The Daily Telegraph. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1900. THE OUTSIDE WORLD

Daily Telegraph (Napier), Issue 9951, 27 December 1900, Page 4

The Daily Telegraph. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1900. THE OUTSIDE WORLD

We are told to-day by cable news from London that Germany has made claims upon the United States in connection with affairs in Cuba. The message as we receive it sets out that the claims are for compensation arising out of the insurrection "subsequent " to the Cuban war. We judge this to be an error. The insurrection which arose in Cuba commenced while Spain was still ruler there, and it was the failure of Spain to quell the rebellion, and so to ensure security of life and property for peaceably disposed residents, which provided the United States with a reasonable excuse for interfering. During the insurrection the property of foreign residents of Cuba suffered to a great extent. Had Spain succeeded in re-establishing her authority she would have had to meet many claims for indemnification, and the standpoint of Germany probably is that as the United States is now the responsible Cuban authority, that country is liable for what Spain would have had to settle.

Oa the other hand Germany may have in mind excesses committed by the Cuban insurgents after Spanish authority had been superseded by the effectual intervention of America. If that be so it is difficult to see how the United States can deny the justice of the claims made, at all events so far as the principle upon which they are based is concerned. The latter Power, however, disclaims all liability. Hence we have the material out of which much trouble may arise, for Germany has already a long-standing grievance against the United States in connection with Brazil. Germany has been told, almost in set terms, that any attempt on her part to coerce Brazil will be regarded as an unfriendly act against the United States, and in a quiet way this has been put forward! in Berlin as one reason why Germany must strengthen her navy. If the United States now decides not to recognise any just claim Germany may have with regard to Cuba the result must be diplomatic friction of a more or less serious description. Indeed, if the cable message as a whole may be trusted, Germany seems inclined to bring about that friction. We are told, for example, that she has other claims "arising out of the Cuban war, but that she will hold them in abeyance until Cuba is " proclaimed independent." If language like that has /been used by any responsible German official, and it is not repudiated" by the Government, the American people could not well be blamed if they chose to regard it as a deliberate insult. For why should Germany assume that Cuban independence is possible ? The recent Presidential elections turned largely on that question, it being understood that the McKinley policy involved retention of every scrap of territory annexed as a result of the war, and that whatever measure of autonomy might be hereafter granted to Cuba or the Philippines would be conditional upon the dominance of the Stars and Stripes. Besides, if an independent Cuba could be rightly indebted to Germany, for acts already committed (all of them committed, too, while she was admittedly not independent) the Cuba now dependent must be liable. Hence any talk of holding over claims which, if rightly founded, the United States ought to settle, is in itself provocative. It assumes that America while she holds Cuba will not be just, and that she will not long hold Cuba.

It is possible that Germany may look upon the present as an opportune time to adopt the attitude she has taken up. The Senate of the United States are behaving very badly in their dealings with Britain in connection with the Nicaragua Canal, and have gone to such a length as to extort from The Times the statement that the President must be responsible for any friction that arises in consequence. At Berlin they may credit the United States with being wise enough to recognise that it is bad policy to quarrel with two of the Great Powers at once, and they may assume that if a choice has to be made the Senate will look upon wrangling with Britain as at j once the safer game and the more profitable i'roTi a political point of view. From that standpoint Germany] may hope to gain her ends. But any such reasoning is bound to result in disillusionment. There will be no quarrel between Britain and the United States, in the ordinary sense of that term. There may be friction of a kind, but that is all.

In the event of any real trouble threatening, Britain would be found on the side of the United States rather than against her. The very war now being discussed was a proof of that, for it has long been known to the world that on a certain eventful morning, when the Yankee Commodore had to send something very like an ultimatum to the commander of a German squadron engaged in " observations," British war vessels similarly employed would have taken pait in any fighting brought about by the circumstances. As a matter of fact the British vessels were moved to positions from which they could have acted as supports to the American warships. It will doubtless be greatly regretted in Britain that the United St"ates should be ruled by a Senate

whose notions of honor are so debilitated, and whose predilections in favor of " slimness " would not discredit a Kruger or a Leyds, but this will never tempt any British Ministry to play into the hands of another Power seeking to bring pressure to bear upon the Great Republic. That is a very significant summingup of the Chinese difficulty by the Novoe Vremya. Incidentally, also, it throws a strong light upon the success which has attended the efforts of Lord Salisbury, for from the inspired utterances of the Russian organ we learn that the most important clause in the joint Note presented to China by the Powers was inserted at the instance of Britain. It is that provision which involves the maintenance of an allied army in China until all the conditions of the Note are fulfilled. There appears no reason to dissent from the views expressed by other Russian journals, namely, that Britain is not particularly anxious to end a state of things which puts out of the question any possibility of European intervention in Africa, and at the same time strengthens Count yon Waldersee, whose position tends to throw more and more the balance of power into the hands of Britain and Germany, now by the force of circumstances working together instead of against each other. But Russia wins iti spite of that, and by Germany's mistaken policy The Novoe Vremya does right to boast that whatever happens Manchuria is secured to Russia. There seems no escape from that conclusion. Manchuria has been really given to Russia by Germany, first by assisting to bring about the war in Africa and thus precipitating the Chinese trouble, and secondly by that course of action having driven Britain to come to an understanding with the Government of the Czar. That agreement practically assured Russia the acquiescence of Britain in regard to the Czar's policy in Manchuria on condition that French and German ideas of intervention in Africa were frowned upon. And so far as we can judge from what has been admitted by the various European Chancellories, the agree ment would have involved more comprehensive issues if Germany had not recognised that she was driving Lord Salisbury to ignore her altogether, and to bring about a state of things in which she would be isolated. But what has been arranged as a result of second thoughts cannot prejudically affect Russia in Manchuria now. There she is ; there she will remain. Lord Hopetoun having done what i his critics admit to be " safe," to be " constitutional," and to be " appropriate," by asking Sir W. Lyne to attempt to form a Ministry, and the latter having failed to perform the task, its carrying-out now falls to the ( lot of Mr Barton, It has been attempted to be shown by Australian journals that all the intriguing which followed the summoning of Sir W. Lyne was due to personal or Federal reasons. On the one hand it was said that Sir W. Lyne lacked the " magnetism " of Mr Barton, and on the other that he ought not to have been entrusted with the task because he had opposed Federation. But those are merely surface reasons. The whole business has pivoted on Victoria, whose hopes are centred upon a strongly Protectionist tariff being resolved upon by the Federal Parliament. The politicians of that State (accurately enough as we consider) looked upon Mr Reid, a Freetrader, as likely to shape to a iarge degree what the Protectionist Premier of New South Wales would, if-left, to himself, bring forward. The

whole affair is therefore at bottom but one of vested interests. Tbe real victor is not Mr Barton, but the Hon. Mr Deakin, founder and upholder of the Protectionist policy of the Age, which journal he so long editorially controlled, and tbe principles which have triumphed are not those of Federation, but of capitalistic rings which flourish as a result of fiscal buttressing. By the way, Sir W. Lyne has been actuated by higher motives than he was credited with, for it is now admitted that he could have formed a Ministry and have been the first Federal Premier. His action in preferring to sink personal ambition in order to permit of the formation of a stronger combination than he could command is very creditable to him.