IN THE PACIFIC. SOME PROBLEMS.

Evening Post, Volume LXXVI, Issue 108, 3 November 1908, Page 4

IN THE PACIFIC. SOME PROBLEMS.

VII.— THE FUTURE OF JAPAN. EUROPE'S CHANGE OF ATTITUDE. INFLUENCE OF THE ELDER STATESMEN. By Professor J. Macrmllan Brown. (Specially written for The Post.), YOKOHAMA, Japan, 14th Aug. There is no country in the world that Western mankind is at present co predictive about as Japan. It is the nncertain element in the problem of the future. Had "it remained a peaceful imitator of Europe and caterer for the European love of A.rt, mankind would have slept in peace. The Chinese War disturbed mea's dreams for q time, but easy formulae soon explained the phenomenon,- and left the Bleep to proceed undistunbed. It was the war with Russia thnt broke it finally and put these formulae to rout. Everything was now possible for the little insular nation in the East. And at first roseate pictures filled the imagination. But the natural recoil came, and nightmare pictures have taken their 1 place. Japan is now what Russia was — the devil and villain of the international melodrama. Her designs are as evil as they are great, and they are all within the scope of practicability. She stalks mysteriously on the worlds stage, the 'Napoleon and Mephistopheles of nations, brooding silently over what she will do next in the way of resistless aggression 1 . The transformation is one of the most singular and striking in history, from the pretty little kimonoed nation, busied >vith its quaint arts, into the omnipotent, dark-browed villain', Whom everypne fears and suspects. The transformation is too much of a bouleversement not to rouse the critical faculty, alid make one suspect that it is more in the imaginations' of the spectators than in solid reality — more a spectral illusion, like the Broekjeu shadow, than a substantial existence. The newspaper correspondents and the sensation-mongers from the East are still persuaded that they are awake; they have rubbed their eyes and still find the vision there. It is worth ■while investigating the facts and seeing ;what grounds there are for the predictions. CHANGE DUE TO JAPAN'S ARMAMENTS. The main basis is the enormous expansion of the armament programme eince the close of the war. Japan has reduced her term of service from three years to two, and so managed to have far larger trained reserves. She can at a pinch put between two and three million men in tb.B field. Her naval programme is on vt- par with this ; she has already launched the biggest Dreadnought in the world, and she is preparing to build several more. Her iieet came out of the war far more ef f ective than it went, into it, because of "her captures ; whilst that of her enemy was practically annihilated, as was the Chinese fleet before. The industrial and commercial elements of the people have beer protesting -.vigorously against this apparently unnecessary expenditure, and till recently protesting in vain. The Saionji cabinet, in appearance unanimous, was in reality at sixes and sevens ; but the heads of the military and nava! • departments knew their own mind, or at least stood to their guns. These »/ere General Terauchi, the Minister of War, and Admiral Saito. the Minister of . tho Navy j they knew they were unde* the aegis of the Elder Statesmen, and could do no wjrong. The country was demanding a reduction . in expenditure j and taxation instead of an increase ; I the Premier and the rest of his Ministry knew this, but the two who knew their own minds and the minds of the I Genro were immovable ; they had agreed the previous year to a brief postponement of the armament expansion programme on the assurance that it would be carried out this year; they would not listen to a second postponement, although they lcnew that the country was in a won© position financially, and thatthe purse-strings of the world were drawn tight against them. Depression or no depression, the army and navy must be put into a proper state of preparation. THE NEW MINISTRY. There was a deadlock in the Cabinet, and it could do nothing else but resign. The new Katsura Ministry is now installed. And though it has issued no manifesto, it is generally stated that retrenchment is part of its programme Various sums are- mentioned as likely to be taken off the Budget, ranging from -one and a half million sterling to ten millions sterling. B*ut there is an ominous silence on the part of the Fre•uier, who is a military man and is a protege of the military section of the Genro, and, what is most ominous of all, General Terauchi and Admiral Saito, ,who held tho military and naval portfolios in the previous Ministry and practically brought about its resignation, retain their , portfolios in the new Administration. It is extremely doubtful whether they will be more likely to give way to their new colleagues than they were to their old. It was the military members of' the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, Who managed this continuity in the military section of the Government. And, though no newspaper or journal has called attention to the aim of it, it seems to me quite clear that they are there to stand to their guns It is the retrenching members of this Saionji Ministry who have gone; it is the members favourable to the armament expansion programme who have remained. And yet all the journals and prominent commercial and