ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.

Evening Post, Volume XXII, Issue 34, 9 August 1881, Page 3

ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.

TO THB EDITOB OP THE EVENING POST. Sir, — Tho news by the last Indian mail tends to foreshadow tho policy of the Home Government with regard to affairs in Afghanistan, and throws light on the telegrams recently received, which pointed to the concentration of troops on the N.W. frontier with the view (it was hinted) to rendering assistanoe to the Ameer, Abdal Rahman, in the event of Ayoub Khan gaining further successes in the neighbourhood of Candahar. We have particulars of tho first three minor engagements between the Ameer's forces and thoso of Ayoub Khan near the Helmund, in all of which tho Ameer's troops were victorious ; but of the last and most important aotion in which a decided victory was gained by Ayoub's partizans, and which placed Candahar in serious peril, no further details than tho-o received by cable can yet be looked for. There ia enough to show us, however, that the Ameer's influence and power wore being tripd to the utmost, for notwithstanding the critical state of affairs in the west of his dominions he has evidently been unable to 1> aye Cabul ; and, in this stato of affairs, if it had been the intention of Government to have assisted him, Ayoub would not have been allowed to continue his march southward unopposed. Without g >ing back to questions now out of date, it is of importance clearly to uuderBtand the nature of our relations with Afghanistan, and entirely to dissipate the notion that, in the event of our settlement with the present Ameer proving unstable, the recent policy of the Home Government will be discredited. The immediate object of our second invasion was to inflict a dire punishment for tho murder of our Envoy, for the necessity of which there never was the least doubt ; but the carrying out of this object was unhappily attended with unforseen results. One of tho most important waa the creation of a chaos throughout tho country. The annexation of the country never having really been at any time entertained, though there were not wanting advocates of this policy, after sufficient punishment had been meted ont, the qu'-stion of reitrement turned on our being able to do so honorably, and on oar repairing as far as possible, before retiring, tho breat-ht-B we had made in the constitution of the country during tho process of punishing it. The first of those conditions was fulfilled by General Roberts — iho second by tho political officers of the Government of India. But to 'suppose that, if the Afghans ! elect to destroy the foundations of or^er and good government, we thought it our duty to organise before retiring, England should be called upon to regard that as any concern of hers — would be to show entire ignorance of faots. For the present Viceroy is bound by no treaty whatever of tho kind with i Abdul Rahman, and the assistance hitherto afforded him was merely given him with the view of establishing such ordor, as circumstances admitted of, while we were vacating the country. But nothing more was attempted, for the very good reason that - short of actual military occupation- nothing more was possible. And all we have now to do is clearly to leave the Afghans to their own devices, provided they do not ag<in suffer themselves to be made " cat's-paws " of by onr enemies, and to ensure our relations with tho semi-independent tribes on our immediate frontier remaining undisturbed, whatever changes in the Government of the country the people may choose to make. I am, *c, H. Closte. Ind. Uncov. Service. ' Lower Hutt, 6th August, 1881.