GERMANY NEEDS AUSTRALIA.

Evening Post, Volume LCCVI, Issue 126, 26 November 1908, Page 7

GERMANY NEEDS AUSTRALIA.

SECRET OF ANXIETY FOR INCREASE IN NAVY. SYDNEY, 25th November. Mr. B. R. Wise, one-time AttorneyGeneral in the State Ministry, recently returned from a visit to England. In the cour&e of an interview with a pressman, Mr. Wise expressed the conviction that Germany needed Australia, and) said that was 1 the secret of that nation's anxiety to increase her navy. He stated that, to hia mind, there was an absolute and real necessity for a much more elaborate scheme of Australian defence than any yet put forward. The Commonwealth universal military training scheme, though a step in the right direction, did not go far enough. No training would be of any us© unless the country* had a very substantial increase in population. Immigration must be the first step in the defence policy of the Commonwealth. When land 1 was available people must be brought hero and taught to bear arms. ' I Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, in an article from which we quoted yesterday, stated regarding the "German Menace" • — "We have much less to fear from Germany than, indeed, she would have good reason to fear from us if she were to carry out her intention of making a wanton attack upon us. I hope that she nvill not do anything of the sort ; bu,t if she does the will have cause to regret her action. "In order to injure us in war to the point of forcing us to yield to any terms that it may impose, a great Continental State must try one or 'more of the four following belligerent operations : It must try (1) to invade this country; (2) to starve its inhabitants into submission by stopping our supplies of food and raw material ; (3) to capture or ruin our mercantile marine ; or (4) to seize and retain some outlying part of our Empires. "Now, the United Kingdom, being an insular State, and' no part of the Empire except India being accessible ,to any Continental armed force unless it go by sea and India being accessible by land to Russia alone of th<* great European Powers, it follows that operations (2) and (3) must be purely, and operations (1) and (4) principally, naval. If Germany proves superior to us at sea she may reasonably look forward to being able to carry out any one, or, indeed, all, of the four. "Germany, as a matter of fact, is far front having a number of fighting ships equal |to ours, and, the strength of her naval personnel is less than half the Istrength of ours. It is, therefore, probable to the verge of certainty that Germany could not now, and cannot for some time to come, prove superior to us at eea. It is quite true that if her naval preparations continue and ours stop, she will catch us up in the mimber of ships ; but, as far as I can see, there is no prospect of our stopping the construction of them. "Some military — not naval — officers in Germany appear to believe really that their navy will be able to get at least temporary command of the North Sea because 'our fleets would have maiiy duties to perform,' and therefore would not be where they were wanted. . . Nelson taught us long ago that the proper station of a British fleet is in the closest possible proximity to the enemy's fleet ; and we have not forgotten the lesson. Where can a British uian-of-war during hostilities possibly be wanted except where an enemy's ship is? We may dismiss as unsuited for discussion outside of a lunatic asylum the belief that the British Navy will go just where it is not wanted, and lea^e the coast clear to the enemy's fleet. If the latter insists on paying us a hostile visit, it will have to fight its way here."