THE WAR.

Evening Post, Volume LIX, Issue 11, 13 January 1900, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE WAR.

HANDLING AN ARMY CORPS. It is an axiom of war (says the Westminster Budget) that to defeat your enemy you must be able to concentrate superior force on the vital point. To do this successfully two things are necessary : in the first place the trained intelligence of the soldier must correctly appreciate the true strategical situation and so form a correct opinion as to which is the vital point; and, secondly, the organisation of the army and its means of movement must bo such as to enabJe it to anticipate the enemy, whose leader will probably be equally able to form a correct judgment on the situation. From history and from modent experience we learn that it is certainly advisable, if not absolutely necessary to inarch on as broad a front as possible. By this alone are the difficulties of tho supply and transport of a large force likely to be successfully Solved. Hence it becomes neccessary to provide for the concentration of the marching columns at the correct moment to ensue the application of superior force. Both these great principles were recognised by the masters of war Napoleon and Moltke ; but each of them adopted different means to attain this end. Napoleon preferred to weld his force into one mass before the battle, and then to endeavour to crush his enemy by its momentum, invariably his concentration under the shelter of a mountain range, river line, or some natural object which would screen his movements from the curiosity of his enemy. A good example of this strategy will be found in his' campaign of 1805, when he concentrated all his strength behind the line of the ' Danube before hurling it with irrestible force upon the Austrian rear at Ulm. Moltke, on the other hand, trusting in the skill and devotion to duty of his subordinate commanders, whose training he had himself laboriously supervised, preferred the more delicate operation of making this concentration on the bat-tle-field itself. The great advantage of Napoleon's method is that less is to be feared from sudden interruption by unexpected movement of the enemy, the army being assembled and well in hand before moving into striking distance ; while Moltke's favourite plan is open to the objection that a mobile and enterprising enemy might dislocate all arrangements by a heavy blow on unsupported columns moving to the point selected for the concentration — an event whjch might lead to the entire army being beaten in detail. If we look at the map of South Africa we -will see that local conditions favour Napoleon's rather than Moltke's methods, at anyrate at the commencement of the campaign. The railway from De Aar to Stormberg, points about 150 miles apart runs roughly speaking, parallel to and about some sixty miles from the Free State frontier as defined by the Orange River, now reported to be in flood. The army disposed along this line, each division fed by separate lines of rail to its port of disembarkation, can be concentrated at any point in this line moz'e rapidly than the Boer army, necessarily dispersed to watch the frontier and for purposes of supply, and without any assistance from railways can be assembled to meet it. Hence we may assume that Napoleon's strategy will be adopted though tlie actual gassing of the army over the wide and rapid current of the Orange River, all bridges but that at Orange River Station having been destroyed by the .enemy, will necessitate elaborate preparations in view of the limited pontoon equipment with tho army. The frontier once crossed, whether with or without fighting, a certain amount of dispersion will again be necessary to avoid unduly lengthening our marching columns, and the mounted troops will have to ' be spread out to cover the front, so as to allow of a second concentration being made whenever the proximity of the enemy renders a battle probable. But it may be asked, how is it that the disadvantages of marching in the fashion suggested, on several parallel roads, with the consequent liability to being berften in detail before support from another column can arrive, can outweigh the very obvious advantage of moving concentrated in one column and along one road? The answer to this is that a force of the strength of the Army Corps now being lauded in South Africa, if marching on one road, would occupy no less than some 12 miles of road, without including the enormous additional space required by the ammunition and supply columns. In other words, this means that a day's march would practically separate the advanced troops from those in rear of the column, the effect of which woujd be that it would be quite possible for the head to receive a seyere blow before the troops in rear could arrive to their support ; while, if desired to deploy into lino of battle to assail a prepared position, at least a day would be consumed . in the operation. These disadvantages, quite apart from the very serious difficulties which would be involved in feeding, such an enormous force along one