financial men are busy sketching out what form and effect the retrenchments are to take. Most assume that the saving will be used in redeeming more loans, the favouiite scheme of all commercial and financial men ; for the price of bonds is falling and needs bolstering up m order to restore" the credit of the country, aad enable both Government and private industry to yet what money they need at v reasonable rate. Others, like Mr. Nakano, the President of the Tokio Chamber of Commerce, would prefer the abolition of some of the objectionable war taxes, liko those on salt and railway tickets, that bear hard on the poorer classes, and some of the economically unwise taxes, like that on textile fabrics': and reduction of the business and income taxes for the less wealthy. NON-COMMITTAL STATEMENTS. General Katsura, the Premier, is said to have stated in a recent interview that he would suspend public works to a large extent, and at the seme time take such measures that National Bonds would be quoted at 90 yen (that is £9) or more. But it is significant that, though this evidently rejects the relief of taxation, it commits him to no reduction of the armament programme, and, in fact, commits him to nothing ; for it is not an official manifesto. At most he will " suspend public works to a large extent." The railway building and jailway improvement projects and,

works will have to wait. Some of the up-to-date institutions will be wiped out or pruned. Government industries, like the Wakamatsu ironworks, always a rank financial failure, will be sold or placed under,, private management. Departments will be drastically purged of superfluous officials and offices. The erection of new buildings all over the country will be postponed, and many an institution held sacred by the Japanese will have tht> sacrilegious hand of the economist laid upon it. Only a journal here and there suggests that the hnga subsidies to the steamship companies should be touched, though it is freely proposed that the subsidies for shipbuilding should be reduced. RETRENCHMENT. It is a matter of great doubt whether such a Ministry wul make any of its savings out of the Army or Navy, though some even of its jingoistic supporters, like Professot Tomizu, M r., think that military expenditure ought to be retrenched, because national resources had not developed, pari passu, with national armament. Ministers insist on the fact that the existing military resources are inadequate t'p the needs of- the country, because Russia is developing the strategic power of her Siberian railways, and China is rapidly increasing her army, whilst the United States and the Eurorjean Fcwers are steadily expanding their navies. But they acknowledge that the nation is suffering from depression, and that the. expansion programme must be postponed till this has passed. They see that without retrenchment the Ministry will always be a minority in the Lower (House. The only political section thoroughly loyal to it is the Daido Club, and that is small, and had its numbers reduced at the last election ; the Progressists might stand by it, but even then it could count on not one-third of the House to support its measures. j The only policy possible for it is re isrenchmemt. But from the constitution of the Ministry this must be reconciled with expansion of the army and navy. Bonds must be redeemed, ih.6 Sinking fund must be made a reality; and by these means the credit of the country must be restored in the money market* of the world. Then loans nay be got with' ease for the extension and improvement of the Government railways and industries, whilst most of the money from taxation and monopolies can be switched off for the armament expansion. AGGRESSION SUSPECTED. Now, why are the military members of the Genro and their proteges so set upon this enormous increase of the army and navy, though they know that national prosperity and national wealth are suffering from what has been done and will suffer to the point of exhaustion if the programme is persisted in? The civil members of the Genro are known to be opposed to this excessive and one-sided development towards militarism. And I suspect that the 1 " various trivial reasons given foi the return of Prince .Ito irom Korea are beside the mark, and intended to mislead ; the real reasons being that, as a civilian member of the Genro, he wishes tor use his influence to assist the two others_, Inouye and MutsuKata, in opposing the resistance to all military retrenchment ; ne sees that the nation is Id a crisis, and that, if the -xpansion programme is persisted in, its life, will suffer for generations. But all this is mere conjecture ; and no one ever hears of any dissension amongst the Elder Statesmen. Hitherto, as far as one Knows, the civilians amongst them have supported the pro-<-jects of the militarists. And this is what has set the tongue of surmise tree as to the purpose of those projects. A large number ot writers, like Putnam Weale ajid F. A. Mackenzie, can find no solution ot the mystery but aggression. And the unfortunate administration ot Korea and Manchuria and manipulation of Chinese questions seem to confirm their worst conjectures. Such an enormous expansion of the army is nob needed for the protection 'of the archipelago or its new continental acquisitions. Ind such a huge expansion ot the navy is out of all proportion