Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1882.

Evening Post, Volume XXIII, Issue 61, 15 March 1882, Page 2

Evening Post. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1882.

FOREIGN ATTACK AND COLONIAL DEFENCE. + Even assuming that tie threatened oatbreak of a European war is delayed for a time, as the latest intelligence seems to indicate, and that in the event of suoh an outbreak England would be able to keep dear of the milie, it is not quite comfortable to reflect on the imminence of the danger which this colony may have temporarily escaped, and against the recurrence of which we have as yet no guarantee whatever. In 1878 we were within an ace of being involved in war, and there is no certainty that Mr. Gladstone, with all his love of peace, may be any more able to avoid it in 188' i than was Lord Aberdeen in 18)4. We have discussed in tormer articles the probabilities for and against a European rupture. Cur present o bjeot is to point out what would be the positiou and special peril of this colony in the event of war being declared between the Mother Country and — let us say Bussia, as the most likely opponent. The great and all important question for us in New Zealand to consider is — What would be the course taken by Russia in respect to New | Zealand ? (1) Would Bu3sia be likely to attack this colony ? (2) if so, how ? and (3) could we resist suoh attack ? In regard to the first question, there can be, we think, no doubt at ail. Every competent military and naval authority seems to be quite clear that I'nsaia would not miss 6o obvious a method of embarrassing and harasing England by diverting her attention, and a portion of her armament, to the defence of her own distant possessions, apart from the tempting opportunity it would offer for seizing the rich colonies of Australasia, and with them the command of the Pacific. But the opinion of experts goes much farther than this. They believe that Rnssia not only has positively decided to take this course in case of war with England, but also is fully prepared to strike the blow at the very commencement of hostilities, nay, that all her plans are in a complete state of readiness,

and even that some material preparations have been made for carrying them into execution at a moment's notice. It is well known that in 1853, during the Polish insurrection, when the attempted European intervention on behalf of the Pole 3 was co firmly rejected by the late Czar, and when there was consequently a strong and outßpoken feeling in England for armed interposition, Russia promptly devised a counter-plan of operations, which was to be put in force directly Great Britian should determine to assist the Poles with force of arms. Thia plan was to make a sudden descent on Australia and New Zealand, to seize and hold those colonies, devastating them where convenient, and so compelling England either to swallow a national humiliation and see the dominion of the Tauific permanently wrested away, or else to despatch a powerful naval and military expedition to recover the lost territory. The British Government, however, decided against armed intervention, and so that cloud dispersed. When, on the crushing defeat of France by Germany in 1870, Russia insolently repudiated the Black Sea Treaty of 1856. wrung from her by France and England as the result of the Crimean war, and England began to grumble at this bwach of faith, the Pacific project was again heard of, but this cloud also cleared away. Once more it arose, and this time in most portentious eize and menncing aspect. In 1878; wbile the upshot of Lord Beaconspield's interference with the high-handed action of Russia at the close of the Rnsaia-Turkiah war, was yet uncertain, Rußsia was not idle in her preparations for a vigoroua diversion in the Pacific. On that occasion a very complete and exhaustive design was drawn up for an expedition to Australia and New Zealand. Nay more, a small picked force was Bent to America as a nucleus of operations, and arrangements were made for the purchase of an adequate fleet of large and swift steamers to be employed on this special service. The details of the Kueeian scheme have not, of course, been made public. Russians are not like Englishmen in that respect, and do not go "blabbing" their Becreta all over the world and giving their foea the very information they most desire, putting into their hands, in fact, the means of defeating their plan 9. Unluckily Englishmen are grievously addicted to the perpetration of this folly, and it is notorious that most foreign officers are infinitely better acquainted with England's strong and weak points, her military and naval capabilities, her means of offence and defence, than are some of the Home authorities. But Russia keeps her own counsel as to the details of her designs, and these can only be conjectured, or rather worked out in theory from suoh facts as may have transpired through acoident. It ia generally admitted that an invasion by a strong squadron of powerful war-ships, ironclad or otherwise, ia not very probable. It would not be a duel of big guns against iron plates. What we have to apprehend is a sudden, bold, and resolute daßh, which would take us by surprise, and deprive us of tho power of defence all at a blow. In 1878, when the peril seemed imminent, an experienced naval officer, who was in the Pacifio at the time, carefully thought out the probabilities, and arrived at a very distinct conclusion, which, so far as we are aware, has never hitherto been published. He formed the opinion that the Russian plan of proceeding would be somewhat as follows : — The small picked body of officers and men sent to America would use the States as a recruiting ground — American friendliness to Russia, or soreness for past recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, being relied on for inducing the American Government to wink conveniently at their doings — and collect a large body of men for a sort of filibustering expedition on an extensive scale. Supposing the "regular" force sent by Russia to America consisted of several parties, each comprising a captain or commander, two lieutenants, two engineers, four stokers, and 24 carefully-selected A.B.s, it is believed they would be employed thus : — All the regular A.B 'b would be created quasi-non-commissioned officers, the eight best being accorded a rank somewhat answering to that of sergeant, and the other sixteen to that of corporal. Each corporal would be placed in charge of 20 men, enlisted as above described, and would drill them into tome sortof rongh discipline. Each sergeant would be in charge of two of these sub-divißions, and each lieutenant would control four sergeants' companies, the captain, of course, commanding the whole. Now in this way a very complete and efficient little machine for colonial invasion would be provided for each steamer. The captain would have at his disposal two bodies of men, each in charge of a lieutenant and numbering about 160 men. r'ach lieutenant would be able to divide his force into two, under their respective sergeants, and these might be employed as required. It is believed that an amplo number of men could have been found, among tho more lawless part of the American population at any rate, who would bo induced, either by liberal bounties or by promise of plunder, to embark in such an expedition. In this wav a very small, but carefullypicked, body of Ruasian " regulars " could have been made the nucleus of a formidable force. We have Eeen how a detachment of three officers and 30 men could be developed into ten times that fctrength. It is known that the steamers were all ready for delivery, and they were vessels of such speed as to be able easily to distance any British war-ship in these seas. Imagine the arrival in any New Zealand port, or perhaps in the four chief ports simultaneously, even of two or three of theße steamers thus manned and armed with only one or two heavy gnns — what would be our inevitable fate ? What could it be but an instant apd abject submission to any termß that the invadera chose to dictate, to any robbery or indignity they pleased to inflict, indeed to their despotic rule altogether. What aro our defences against such a form of foreign attack? Four or five British war-shipß which would bo over-matched in speed, and which assuredly could not even attempt the defence of the whole Australian seas and seaboard. Onr colonial defonces are Bimply non-existent We have plenty of well-drilled volunteers, but the country would be lost before their Fervices could come into play at all. The harbours once in posses- ion of two or three foreign vessels — nay, of only one — ahore resistance would be worse than idle. Yet we have naval brigades, artillery batteries, aad torpedo corps, but we have not even a gunboat for the first, we have no suitable ordnance for the second, we have no torpedo appliances for the third. . We have .a few big guns, it ia true, but they are stowed away in store and not mounted. Why not? We may rely upon it there will be no time to do this if war once breaks out, still less to drill our artillerymen — used to handling six or nine-pounders — in the management of heftvy guns. Engineers and torpedo corps have everything to learn in their branch of warfare, and naval brigades need to be taught how to use with effect against hostile visitors such gunboats as could be easily built in the colony. Our safety in cage of war must needs depend wholly on our harbour defences, for, our harbours once in hostile possession, ail the bravery and skill of our land forces would be impotent to save us from disaster and public ruin.