road, difficulties which will be further explained in a subsequent article, are quite sufficient to outweigh any advantages arising from the fact that the troops would bo concentrated within the grasp of one commander. But to benefit by the advantages of moving on separate roads, with a view to quickly concentrating in the required direction when the onrmy is met with, a very thorough tr " nig and organisation of the staff is nccuHHary. The staff of an army may be likened, to the nerves, which, leoeivmg an impulse from the brain (or directing mind of the army) communicates it to the limbs typifying the various un?ls into which the great force 'is divided. With a view to simplifying this transmission of orders from a central authority, delegation of command to a certain extent is necessary, each unit being provided with its own leader and its own staff. Thus we see that the Army Corps itself, or aggregation of minor units, has the officer in supreme command, and a number of officers to assist him, under the title of the Headquarter Staff. The General in supreme command receives from the officer in charge of the Intelligence Department all news bearing upon tho operations in hand, so far as the slate of the country and operations of the enemy ar« concerned. Through his Chief Staff ' Officer ne receives comimmications as to the exact position of al the units of his force, and the numbers of effectives which they can muster for duty; and from the Senior As-fdslunt-Adjutant-General for supply and transport duties he learns the state '<#' the arrangements necessary for victualling the troops and keeping them supplied as they advance. With this data he can then proceed to draft in outline a plan for the opera*

tions of the following day, calling into consultation, if necessary, for topographical details, the D.A.A.G. fo^r topography, while engineering questions can be discussed with the Chief Engineer — a MajorGeneral of Royal Eriginers on the staff. Before any precise orders can be issued it will usually be necessary to make a number of careful calculations as to the time which will be occupied in moving the troops from their present position to that which they are to occupy — calculations which can be made by some of the D.A.A.G.'s— and also calculations as to the hours at which the various supply columns will be able, having replenished their stores from the waggons toiling in rear along the lines of communication, to issue fresh supplies to the waggons accompanying the troops. If an action is likely it ,will also be necessary for the Principal Medical Officer to be consulted as to the position he would recommend for the field hospitals ; and if the various columns are to be linked by signalling stations, the Director of Signalling must be informed in order that he can make the necessary arrangements. When all these details have been settled the first ■ draft of orders can then be made, and will usually run somewhat in the following form : — FIRST ARMY CORPS. Corps orders by Lieutenant-General Sir R. Buller. (1) The Army will advance to-morrow in the direction of — (2) The enemy was last heard of at — . His patrols have- been seen on the line of the (3) The Cavalry Division will move to -* — t starting so as to arrive at by — p.m. Reports to be sent back every — hours. The flank to be carefully searched, etc. (4) The Ist Division will march off at such an hour that it will reach at — a.m. It will follow the — road. (5) The 2nd Division will (as above). (6) The 3rd Division (as above). (7) The Corps Troops. (This body may be either treated as one unit, and assigned to one road,' probably in rear of one of the Divisions, or may be ordered to detach guns, infantry, or other units to one of the Divisions.) (8) Any orders concerning Supply Columns, or Supply Park, Ammunition Park, etc. (9) The ' position of Commander-in-Chief during the coming day's operations. By order, (Signed) , Chief Staff Officer. Place, date. These orders, when completed, will be dictated by Staff officers to clerks using typewriters, and immediately forwarded either by telegraph, cyclist, or mounted orderly to the various divisions concerned. Each divisional commander will have meanwhile formulated his own. theory as to the nature of the coming day's operations, and will have obtained m advance aIJ the information which will be likely to be of use to him in issuing his own orders to his command. As soon as the corps orders are received he will immediately, in conjunction with his chief Staff officer, prepare the orders lor his division, detailing brigade's to furnish advanced and rear guards, fixing the hour at which each brigade will move, and at which the outposts may be withdrawn, and giving .orders for the move of the divisional baggage, supply, and ammunition coi umns. These orders will be dictated, typewritten in a similar form to that adopted for the corps orders, and dis-. tributed, with a copy of the corps orders on which they are based, to Wie iniantry brigades, cavalry, and artillery in his command. The commander of these smaller units will in