THE FRENCH EMPEROR AND THE ITALIAN QUESTION. [From The Saturday Review.]

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XVII, Issue 1295, 10 February 1860, Page 4

THE FRENCH EMPEROR AND THE ITALIAN QUESTION. [ From The Saturday Review.]

If the letter attributed to the Emperor ofthei?renoU ii genuine, Napoleon 111. has laid down a detailed plan for the regeneration of Italy which has the merit of being almost equally objectionable to every clas and parly in the nation. The moral influence of the Pope, i which is despised and detested by nine Italians out of ten, is, according to the Imperial scheme, to be increased and extended; and at the same time, reforms which in turn are odious to the Pope will be introduced into the Ecclesiastical States. The definitive arrangement has not even the trifling recommendation of coinciding with the preliminaries which the necessities of vrar have forced on Napoleon 111. at Villafra&ca. The Duke of Modena, vrho shared in the general guarantee given to the Austrian Viceroys, is, it seems, to be deprived of his dominions. The Duke of Parma is not even to be restored to the territory which he held by an hereditary title ; and a, couple of foreign potentates are to present him with half a million of subjects, to whose allegiance he has as little right as his patrons themselves. As if to prove that the stipulations of Villafranca are in no respect binding, the Grand Duke of Tuscany is,, without any claim of reason or justice, to acquire some additional territory. Finally, Austria is to withdraw her German forces from Venetia, and Mantua and Peschiera are to be garrisoned by federal troops. The authenticity of the document requires farther confirmation, but in the meantime it may be treated as a formal summary of the terms which have been constantly recommended to the acceptance of Italy by the French Ministerial papers. "When the scheme is thus stated in detail, its absurd and unstntesmanlike character scarcely requires any further exposure. If the Emperor of Austria had, during the interview of Villafranca, made any promise as to the administration of Venetia, the concession would certainly have been made public, for the purpose of softening the universal disappointment occasioned by the sudden peace. As to Mantua and Peschiera, it was expressly stated that all the fortresses on the Mincio were to remain in the possession of Austria- If it is true that an entirely different arrangement has been made at Zurich, Austria must obviously have received some fresh equivalent which has _ not yet been published to the world. The Emperor of the French, if he' wishes his statements to be believed, ought to make them complote and .intelligible before he requires that his dictatorial counsels should be followed. The most unins£ructed politician is in a position to see that the allegations which have been put forward are either untrue or a mere fraction of the truth It especially necessary to disclose the natra eof the secret com--pensation which must have Hieeu provided for Austria since the conclusion of the war. Two great fortresses and the cherished unity of the Empire have not been sacrificed through a disinterested love either of Italy or France. » The language which the French Government has held iince the cessatiou of hostilities has been characterized, like the alleged manifesto, by atotaland|delibeiate forgetfulness of existing facts of the feelings of all parties concerned. It is not now for the first time that the Papal Presidency is represented as a measure which, satisfying "the religious sentiments of Catholic Europe," will also enable the Holy See to make reasonable concessions to its own immediate subjects But Catholic Europe entertains no sentiment of the kind, and the Pope has assuredly neither the will nor the power to liberal^ and reform his government. In a letter addiessed to Victor Emanuel, the religious sentiments of Catholic "Piedmont might have deserved as much consideration as the lachrymose fustian of French or Irish bishops. The Kingdom of Sardinia is at this moment threatened with an interdict and the Sovereign is, in the person of his Minister, denounced by the Pope himself as having, by his policy at Bologna, constructively denied the immortality 'of the soul. The meetings of a Diet or Federal Assembly at Eome would either degenerate into idle formalities, or I lead to inextricable conflict and confusion Neverthe- ! less, it is not impossible that the Emperor of the French may be especially bent on the accomplishment of the most chimerical part of his own project. M. de Montalembert has again incurred an official censure by the utterance of an unwelcome truth. As a lover of liberty he was prosecuted for applauding the freedom of England, and in his capacity of a zealous Roman Catholic, he is now reproved for the undeniable statement that the French expedition to Italy has endangered the temporal authority