H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE ON COAST DEFENCES.

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XVIII, Issue 1634, 16 October 1862, Page 4

H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE ON COAST DEFENCES.

Tun Duke of Cambridge. — T am sorry to prolong this discussion, but there aie one 01 two obseivations of the noble earl upon military points which I feel bound to notice. With respect to the policy of the Government, it is not for me to defend it, but I must say as a member of this House that I entirely agiee with the course that has been adopted by the Government upon this occasion. I think, under all the encumstances, and considering the difficulties in which this question from various causes has been involved, that they have come to a wise conclusion in suspending — not giving up— but suspending for a period the construction of the foits at S pithead, and going on as far as they aie able with the other works, that have been commenced and aio now in various stages of piogiess The noble earl has alluded to the works atPortsdown Hill. I think that any military man who considois the position of Portsmouth will come to the conclusion that, unless Poitsdown is occupied, Poitsmouth is entirely at the mercy of anybody who can occupy that town. Well, if Pot tsdown is to bo occupied at all, is it to be occupied by works or by an army ' I say by woiks, because by that means you will require a much smaller force than if you occupied it by an aitny If Poitsmonth is to be defended, and it is admitted that Poitsdown is the key of the position of Poits month, as I hold it to be, and I believe the same will be found to be the opinion of most mihtaiy men then it would lequiie^. much laiger foice to defend Poitstown without foits than to defend it with forts and ti oops combined The objection as to shutting np\oiu tioops there is quite untenable Who aie the hoops that would be so shut up ' Why, the law levies of the uountiy (I [cat, hear.) And pi ly iciuenibcr if weie to ha\e an invasion — and leoollect that the whole question turns upon that, because if it is to be assumed that theie can bo no invasion then T agiee that these woiks aie useless — but if you have befoie you the possibility of an invasion, theie is no doubt that it would come upon us suddenly, unexpectedly, and at veiy shoit notice. Then the levies you have to aid your regular tioops would be so law and ine\peiicnced in the fust instance, that they would be valuable to you only when m foits ; it ■would only be when they hid the projection and suppoit of such woiks that you could make them genei ally useful The aigument which has been used in another place, that it was demgataiy to the English soldier to fight behind walls (laiightei), is the most extiaoidwaiy of which I can conceive. (Hear, heai ) It is the fiist time in my life I ever heard that it was deiogatoiy to us to use the resouices of science and ait in oidei to make a small force moi ea\ ailablc , and yet, 111 1 egi et to sly such an argument came f1 om a militai y man (Heu, hear) Now, let us see what weiequiie at Poitsmouth We leqime for occupying those foits the raw militia and such of the volunteers as may not be thought sufficiently dulled andtiained to take the field You will then have au available foicc of, say, 10,000 or 20 000 men who can issue fiom Poitsmouth and fall upon the flank or icai of any enemy who may have lauded on your shores and beadvanc ing on London (Heai, hear.) But Poitsdown-lnll does not stand alone. Theie is Dover, which my noblo friend says he has never heaid a leason for foiti tying My noble friend will lecollect that the late Duke of Wellington, who surely may bo fairly quoted on such a matter, always said that Dover was one of the most impoitaiit points on oui coast, and that its defence ought to come within the system of defences for the whole countiy. The leason the Duke of Wellington gave foi that opinion was this, — that the woiks at Dover woip not at all meant for defending the limbour There is no hnrboui to defend. Dovei is an enhenched camp the only entrenched camp that we have along that whole line of coast, and a very vulnerable line it is. It is the only position in which you can place mihtaiy stoics and military assistance of evei y kind for the army that may bo defending yom shores Tlicie you have a point (Vappiu foi a meat stietch of coast which is so vnlneiable And if you lwve an available aimy of 40,000 men between Poilsmouth and Dovei, I contend that no hostile aimy, e\en if it effected a landing, could with safety or secmity move upon London. (Hear, hear.) I maintain, then, that the defence of yom capital lies veiy much m your occupying and stiengthening Dover aud Poitsdown-lnll Recollect also, that on the whole of that bne of coast theie aie few harbours indeed, and none at all that can bo enteied without difficulty. ButatDo\er you have a maginficant landing stage, wlieie the largest line of-battle ships fan l un alone; side, and land men and stoics Only consider what a benefit that would be to an invading enemy And, lemember, it is sifcua ted at the very point of