advantages ensure that, whether we lead or follow, oil must within a few years replace coal as the fuel oLwarships." ( "We are witnessing nothing less than a revolution, comparable in its importance to the substitution of steel for wood, steam for sails, and breech-load-ing for muzzle-loading guns," sayß the Telegraph. "In all those instances we lagged behind the times ; now we are leading the world. "We now have 'more than 100" destroyers built and building dependent entirely on oil fuel," Mr. Churchill said.^ "The experiment of building a division of fast battleships and battlecruisers and a number of light cruisers burning oil fuel only, had proved successful. 'The fast battleship armed with 15in guns seems likely to be imitated, though at a very considerable distance, by our competitors, and there is no reason to doubt that we ha.ye successfully maintained that superiority in construction which can be traced throughout the whole naval history of the last twenty-five years. , None Of ! these vessels could have been satisfactorily constructed on a coal-burning basis.' "Why, then, were the five battleships this year to be coal-burning, with oil as auxiliary fuel only? 'Oil is only required in large ships when an exceptional speed has to be reached with a vessel oi exceptional quality. Ordinary speed can be ettectively realised with coal as the main motive power. Coal will continue to be \the main basis of our aea power in line of battle at present.' % "Criticism^ of the difficulty of* getting oil supplies into the country in time of war was dismissed in a sentence : 'If we cannot get oil, we cannot get corn, cotton, or the thousand and one commodities necessary for the economic energies of Britain. There was, hiß naVal advisers v declared, no serious .danger to our oil supply so long as we kept the command of t/ie sea. 'There is plenty o{ oil in the World.' The annual output was 50,000,000 tons, and at the outside our Navy would require ho more than 200,000 , tons' ; 'and we are drawing, or soon shall be able tb draw, supplies from California, Persia, Texas, Rumania, Borneo, Egypt, Mexico, and Trinidad.' "r" r "At home we have 'great potentialities,' for it is calculated that the Scottish shale deposits would, if developed, give between 400,000 and 500,000 tons a year for 160 years.' 'At a price,' he added significantly, in reply to an observation across" the" table. 'The problem iB not one of quantity, the problem is one of price," he proceeded. Oil had doubled in cost. So far, the system of purchase had been 1 satisfactory— 'so far", but no farther.' "Hitherto we. had bought 'in what •might by a stretch of the imagination be called the, *Open, market,' but 'the open market has become an open mocker y"'Ovfr stake in oil ships has* become' so important that ~,we must have tho certainty of being able to buy a steady supply at a steady price.' To meet this situation a two fold policy had been prepared : an ultimate and an interim policy.« • . . • "Ihe ultimate policy is that the Admiralty should become tho independent 6wner and producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel. "The immediate policy of the Govern' ment is to obtain oil by contracts for five years. "The storage, transport, and distribution of oil to the fleet has not been neglected. Built and building, we have thirteen transport steamers; five of thd largest aloas can bring more oil than the whole Navy consumed last year."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19130906.2.167

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 59, 6 September 1913, Page 13

Word Count
741

OIL IN THE NAVY Evening Post, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 59, 6 September 1913, Page 13

OIL IN THE NAVY Evening Post, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 59, 6 September 1913, Page 13

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