Evening Post. MONDAY, MAY 17, 1897. THE COMMONWEALTH BILL.

Evening Post, Volume LIII, Issue 115, 17 May 1897, Page 4

Evening Post. MONDAY, MAY 17, 1897. THE COMMONWEALTH BILL.

Thh Draft Bill drawn up by the Adelaide Convention to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia is an interesting, as it is a most important, document. Its provisions, especially in respect of disputed points, speak eloquently for the wisdom of Australian statesmen. The difficulties in the way of Federation seemed at one time great enough to threaten the Convention with failure; but the patriotism and earnestness of its members rose superior to the danger, and enabled them to design a Constitution which should in the main meet with the approval of the people of the federating States and the Imperial Parliament. The members of the Contention were fortunate in having the precedents of Swiss, German, American, and Canadian Federal Government to guide them in their^vork, and the draft BiJl contains abundant evidence of their having made judicious use of these living models. The founders of .the United States had little more than Greek antiques to work upon, and tbe fathers of the proposed Australian Constitution have consequently been able to avoid many of the errors into which they fell. It is worth noting too, that, unlike existing federations, Australia has no possibly hostile neighbours on her frontiers to prompt the colbnies to unite for mutual defence ; and so the most important discussions in the Convention have almost always turned, directly or indirectly, upon questions of trade and finance. The chief provisions of the Bill may be most conveniently grouped under the three heads of Machinery of Government, Relations of the Federal to the State Governments, and control of the finances and of commerce. The functions of Government are three1 fold, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial, and its framework or machinery must therefore provide for this triple duty. The Executive power iv the proposed Commonwealth is vested in Her Majesty as represented by a Governor 1 - General in Council. The Gov-ernor-General is to be appointed by the Queen, and, as her representative, is to be Commander-in-chief of all the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth. In the exercise of his duties he is to be assisted by a Federal Executive Council composed of such persons as he may from time to time summon to be sworn iv. The departments of State are to be administered by officers, not more than seven in number, who shall be members of either one of the Houses of Parliament, and shall also be Federal Executive Councillors. They are to hold office during the pleasure of the GovernorGeneral. In other words, the Government of the Federation will practically be in the hands of a Cabinet— which, by 'the way, is a secret conclave unknown to constitutional law — responsible to Parliament, and subject to the Eoyal prerogative of dismissal. The annual salary of the GovernorGeneral is fixed at £10,000, and the aggregate salaries of the Ministers of State at £12,000. The appointment and removal of all Civil Servants is, in default of Acts to the contrary, vested in the Governor-General in Council. There is no trace of the elective principle in the appointment of the Governor-General or of his Executive Ministers, nor does tbe Bill provide for the creation of an independent permanent Civil Sen ice. The responsibility of Ministers is secured by a special clause^ which provides that they shall not hold office for a longer period than three calendar months, unless they shall be or become members of one of the Houses of the Parliament. In its general outlines the Executive of the new Federation is to follow the precedents of British Imperial and Colonial institutions, and in no sense is to be an independent power like that of the United • States. The Legislative machinery is also designed on British models, and consists of the Queen, acting immediately or mediately through the Governor-General, a Senate, and a House of Representatives. After considerable discussion it was finally decided that the component States should have equal representation in the Senate, while as a concession to the more populous colonies of New South Wales and Victoria the powers of that body in the treatment of Money and Appropriation Bills were subordinated in some measure to those of the Lower House. There are to be six Senators from each State, and they are to be -chosen for six years by the people of the State as one electorate. The methods of their election are to approximate as closely as possible to those of the existing State election laws. Half the Senate is to retire every three years, and the qualifications of Senators are, like those of representatives, the full age of 21 years and a certain term of jresidonoe (three years) within the limits of the Commonwealth. The Federal Parliament may legislate for a uniform franchise for election of Senators. The members of the House of Representatives aro to be directly chosen by the people of the several States according to their respective numbers. Rather complicated provisions are made for determining the number of representatives to be apportioned to each State, but they all rest on the population basis. Shortly put, while no colony shall have less than five representatives, each State shall have one representative for every 50,000 of inhabitants. The qualifications of electors are those in force for the Lower Houses of the various States, and the qualifications of representatives are tbe same as those of Senators. Every House of Representatives shall continue for three years, unless dissolved during that period by the Governor-General. The salaries of Senators and Representatives are fixed at four hundred pounds a year. Holders of auy office of profit or of any pension from the Commonwealth are disqualified from sitting in either House, as also are contractors and persons interested in Government contracts. Each House will of course frame its own standing rules and orders, and disputed elections are to be decided by the Federal Court. , Tke Federal Judicature is to consist

of a High Court and such other Courts as Parliament may from time to time create. The Justices of tbe High Court are to be appointed by the Governor -General in Council, and are to hold office during good behaviour. They can only be removed by the Executive authority upon an address from both Houses. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court is in almost all cases to supersede that of the Privy Council. The Lower Federal Courts will derive their powers from Acts of the Federal Parliament. Indictable offences are to be tried by jury, and '•' every such trial shall be held in the State where the offence has been committed." The independence of the High Court Judges is secured, and they are to be, within the limits of the Commonwealth, the supreme interpreters of Federal and interState law. 'j?he above is an outline sketch of the main features of the proposed Constitutional framework. One of the great difficulties in drafting a Federal design is the reconciliation of State rights with the necessary authority vested in the central Government. The concessions made in tbe composition of the Senate and in the control of money matters went a long way towards smoothing over these difficulties. The Governments and Legislatures of the several States are to retain all their present powers not directly delegated to the i Federal authorities, hut to avoid deadlocks | it is provided that " when a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Coinmouwealth' the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid. The chief I matters handed over to the Central Government are — the regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and between the j States ; Customs, excise, aud bounties ; other taxation, provided it be uniform throughout the Commonwealth; raising loans; postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and like services; military aud naval defence; navigation, shipping, and quarantine; currency, banking and insurance : bankruptcy, census, and statistics ; naturalisation, immigration aud emigration; external affairs and treaties, and marriage and divorce. The exclusive power of dealing with alien races other than ' aborigines is vested tn the Federal Parliament; and a permissive control of railways and rivers is also granted it, subject to the approval of the States concerned" With regard to finance and trade, provision is made for the establishment of a uniform Customs tariff within two years of the establishment of the Commonwealth. Intercourse throughout the Commonwealth shall then, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, become absolutely free. It is estimated that the Central Government will have a surplus revenue at its disposal. Arrangements are made for repaying Lus surplus to the various States upon a graduated scale based upon the present contributions of the States, aud leading up to an adjustment governed by the numerical strength of the State relatively to the aggregate population of the Commonwealth. Money Bills must be initiated in the Lower House, and the Senate can. only suggest amendments. It is, however, provided that the various items of Customs, exoise, taxation, and appropriation shall be presented to the Senate in separate Bills, any one of which may be wholly rejected. The financial provisions of the Bill are full and suggestive, but space forbids us to enter into them in the present article with the completeness they deserve. We have said enough, we think, to give a fair idea of the scope and general tenour of the draft Bill and of the statesmanlike thoroughness of its design. ' It has still to pass the various colonial Legislatures, be endorsed by the people, and finally submitted to the Imperial Parliament before it will actually establish the Constitution, and we heartily ¦wish it success on its way.