your coast which is at the shoitest distance from the neaiest Power which could ever land on yom shores as an enemy I trust, my lords, that that may never occur ; but still it may occur at some time or other, and suioly it would be veiy lniudicious for us to do what the noble lord spoke of— namely, vote £5,000 or £G, OOO to be spent in blowing up the woiks at Dover T should e\tiemely iet;iet to see any such piopnsnl made either in tins oi the other House of Paihament (Hear, heai ) I believe that what the government have done at Do\oi lias been wisely done, and will be valuable for the general defence of the countiy My loids, we cannot disguise fiom oui selves the fact that we have a veiy small .aimy to defend a veiy great empne ; that only a veiy small foice can at any time be at homo ; and that we must mainly lely upon the raw levies which we can bi ing out at any pel tod for the support of that nucleus of regular troops. Let us, then, put those law levies in a position wheie they can be made available The only position wheie tor a long time they can be made available is within woiks, wheie they will get confidence and efficiency It is said that we have not atfcilleiy foice to man these woiks. I can assure your loidslnps that wo have a very valuable body of artilleiy ; that the militia aitilleiy have, within ashoit time, made \eiy considciable progiess; and, with a spi inkling of the oidinaiy artilleiy of the aimy, they would make most excellent gunners in all these woiks If, on the other hand, you were to put those men in the field without the assistance of woiks, you would ceifcamly have a poor chance of making them available But i>lace them m foils and they would piove most useful, and that, too, without in the smallest degree lnteifeung with the stiength or efficiency of your field aitilleiy. (Heai ) Let me turn foi a moment to another point I have stated that yon might have an available aimy of 40,000 men between Dover and Poitsdown, to act against any enemy landing in this counhy. It may be said that if you were to scatter yom troops like that you would have no foice foi the defence of London. I deny that. You have gi eat facilities for moving troops' by railway. The other moi mug 20, 000 men wei c taken down to Bi lghton by rail m the com se of four or five hours, and that, too, lecollect, in addition to the whole of the ordinary tiaffie of the country. (Hear, hear ) Indeed, not only was the ordinary tiaffic earned besides the Volunteen, but an •■extraordinaiy tiaffic also; because special trains lan at the same time to convey the public to see the leview ; and all this was done with great facility and legularity. In the event of an invasion, of course the whole tiansporbby railway would be taken up by the government. The troops could come up by lail from Poitsmouth, and two railroads would also bring them up from Dover. The field artillery and the cavalry might be concentrated at Bughton or some other suitable place The force, then, in these detached forts would form one army and one command, and would be legarded as detached Jor the purpose of hanging upon the flanks of the enemy. (Hear, hear ) I have referred, my lords, to these military points, because I thought they had not been sufficiently consideied to-night, and because noble loids who have spoken have, perhaps, not entei ed as fully into military details as may bo desii able. Ido not pretend that my opiniou is as valuable as that of many others, but still it is the same as was entertained by the Duke of Wellington, and not entertained by that great man alone, but as was mentioned elsewhere the other day by a right hon. friend of mme — by Napoleon the First also. (Hear, hear) The evidence of a gallant and'distinguished friend of mine has been quoted against the works in progress at Portsdown-hill ; I refer to Sir J. Butgoyne. But in the blue-book which contains the questions put by General Peel to a certain number of officers as to the effect of the nov- rifled gun upon works, Sir J. Burgoyne states that he considers Porte-

down-bill ought to be occupied— that it ought to bt> occupied by 10 works, and that theie should bo thrco works between Portsdown-hill and Oospnit alone ; whereas the present proposal of the government is that there should be six woiks for the whole! of that line. (Hear, hear.) And what does Sir J. Burgoyue say in his evidence befoie the Defence Commissioners ? Why, that if he h.ul the men to defend the works at Portsdown-hill, he should be all for occupying them, but that lie does not lecouimeud the construction of those woiks at present, and he gives, as his sole reason for that recommendation, "the want of men to defond them." He adds, that if it wore in Fiance he would recommend them to be occupied, but in England he would not. That appears to mo a singular argument, (heir, heai), and I refer to it because the opinion of Sir J. Burgoyne has been much relied upon by those who aie opposed to these works. My louls, at this period ot the evening T will not enter fuither into this subject, and I have only to thank your loidships for your kindness in listening to me. (Hear, hear )