of the Pope. As the same conviction is undoubtedly shared by the Ultramontane priesthood of France, extraordinary efforts will probably be made to prove that devotion to the Holy See forms an inseparable element in the great militant French "idea." On this peint, again, Englishmen are entitled to ask whether Lord Palraerston and Lord John Russell are prepared to consult, in a Congress of Great Powers, the religious sentiments of "Cathob'c Europe." It is true that the French and Austrian Governments have long provided aPontifiical police for the mppression of open discontent at Eoms and in the Ecclesiastical Stxtes, but it is quite -unnecessary that England, receiving no credit for religious sentiment, should sanction, either by interf erence or by silence, a continuance and extension of an iniquitous system. There is to be a decent amount of freedom — vuhborte sage — established in Italy, under the auspices of France and of Austria. If the Imperial intentions are carried out, there is no doubt that the liberty which may ensue •mil, whatever may be its other characteristics, be undeniably sage. Nothing more decorous or unobjectionable than the liberty of the French Chambers and press can be desired by the most prejudiced Monarch. The Pope himself once appointed a Consulta, which was at liberty to lender unobjectionable advice, if the Government under any circumstances thought proper to invite it. France would be justified in resenting the establishment, by her own Government, of a less absolute monarchy in Italy than that which constitutes her own felicity at home If the Confederation were ever brought into actual existence, it would be far better for Italy to dispense with any foreign guarantees for liberal institutions. The Power which grants a constitution is likely to assume a right of watching over its infiactions, and especially of checking any popular attempts to transgress its limits. The pioposed exclusion of foreign influence seems for the present to be inaugurated by the minutest regulation of all the affairs of Italy, without the slightest participation on the part of the nation, or even of the Soveieigns themselves. The Imperial letter, if it is authentic, refers in singularly ambiguous terms to the position of the Ducal Pretenders. Their lights are said to be reserved, although it appears that the rights of the dynasty of Este are to be disregarded, "but the independence of ' Central Italy has also been guaianteed, inasmuch as " all idea of foreign inter veutioa has been formally " set aside." It is not clear whether the guaranteed independence involves the power of refusing to readmit the fugitive Princess. The words may .also refer to a supposed exemption from foreign influence, notwithstanding the restoration of the Austrian vassals. The consolidation of Italian independence by the hands of Bourbons & Hapsburgs, is an idle substitution of forms and phrases for the securities which the nation deshes and demands. It is true that the Federative scheme, including the territorial aggrandizement of Piedmont, would have been welcomed by the r whole of Italy as a valuable boon, when, only twelve months ago, it would have been wholly impracticable. Before the war, Austria would have refused her consent, and it is not unreasonable that Italy also should change her policy with her circumstances, and claim to ptofit by the removal of external force. Even nowj notwithstanding the menacing remonbtrances of France, the Italians have their fate in their own hands, if they are capable of a vigorous union. The Emperor of the French, in .the last resort, will bcarcely dare either to make war on Piedmont or to allow the Austrian* once more to garri«on the Peninsula. All the towns, the fortresses, the recruiting ground, the material resource!, are in the possession of their proper owners, and they can only be endangered by foreign invasion. There are men and money in abundance, and there i« a daring ruler, with a well-organized military system, ready to place himself at the head of his countrymen, if he can only depend on their following him It is abiurd to suppose that there can be any appiehenaion of danger from the Papal or Neapolitan arms The greatestj-ißk woidd be- incurred by the refusal of the Piedmontese Government to take the lead of the national movement. In such a contingency, Garibaldi might Btnlcontimie the struggle by appealing,to the revolution*iy passion* of the lower classes, and by consequently alienating the actual leaders of the national cau*e. In the absence of a recognised flag, amidst the dissensions of an uncertain and divided people, foreign aggression would inevitably prove successful. The long business of liberation would have once more to commence from .the ( beginning, and rightful, claim* of independence would be regarded- throughout" Eijrope" as menaces igainitexiftdng establishmgnta and agauut the public „ tranquilly. ' , „ /r ' ,