their turn prepare their ciders to meet the situation disclosed in the divisional and corps orders, and the result in the shape of brigade orders will finally reach the commanders of the infantry battalions, cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries, who will finally issue their battalion, regimental, or battery orders for their own units. The system of orders thus sketched out can only be iollowed in its entirety when communication between the different units is easy and assured. This*- routine of preparation and issue of orders can be followed till contact with the enemy is attained, but as the situation consequently develops it may bo necessary to issue fresh instructions from time to time, and it is in the rapid preparation and transmission of these orders on the field of battle that the value of a highly-trained and expert staff will become most apparent. Each order must be concise, absolutely clear, and plainly written. Of late a great deal of attention has been paid to these details at the Staff College, and we hope that the benefit which our Staff officers have de-, rived from their training will be clearly shown by the campaign now commencing. THE BOER ARMY. ITS STRONG ImDINS AND ITS WEAKNESSES. Is the Boer a first-class fighting man ? He has yielded to a superior intelligence and, perhaps, a deeper determination at Glencoe and Eland's Laagte ; But in no engagement has he proved, himself a contemptible foe in courage or in tactics. Nor Avould we British have it otherwise. It is no part oi the British character to dppreciate an enemy, and, for their very stubbornness in opposing us, we to-day acclaim the Ztilus, the Afghans, the Afridis, and the Dervishes as fiEst-class fighting men. Has the Boer likewise earned a right to a place among the foemen worthy of our highest skiil and most exalted courage? The strength of the Boer forces is an unknown quantity. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities I received a cable giving the Field Cornets' returns at 5'4,U00 men capable oi bearing arms. At the time this was received by the British press as an exaggerated estimate, and it was only after careful calculation, and after consultation with the men best able to form an opinion, that I accepted its approximate accuracy. Events have provecf that it was within the mark. Three years ago the Transvaal Undersecretary for -Foreign Affairs assured me that the Boer strength was 34,000 men armed with rifles. Dr. Leyds' more recent estimate is 35,000 burghers. The number and strength of the commandoes | now in the field prove that the British wnte-war calculations greatly UNDERVALUED THE BOER FORCE To-day there cannot be less than 60,000 men in arms — no mean army of sharpshooters. I use the word sharpshooter with ''ntention. The idea has gone abroad that the Boer can tio longer shoot straight; but this applied to the bulk of the burghers is a ' fallacy. ' Uitlander critics—and published comment has been almost wholly confined to these — have judged the Boer race from the weaklings who have drifted into Johannesburg and the mining camps along the Rand. But these are no more representa-

tive of the nation than the Hooligans of Blackfriars and Lambeth are typical of the great lniass of the people throughout, the length and breadth of England. It needs a Selous, who has hunted by day with them and lain by the camp fire alongside them at night, to speak wit> authority of 'the Boers who are now op posing Great Britain on the borders of the Transvaal. The police is the last resort of the indigent Transvaaler, and the Johannesburg Zarp is — alike in courage and in morality— everyway comparable 10 Wellington's Peninsular soldier. From them the Uitlanders have judged the race. But the great mass of the nation is today, as in 1880, a people ot simple habits — gazing wide-mouthed at a train and FEARING THE WRATH OF GOD in chastisement for a street-lamp or a telephone. One sees them upon the veld, tripping lankily on shaggy South African ponies, caring naught for anything beyond their sheep, and acknowledging no authority save God's, the Veld Kornet's, and the Predikant's. These are the men on whom the defence of the Republic has devolved, and the British forces have yet to measure strength with them in the field. General Jouberl is not devoid of a Moltke-liKe indifference to human sacrifice where the exigencies of the case demand. But Slim Piet is careful to offer only such lives as he can best spare. These lay in the Johannesburg contingent — the commando where clerkly Hollanders bivoucked alongside weedy Boers from the Fordsburg slums — and they were sent to draw the British fire at Elands Laagte. There was a fitness in this that is not at first apparent. The commando was that most easily spared by Joubert, relying upon his back-country burghers for his ultimate support, and was that containing the largest number of townsmen acquainted, colloquially at least, with instruments of modern warfare.' They alone have stood by their artillery in the campaign. It is a rule of Zulu warfare for the young impis