Evening Post. THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1882. AN UNDEFENDED CASE.

Evening Post, Volume XXIII, Issue 62, 16 March 1882, Page 2

Evening Post. THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1882. AN UNDEFENDED CASE.

Should this oolony become involved, as a shareholder in that great unlimited liability company, the British Empire, in the species of litigation in which armies and fleets are the advocatoß of the contending parties, we fear that the entry against onr name would be "No defence." The action— Foreign Ship versus New Zealand Port — would assuredly result in judgment going by default. We indioated yesterday what, in the opinion of experts, was the probable nature , of the offensive operations that would be adopted against the Australian Colonies in the event of war, and also pointed out the moral certainty that these colonies would be assailed in such case. Jnst at the present moment it does not seem probable that England will be involved in war for some little time, but events march rapidly nowadays, and with Eussia and England brought almost face to face in Asia, through the former's occupation of Merv, it would be rash indeed to predict that the Mother country will be able to avoid fighting to maintain her own. Ihe position then being that England may any day be forced into war, and that in such a contingency we should be utterly defenceless and helplessly at the mercy of any hostile cruiser or privateer that might visit our ports, it obviously behoves ua to see without delay that this humiliating and perilous state of affairs is not allowed to continue. We have the material for a very efficient little army. Our constabulary and volunteers together number something like 10,000 men. Supposing an enemy to have landed, and to be disposed to meet our men in the field, we have no doubt the latter would give a very good acoount of themselves. But unfortunately the colony might be seized and ruined before the bravery and discipline of our soldiers could oome into play at all. Of course if an enemy landed at some place other than one of the main ports, it might be easy enough to send against them a force overwhelmingly stronger in numbers than any that would be likely to be landed. But equally of oouree that is just what no enemy with a particle of sense would think of doing. The sole object that would be worth an enemy's while to aim at would be the seizure of one or all of New Zealand's chief ports, through which a ruinous ransom might be wrung from the colonists as the price of escape from sack or bombardment, while on the other hand it would enable a useful diversion to be effectedagainst England, who would be compelled to

send a strong force for the recovery of the colonies. It may be taken for granted that the full efforts of an enemy would be directed against Wellington, Auckland, Lyttelton and Dunedin. We may take the case of the first as fairly typical. Let na imagine the sudden arrival at the Heads of two or three Bwift steamers armed and manned aa suggested ia our hut article. There is nothing to prevent their steaming right in and anchoring just opposite the city, after possibly sending a boats-crew to cat the telegraph cable and bo prevent any intimation being Bent to Australia or wherever the Australian squadron might happen to be. Even if this were not effected in time, it would take nearly a week for the Equadron to reach Wellington, and as one of the enemy's proceedings would undoubtedly be to establish a look-out to give warning of its approach, the superior speed of the vesaelp purchased by Russia would enable them to get dear away in good lime to escape reprisals. But consider what might have happened in the interval. With the hostile cruisers anchored off our town, there would be nothing for it but instant and abject submission to every demand, however extortionate. Refusal would simply involve bombardment, the burning of the city, and probably all the unspeakable horrors of a free sack. Those who are curious as to what this means can obtain ample information on the eubject from almost any historical work. Perhaps Motley's "Rise of the Dutch Republic" gives as vivid a description aa any to be found in literature ot what happens when a town is sacked. The description ia absolutely bloodcurdling, yet it might have been applied with strict accuracy to the proceedings of the! Russians, as well as the Turka, in the last war, not five years ago. The position would not be improved by the Russian force consisting largely, aB it probably w<suld, of desperadoes recruited from the worst and most lawless class of the American population. It would be no consolation for suoh atrocities to be afterwards, bloodily avenged- by Great Britain. That would not restore happiness to the hnndieda of bereaved, ruined, and dishonoured homes. The injury wonld be irreparable. Yet this terrible disaster could in all likelihood be averted by a few comparatively inexpensive precautions. One or two properlyplaced batteries of heavy guns ; a simple system of torpedo defenoe ; two cor three gunboats manned by the various Naval Brigades, would probably render all our chief ports totaliy impregnable to any attacking force that there is the remotest proapect of our ever being visited by. There is no possible excuse for neglecting or delaying to provide these in despeD sable safeguards. We have a few heavy guns, and Colonel ! Scbatchley'b advice where to plade them and how to use them. If more are needed to ensure safety we must have them, and Obtain i further oounael from Colonel Scbatchley or some authority as to their most effective disposal. What we have already should be mounted immediately, and provision made for their working by trained artillerymen. The 6-pounder popguns now used by our Artillery corps would be utterly useless against a single hostile vessel anchored in the bay. She could reply with her 300-pounders and knock Wellington and the Artillery 6pounders into cocked hats without incurring the slightest risk herself. But she ought never to be allowed to get there. Our heavy guns should be placed in batteries, and our artillery drilled in the use of such ordnance and in garrison work, for these would be the only capacities in whioh they could be'really serviceable in case of actual need. So also a gunboat or two ought to be provided for each chief port, and equipped with all the latest appliances for naval offence. Our naval brigades should be trained to" handle them efficiently, and in co-operation with the Torpedo Corps, who aleo need' to be throughly instructed and practised tin the use of these deadly engines of destruction against hostile visitors. It must be clear as daylight to everyone who reflects on the question,- that our sole hope of safety in such a contingency as that alluded to wpnld rest in the judicious employment of naval, artillery, and engineer corps with their appliances. The rifle corps would have their own function?, and very important ones to fulfil, in garrisoning the city and in rendering it impossible for an enemy to take us in flank or in the rear by avoiding the harbour defences and landing forces at some unprotected spot. But they would be wholly useless, unless the harbour defences were secure, for those once safely passed, our case would be hopeless, and no defence by land, however gallant it doubtless would be, could avail us one straw. Here, then, is an obvious course of duty on the part of the Government. The harbonr defences will cost money — all precautions do. Insurance of every kind costs large Bums, for which wo obtain no return, except in the comfortable sense of Beourity, unless the contingency against which we have insured — death, fire, Bhipwreck, or acoident — actually occurs. Thia consideration, however, does nofc prevent our insuring, and ought not to do so. What is a right and proper policy on the part of the individual is equally bo in the oaso of a community. The question of mere -expense is quite a secondary one. A large surplus iB always a good and pleasant thing, and retrenchment is very necessary at times, but the safety of the whole colony is a matter whose importance by far transcends all such considerations as these. We are satisfied that our volunteers aspire to fulfil higher functions than attendance at Church Parades, or- -Easter Encampments, or Rifle Association" competitions. All these may be means to an end, but what our volunteers aim at being is the safeguard of the colony, and they ought to be enabled to become national defenders in deed aB well aa in name. We earnestly hope that we shall be able to announce ere long that the Government have determined to take instant steps in the direction above indicated, and that we shall not wait to shut the stable door until the steed has been successfully stolen.