(FROM THE 'OTAGO DAILY TIMES' OCTOBER 8.)

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XIX, Issue 1954, 21 October 1863, Page 4

(FROM THE ' OTAGO DAILY TIMES' OCTOBER 8.)

Thb alacrity'with'wliiiih the'iuvltatioii'of tile Government of New Zealand-to volunteers, for 'the Militia 3?oree Ku beeifrespojided to, ii one of the most inter- . etting feature! of the preient war. Those who doubted j the ability of> the Europenn population to raise ft colonial fowe, sufficient at least for the purpose of, defence,, must' now be convinced that it only required the effort to be made, . to securo a local army. The experiment made by the New Zealand Government has been eminently successful, and one can only regret that the ■tcp of organising a strong colonial force was not adopted in the last war. It may be safely calculated tbat the Militia and Volunteer Force of the colony numben now some 5000 men. Fiom Australia over 2000 men have been raised, and Olago has contributed to the Auckland nnd Tiiianaki Militia mid the Defenco Forces at Napier and Wellington somewhere about 900. To these must be added the Militia and Volunteers constituted fioin the local population. It will of course take some tiin* to render this largo force, ■uperior as it is in the quality of material to the regular military, available for the put posts of actual waifaie. In fact, we doubt much if it would bo (keirablo lo use it for such purpose. The Militia raised under the special conditions of occupancy of Native land is essentially a defensive force, and as such must be regarded. Its utility will consist in finding garrisons for outposts And the chain of redoubts, which it is General Curaeron's intention to establish round the districts which feed the insurrection. In course oi time each little band will become thoroughly acquainted with the country in the vicinity of its post ; the men are not inexperienced raw recruits, but inured to almost every hardship and trial. The great proportion of the Volunteers raised in Otago and Victoria, consists of men to whom the inconveniences and privations of bush life offer no tei roi s. Those who have been accustomed to encounter, in the w ilds of Australia and Otago, all the vicissitudes of hunger, cold, and the thousand obstacles continually occurring to men of their vocations, ate not likely to be daunted either by the natural intricacies and difficulties of the New Zealand bush, or the prospect of an encounter with the natives. We question if at any previous time a force so admirably adapted, for the purpose for which it is intended, was collected together as the Volunteer Militia now being raised ; and \\ hatever result may attend the offensive movements of General Cameron, we may safely conclude that the defence of the colonial settlements will be full}' ciismed by the civiliau forces. We are strongly of opinion that the proposed inilitarj' settlements .should bo at once organized, and the men employed in the construction of the necessary block houses. The sooner this is done the sooner may wo expect to hear the last of the murderous and sudden onslanghteis by the lebels, which at present keep the whole of the Auckland frontier in an iiuecme state. As General Camei on gradually drives tho insurgents before him, his rear bhould be followed upand occupied by these military settlements, which will seive not only to keep open the communication, but to prevent the chance of the enemy securing :my advantage by a flank movement — a contingency to which, in a country of so intricate a character, an attacking force is always more or less liable. Feais are expressed in certain quarters that the Colonial Government has not the power to alienate the lauds of the robeli, and that the Home Government v. ill not consent to such a sweeping measure. There is a, good deal of plausibility in the arguments brought forward in support of this jiew, but nothing can be more certain than that the confiscation programme wdl be carried out. At a time and undersnch circumstances like the present, ft will notdo to draw too fine linesof distinction between what is strictly right and what is a military necessity. The treaty of Waitangi has been uspd as a weapon by the philo-Maoris on both sides of the question. At one time it was the fashion to speak of the treaty of Waitangi as so much waste paper, co far as the Maoris themselves were interested. " The natives did not understand its obligations ; it was a treaty only partially acknowledged," said they, in discussing the questions which gave rise to tho last war. Now the treaty of Waitangi is hurledjn the face of the udvocates of confiscation. "The"(friaty guaranteed the integrity of the lands of the natives ; therefore you have no right to deprive this or that tribe of its hind." Common sense, however, is quite sufficient for the consideiation of these finely drawn arguments. If the treaty is of any value at all, iis provisions must be of a compensating character. The privileges confeiied and the obligations demanded wpre dependent on each other, and any departure flora the one warrants the deprivation of the other. The plan of confiscation, recommends itself in every way. It is in a military yeme a necessary part of the scheme of self defence ; legally it ia right— morally it is just. The most indent well-wisher of the Maori lace could not devibe any measure so calculated to save the aborigines fiom rapid total extinction, by imposing a check on their disorderly tendencies, as the foimatiou of military settlements. Besides, the i\«rd of the Government is pledged to tho men^ure, without which the large volunteer foice would not have been socmrd. We fancy it is intended to carry out the military settlement scheme extensively thioughout the North Island, as we notice that a lccent Gazelle contains the conditions upon which land "situ.ited in the North Island of New Zealand" will be granted to volunteers — an enlargement evidently of the Waikato and Taranaki schemes. Sufficient laud not only foi the purpose of the proposed military settlements but for the purpose of colonisation, will fall in under the Confiscation Act, without making the condition of the Maori population any worse. Thousands upon thousands of acres of valuable land are in the bauds of the native owners absolutely worthless, not the slightest attempt being made to cultivate them. Supposing the land of every insurgent tribe to be confiscated, there would still be ample room for tiie Government to make suitable and extensive reserves for the native population, sufficient for their requitements, and leave an enormous area of land for profitable occupation by Europeans. We notice it is suggested to offer grants of land to the regul.ir military, but the proposition is a foolish one, although doubtless well intended. The occupation of the land is the most important feature of the military Bttlli'inent scheme — a condition which the soldiers of the hue could not comply with. It might be deshable to make offers to men whose term of service has expit ed, and it would not be a bad plan to periodically elm ft, say from India, soldiers whose term of service was up and who would gladly accept the conditions of mtlitiry occupancy. Iv this way tho colony might constantly calculate on receiviug an accession of militiry strength year by year, until an extraneous assistnncp could be entirely dispensed with. In whichever way we look at the military settlement ficheine, it appears to be the most reliable system of defence, and to hold out the greatest hope for the prevention of native outbreaks. The colony has reason to congtatulate itself on the magnificent body of men which has been raised under the auspices of the Government, s When the present war is finished an clement of stiength will have been created which will render the colonists as ablp as they are willing to defuid themselves for the future.