to go first into the battle, while the men of the Old Guard stand by and criticise their conduct in the fight. Much of the Boer method has been learned from the SAVAGES UPON THEIR BORDER. The Johannesburg contingent possessed the qualifications of indifferent material and respectful familiarity with the weapons engaged. Hence their place in the van of the Boer attack. Afterwards, at Nicholson's Nek, and in circumstances better suited to their method of fighting, appeared the men of jthe back country — the true Boers of the Transvaal. The Boer degeneracy has been confined in great part to the men of the towns ; the others are shepherds, hunters, and transport-riders, as in the days of their wars against the Matabele, the 3&>sas, and the Zulus. Game has grown pitiably less in quantity, but proportionately more difficult to take. Ido not find that Boer prowess in toe chase has markedly depreciated. The men of the Wakkerstroom district, for instance — those nearest to the present seat of war — take their herds for six months of every year into the highlands in search of forage and water. They live there the traditional open life of the Boer, dependent on their guns and woodcraft? for their sustenance. Somp two years ago I was present at a wapenschouwing at Roodekoppen, in the 'Heidelberg district, and saw there an exhibition of shooting on the part of the local commando that impressed me with the present-day marksmanship of the Boci as much as anything I have read of hi; prowess in the past. There was a iorce of 700 Boers mounted on the customary veld ponies, each me;: with a remount. A canvas target wet raised a mile distant, and, at the word, •THE WHOLE COMMANDO THUNDERED down upon it, riding loose-reined, guiding with their knees. Some 300 yards from the mark the men threw themselves ia the ground, and, in squads of twenty, fired a hasty volley, remounted, and rode back to re-form column. The manoeuvre was executed as smartly as anything J have seen done by specially-trained troops at Bisley or at Alaershot. As they galloped away, only a few tattered ribbons remained fluttering in the breeze. The target was no more. In that single evolution lies the whole secret of Boer tactics — rapid advances, accurate volleys at short range, speedy retreats. The retreat is as important as \ the advance, and therein lies' one- exj planation of the employment of the Jo- : Eannesburg contingent at Elands Laagte. They were the only troops who could be trusted to remain beside cannon in position on a hill. [ In all the engagements since Elands Laagte the cannon have been withdrawn so soon as the British advance became definitely apparent. The Boers, freed from the anchorage of their artillery, have pursued their old tactics of rapid retreats from the point of most virulent attack with compensating attacks on flank. In i Carleton's case the strategy, aided by the old native trick of stampeding the enemy's horses, proved successful. To the Boer a position has no importance save as a place to fight from. One kopje-top i 3 the same as another kopjetop, and, if the enemy beset one overmuch it is wise t<» remove to another. With cannon this manoeuvre is impossible. Men must stand by the guns or lose them. The typical Boer will lose them ; and I question if any of the old commandoes will consent to give battle hampered by stationary or ' CUMBERSOME ARTILLERY. The strength of the Boers, then, lies in the back-country commandoes who will engage, maybe in considerable numbers, but who will invariably avoid heavy assault by rapid retreats, followed by reformations on the flank of the opposing force. The weakness lies in the inability to co-operate with artillery — not that theft commanders do not understand its value, but that the burghers resent its immobility. The most serious weakness of the Boei army is the scarcity of its gunners. Al ready there has been a terrible deatlvrati among the artillerists, and it must be re membered that each vacancy is a permanent vacancy. Joubert can bring up com- , mando after commando to take the place of the killed among his mounted infantry, but he has no recruits wherewith to man his depleted guns. Their efficiency is dependent upon the lives of the men wht have been trained to work them. It i? for that reason that the naval contingent has become, of a moment, worth the whole division of reinforcements to General White. The average Boer would as soon stand before the (muzzle of a loaded cannon as take charge of it at the breach. It was with the greatest difficulty the native-born members of the Staat's Artillerie have been induced to practice with their guns at Pretoria. At no time have they been fond of their migiity and mysterious arms. In the artillery lies tho chief weakness of the Boers. The strength of the Boers, on the other hund, lies in the presence at their hood of all the old leaders, save Nicolaas Smii. dead in 1896, and J. H. M. Koch, killed at Elands Xaagte. The Boer brain is stilr intact. — By Douglas Story, editor of llit> late Boer newspaper, the Standard and Disteers' News, in the Daily Mail.