to that of China, or that of Russia, ov that ot any nation on the Pacific. They can be intended for nothing else than aggression on neighbouring territories, and, some Australians think, on even far-distant territories. AGGRESSION. NO REAL EXPLANATION. What Japan would do with these conquests is not explained. The emigrants sne sends into Korea and Manchuria are more often than not the refuse of her population — defaulting bankrupts, poverty-stricken rogues, unsuccessful farmers, and coolies and loose women. This is by no means'to the taste of the authorities, 'for it makes their problem more and more difficult, it has alienated the Koreans and Manchunun Chinese till they are as hostile to the Japanese and their Government ■as they were before friendly. Is it likely that any better elements wouid go farther afield ? The benefits that would be derived from such aggressions are purely problematical. And one knows that her new continenta' possessions near at hand still drain the Home Treasury, instead of contributing to it. To imperil the national prosperity and! wealth, if not the national life, for such a doubtful result would bo the act of fools and madmen, and »iot of wise or sane patriots: Some other explanation is needed for this extraordinary impoverishment of the nation in a time ut peace for the sako of an overgrown army and navy. There is something far more urgent than mere shadowy and distant ambitions to explain this nation-exhausting programme on the part of men who nave ever been marked for their wise caution and foresight and fervid patriotism. Of course it has always been conjectured that Japan aims at being one of the first-class Powers of the world. But it is not mere armament that can keep her in that position. If she is industrially weak and financially rotten, a large army and navy will only saj) her life instead of giving vigour and power to it. The mer who engineered the Chinese and Russian wars to so successful and decisive conclusions are not likely to be blind to this truth. Even the_ jingoists among her young poli ticians realise that armament must not go ahead of prosperity and the growth oi national life ; they have only to look at Italy to see the effect of inattention to this truth. Is it likely that those cautious, silent, wise watchers of the pulse of the nation, the (3enro, are less cognisant of this politi cal law and of the national symptoms than the most Chauvinistic of their followers? Is if. likely that, for the sake of a distant and problematic possibility, they will endanger the life of the nation? Is it likely that they intend to involve the country they so loVe in war with the wealthiest and most powerful nations of the world, like the United States and England, merely on the chance of coming out of it with more territory and more reputation ? I had a long conversation with one who is now xa the Ministry some weeks before there was any talk of a change. And one of the things he quietly insisted on was that the European journals are completely mis taken in thinking that Japan is a warlike nation. She has never been aggiessive in all her history, I called his attention to the expedition of Hideyoshi to Korea in the sixteenth century, and to his expressed ambition to conquer China. The reply was that he was an adventurer who had risen from tho ranks, and that he did not represent Japan truly, as was shown by the closing of the country not long jfter his death to all intercourse with

other nations. He was quite emphatic in his gentle, quiet, philosophical declaration that the Japanese, loved peace, and would resent intrusion upon their peaceful purusits. All that Japan has evei done m the way of war has been to guarantee the national lite. "japan now a continental NATION. This is the keynote of her policy. The only foreign question that stirs her to the heart is the possession of the Korean Peninsula. As long as it is in the hands of the Koreans, without the shadow of foreign suzerainty over them, she is satisfied. For she has always' been able to prevent their aggressions. The moment its independence is threatened her whole life-blood is stirred. This is the cue to all her foreign wars, both ancient and modern. One of her greatest misfortunes has been that in her war with China she tried to secure the Liaotung Peninsula as a buffei between tha* nation and Korea — a buffer easily made safe by Japanese naval power. To re-secure this from Russia she spent the best of hei bloud, and in order to make a buffer lor «his against that European Power she has taken Southern Manchuria. All this was inevitable ; and yet the process is unending. It is Alsace-Lorraine over again ; the buffer State is more difficult to protect thaa the trontier that it is meant to protect. One of the unwisest things Japan has ever done was to make herself a continental nation with an everlasting frontier question. This, even if alone, should satisfy the journalistic painters of her as a Mephistopheles tnat she is human. She has laid her flanks open to all her enemies. And she has centuries of unrest and anxiety, if not war, before her as a consequence , and' 'this war will have no finality, just as when England had possessions on the Continent oi Europe — till she was rid of tnem there was no eontinuoub peace loi her. It is folly foi an island nation to acquire a continental frontier. And it is here we