THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28,1899.

Evening Post, Volume LVIII, Issue 153, 28 December 1899, Page 4

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1899.

A LESSON OF THE WAR. The Transvaal war wili, ere it te ended, be prolific in lessons to the War Office and the British public . Already the most sane and trustworthy oi the English journals are beginning to realise two things as the outcome of the conflict. First, that the Boer army is, while deadly effective, a volunteer force, , and in that sense non- military; and second, that it is deadly because it is nob the slave of the drill sergeant, and has learned to shoot. After all, it is but history writ large, for we had a minute edition of the same story years ago in the campaign of which Majuba Hill was the pivot. As our readers know, this journal has time and again urged that our true strength for sett-defence must lie in the generous support of a national volunteer movement, with the most liberal encouragement to our citizen soldiers to " learn to shoot." From this standpoint we have repeatedly urged tho Government to give monetary aid to rifle clubs, to grant free passes to volunteers on duty over the railways, and have consistently opposed tho recommendations of our Imperial military commandants to increase the nucleus of our standing army. In this attitude we now find, as an outcome ot the Transvaal war, strong support in some of the greatest English journalsj notably the Spectator, than which there is no contemporary newspaper that carries more weight with the most steadfast National and LiberalConservative element in the Old Gountry. It is in fact coming to be suddenly recognised that, in event of international complications, and a possible invasion of England, th« country will have to rely — not upon its imall army, which to hardly more

j than sufficient to " police " tho Empire oven in times of peace — but upon its volunteers, and that what these may do in timo of peril is illustrated by what the volunteers of the South African ll^ublios are doing in their stubborn and gallant efforts to obtain supremacy in the countries to which they belong. " Tho Boors," wo aro told, " are affording us a magnificent object lesson on the value of volunteers in defensive warfare. That is to say, they are not trained at all in barracks, and though when in the field they aro under strict laws, their discipline consists really in their readiness to obey. A few of their officers may be instructed men, imported from Holland and Germany, but the majority are avowedly or practically appointed by themselves, being selected as men whom the volunteers are individually willing to follow. All the Boers really know is how to occupy strong positions, how to secure cover, how to render their groups least liable to get killed, and how, when they gekthe chance, to shoot straight." Opposed to them they have a modern army of the latest pattern, led by experienced generals, who have, or had, the confidence of their countrymen, and behind the richest country in the world, ready to pour out money like water to bring the war to an early and triumphant termination. Yet during the past few weeks the burgher volunteers have won three battles — Magersfontein, Stormberg, and the Tugela, and have pushed back the British armies at every point. Not only do the Boers know how to occupy strong positions but they manage to induce our men, to employ the slang of the time, "to walk right in," as witness the ghastly blunder of Gatacre at Stormberg, and the even less excusable stupidity of Long at Tugela. "England," says the Spectator, "would feel well defended with one hundred thousand Boers to meet an invader, and she has no reason to believe that her volunteers are in any way, if properly handled, their inferiors. . . The first thing the war teaches us is that we ought to trust more than we do to the individual capacity of the volunteers, and not try so hard to turn them into ordinary soldiers." How much is the "individual capacity" considered here?v We have repeatedly .insisted that tho first thing essential is that our young men should "learn to shoot," and to that end Rifle Clubs should be encouraged all over the country, and a War Office Commandant practically answers — "Rifle shooting must be accompanied by the continuous drudgery of the drill of Tommy Atkins, or there shall be no rifle practice at the cost of the country." As a consequence thousands of men, who cannot afford the time for continuous drill, are not induced to use a rifle. Of the Boers we are told— "They afe expected to support each other rather from willingness than from discipline, and to rely on their rifles and their steadiness under fire rather than any coherence derived from drill. . . The strength of the Boer volunteers is nob in their drill but in their individual ability when regulars are charging' on mem to await their charge, and keep on their desolating fire. . . . We are, we suspect, cultivating the company to much — among the volunteers we mean — and^ the individual not enough. Yet it is as individuals acting together that tho Boers are giving us so much trouble." It looks as though this Transvaal war, if it last long enough, may prove a blessing in disguise. Certainly if the example of the Boers should prove to the British War Office that an effectual army for defence against possible invasion of the Mother Country can be created from out of her volunteers, the Empire will be more than repaid for the blood and treasure poured out and yet to be spilled upon the veldt and hills of South Africa. And the lesson .will not be lost to us. A standing army is a standing caste that may at any time in a country like ours, become a menace to the democracy. Tne greatest war of modern times was that 'twixb the iNorthern and Southern States of America, yet when the first shot was fired at Harper's Ferry the regular army did not number that of a single British Division. Let then our volunteers bo encouraged to believe that they can be made efficient for defence of their country without being required to be made the Blave of the drill sergeant, or harassed by the regulation of the barrack, and, above all things, let us make them familiar with the ritle and the way to use it, so that if the time Bhould come when they have an enemy for target they may bo confident in their ability' to bring him down. And as for the Boer example, when the war is over we hope that at least one man will return hither with name and fame enough to apply the lessons he will have learned in that arduous conflict to the effective teaching and control of the volunteers of New Zealand.