INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE.

Dunstan Times, Issue 2963, 14 April 1919, Page 4

INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE.

Major-General Sir H. M. Trenchard a despatch on the work of the Independent Force, E.A.F., covering the period nom June 5, 1918, to the signing ot the armistice," is a record of great enterprise which met with substantial reward, as well as of remarkable bravery and of keen and efficient work performed by the staff and al on Germany were begun by a small force located near Nancy, and up to June hj 57 attacks were made on the Rhine district, despite the severe handicap imposed by the limited capacity of some of the machines then in service. It was only after that that large bombers thoroughly equipped for long-distance work became available in any number. With the addition of further squadrons of heavy machines a more ambitious programme was entered upon, but raids on Germany were at all times highly difficult and dangerous. The toll of Independent Force machines “missing” is 109, but no risks and no losses deterred our pilots and observers, whose courage and determination are described by General Trenchard (commanding the Force) as “magnificent. I never saw, even when our losses were heaviest, any wavering in their determination to o-ei well into Germany. There were cases fn which a squadron lost the greater part of its machines on a raid, but this in nowise damped the other squadrons. Keenness to avenge their comrades and to attack the same target again and at once It is to this trait in the character ot the Bntish pilots that I attribute their suc-

cess in bombing Germany.” On June 5, General Trenchard took over from Sir D. Haig the tactical command of the Force, and the administration and complete control a week later. His first task was to push on and arrange for the accommodation of a force of some 60 squadrons, which work was practically copipleted by November 1. Previously be had emphasised the necessity for equipping the B.E.F. on the Western front with sufficient aircraft to hold and beat the German aerial forces there; that the bombing of Germany was a luxury till this had been accomplished, but that once accomplished, it became a necessity. He decided to attack as many as possible of the large industrial centres which could be reached by the machines at his disposal. The moral effect of this plan, the General considered, was very great, as no town fett safe, and it necessitated

continued and thorough defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different localities over which the A.I.F. was operating. Bombing by day as well as by night was necessary, because if the former were excluded (although it meant higher casualties) at least fourfifths of the value of night bombing must he wasted, owing to the fact that the enemy could then make his arrangements to work by day and live at d distance by night, and take other similar defensive steps. Decision had to be come to, when it was impossible for squadrons to reach their objectives well in the ulterior of Germany, what alternative objective should be attacked, and which attacks would have the greatest effect in hastening the end of the war. General Trenchard put railways first in order of importance, and then blast furnaces. He knew that the Germans were extremely short of rolling stock, and some of the main railways feeding the German army in the west passed close to the British front, and they were fairly easy to find at night.