THE SPIONKOP DISASTER.

Evening Post, Volume LIX, Issue 127, 30 May 1900, Page 5

THE SPIONKOP DISASTER.

LORD ROBERTS'S DESPATCH. [our own correspondent.] • LOjNjjON, 20th April. Lord Roberts startling despatch on the Spionkop operations, with its scathing criticisms on the capacity and con duct of several of our Generals in South Africa has of necessity been the sensation of the current week. The severity of his criticisms is even accentuated by the obvious care taken to use the mildest language warranted by the circumstances. It is nob too much to say that the despatch has created a profound sensation throughout the country, and has inspired a feeling of uneasiness amounting almost to dismay. In his despatch Lord Roberts says : — "The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them, and the accompanying documents themselves, that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichardt's Drift, and thence by following the road past "Fair View" and "Acton Homes," to gain the open plain north of Spionkop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter's Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Bul.er had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading norfch-easfc and branching off from a point east of "Three Tree Hill." The selection of tliis road necessitated the capture and retention of Spionkop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spionkop, had the advance indicated by Sir Rtdvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir jtedvers Bul•ler with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions J»e was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spionkop he resumed the chief command. "As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spionkop position, which, though occupied without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut. -Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position, during the night, reorganising the defence, and bringing up artillery — in regard to which Sir Charles Warren's report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller's contention — admitting also that the senior officers on the summit of the hill might have been more- promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut. - Colonel Thorneycroft's assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the "night the enemy's fire, -if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and, though lamp signalling was not possible at the time, owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut. -Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spionkop at 9.30 p.m. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately aftA-Major-General Coke's departure Lieut. - Colonel Thorneycroffc issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect. On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut. - Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it is doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire. "The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving, of high commendation." He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30 a.m. on the 25th January, and by that time the Naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieut. -Colonel Thorneycroft | had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn. "It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spionkop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, con*

.••equcnlly, o'uH^cJ to 'u.ninon li' i 'yA' General Cijce Ut his Lculquaivei-. I.i L iia evening, in order that ho might ascertain how matters v/eie going on, and the command on Spionkop thus devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft ; but MajorGeneral Coke, was not aware of this. About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Bri-gadier-General ; but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, , who, until he left the position at 9.30 p.m., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hih, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may Be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of the events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that "there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unf avourably on the defence." "The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches, was well devi&ed, and I agree with Sir Redvers BuJer in thinking that it ought, to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy — probably also ,to erl'ors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But, whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command -to assert his authority, and see that what he thought best was done, Mid also to the unwarantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer. "The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour oi ■the troops throughout the operations. " (Signed) ROBERTS, Field Marshal ,Commander-in-Chief, South Africa." [Since our correspondent's letter left England it has transpired that at the instance of the Secretary of State for War, only selections made by him from Lord Roberts's despatches were published.]