have the true solution ot the mystery about Japan's armament expansion. She knows not the day when she will bb challenged to protect her continental frontier. After the Chinese war she adopted the same programme ; she did not know how soon China might retaliate, and try to recover her lost influence. Now she has two prospective enemies, both with enormous territories, marching on hers, and unlimited possibilities, if once they set themselves scientifically to the task of armament. Her statesmen know that China is beginning lo move on her own account, and resents any Japanese patronage. And all the palaver of their ambassadors and diplomats about the everlasting friendship of Russia, and her resolve to keep the peace for ever is not untrustworthy evidence of belief in the opposite. The constant reiteration makes it only clearer, just as a child's repetition of the phrase, ' I'm not afraid " in the dark, reveals its alarm. And one has only to travel in the less frequented parts of Japan, and especially on the western coasts, with a camera and a notebook to see the fear of Russia that is haunting Japan. All along the coastline, even as far as fifteen miles from the shore of the Japan Sea, 1 found Naval Department notices prohibiting all ■■use of the camera ; I had to put my camera in my portmanteau. And at the railway stations, in the streets, and in my hotels, the policemen were constantly enquiring of the student who travelled with me who 1 was and what I was doing with my notebook ; they were satisfied when he said I was British, and that 1 was a university professor. And any Continental European who goes into unfrequented parts of Japan will find himself shadowed everywhere, even if he proves that he is an Austrian, or German", or Frenchman. This perpetual vigilance is not to be rejected as evidence of the ! fear of Russia and Russian designs that haunts the minds of the Japanese authorities. ~ RUSSIAN RETALIATION FEARED. And the fear is by no means beseless. From men who have been shooting game in the country round "Vladivostock, and from timbermen who have been into the mountains between that, port and the Korean frontier, I have learned that immense barracks are being erected by the Russians ; in one place on the coast barracks capable of accommodating a hundred thousand men. This the Japanese know ; for they have a most elaborate spy system, and spies all over Manchuria, Mongolia, aad Siberia. And it seems to me there is nothing else needed to account for the inordinate haste on the part of Japan to increase her armaments. , Such forcing of the pace in spite of the protests of the country, and the manifest injury done to the life and industrial prospects of the nation, reveals great urgency, and -implies as its stimulus no emotion less piessing than alarm. The navy, the surest weapon of an insular nation, must be raised to still greater efficiency so as to secure not merely the coasts, but communications with the continental possessions. It is the western naval stations, Sasepo on the coast of Kyushiu, and Maizuri* and Tsuruga in Hondo, all of them on splendid and easilyl protected fiords, that are having most done to them to make them safe and efficient. I have a letter from an admiral whose contingent kis stationed in the port of the solitary island of Tsushima, near which the Russian armada was shattered ; this step-ping-stone to Korea is evidently being made navally secure. A DIFFICULT FUTURE BEFORE JAFAN. The Japanese statesmen are only beginning to realise the extraordinary burden they have shouldered by making their nation continental. And I doubt if they have fully seen the long vista of eternal vigilance and intermittent war that it has opened up for them into the centuries beyond. The responsibility of preserving Manchuria and Korea intact is goin gto clog and hamper the national life for ages to come. All the financial resources of the nation will be strained to the upmost; that every one can see already. Its energies are getting switched off from peaceful and industrial and commercial pursuits. And thij process cannot stop as long as Hie military and naval men have command of the situation — that is to say, as long as the Government is an absolutism, tempered by a small bureaucratic council. They will never see finality in their task of self-defence, and self-defence at_ times will have a dangerous tendency to pass into aggression when any military genius with a strong will and unscrupulous ambition seizes the helm of affairs,. If Prince Ito's ideal, expressed again and again, were to be realised with regard to Korea, and extended to Manchuria, the danger to the peaceful development of the national life might be avoided. He declares_that he. means to make Korea strong and independent, capable of defending itself, and then hand it over to the native authorities. But the Japanese colonists are making this impossible, they are so abusing their position as members of a conquering community. It is growing more and more manifest that Japan will come no nearer to the evacuation of Korea than Britain to the evacuation of Egypt. And Southern Manchuria will have to grow more and more a Japanese territory! The trouble before the nation is therefore endless. She has entered on a career absolutely new for her, and become a continental nation, with continental frontiers and continental responsibilities.