THE BALTIC FLEET.

Evening Post, Volume LXVIII, Issue 81, 3 October 1904, Page 5

THE BALTIC FLEET.

DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES. The dangers and difficulties with which the Baltic fleet uould ha%s to contend in the event of its undertaking the voyage to the Far East were discussed in detail by the Cologne Gawtie, of 21st August, and from the formidable array of practical obstacles willi vhich thb project is> oeset the conclusion n, draAvn that the prospects of its xValisation are slight and the chances oi its success wholly unfavourable, iiiasniach as the dispersal of the Port Arthur fieet has completely altered the naval station. The distance from Kronrtfadt to Vladivostock is estimated at 12,303 marine miles, and there is no precedent for an expedition 'of 'this size or kind upon which to base any conjectures as to its probable fate. , ' The minimum duration of the passage may be placed at 70 days at a speed of eight knots, of which it may be ns&umed thai the Russian vessels are capable. When, however, the repeated delays and stoppages which coaling and the renewal of water and of provisions must ineyitab.y entail are taken into account it is absurd to suppose that the voyage could; db accomplished in less than 90 days. The German mail steamers, for example, cover the distance from Bremen to Yokohama, which roughly corresponds to the distance from Kron- ■ staat to Vladivostock, in 53 days at a speed of 14 knoti. Apart from the higlier rate -of speed It must be remembered that an individual unit like a mail steamer has not to prepare for the countless ] emergencies with which a heterogenous fleet of warships would have to contend with even in time of peace. Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful whether the Baltic fleet would choose the shortest route to the Far East via the Suez Canal. If not, the duration of the voyage must of necessity be indefinitely prolonged. The Rhenish organ points out that to select the Suez Canal route would render the Russians dependent upon Great Britain along the whole voyage. The route round the Cape of Good Hope would increase the length of the voyage 25 per cent, and the Russian vessels would be thrown upon the favour and the good will of Great .Britain in an only slightly less degree than if they passed through the Suez Canal. ,The third possibility that the Baltic fleet may eventually elect to sail round Cape Horn po&esses the single advantage that the Japanese intelligence department might find it difficult to keep in close touch with the movements of the enemy Nevertheless, whichever route the Russians ultimately decide upon, it is perfectly certain that they cannot reach their destination befoie winter has set in. Port Arthur will in all probability by that time be no longer available as a base for the fleet, while Vladivostock will be icebound The final and most important consideration is certainly that the dispersal of the Port Arthur fleet will have released a goodly proportion of the Japanese ships from their arduous duties, and will have permitted Admiral Togo to send them home to be docked and cleaned. The time at his disposal before the advent of the Baltic fleet may be expected will without doubt amply suffice to effect the necessary repairs upon practically all his vessels. The Russians, with "untried ships and untried men, w ill, therefore arrive in the Far East to find themselves confronted at the end of «* long and exbausting journey by the victorious Japanese, who will have enjoyed the opportunity of renewing then' efficiency and their confidence in the interval. The Cologpe journal is accordin ely led to observe;—

"li cannot be assumed that the Russians have by now renounced their mistaken contempt for their adversaries, and the favourable oombmation of circumstances which would beem to be premised by the despatch of the Baltic fleet is consequently not clearly apparent. A Power does not equip a« armada and rush headlong into the expenditure entailed by such an undertaking if tbere is little or no prospect that tue emerprise wiP lead to victory." v i i — — — leu