QUERY.

Daily Southern Cross, Volume XII, Issue 836, 3 July 1855, Page 3

QUERY.

To the Editor of the Southern Cross. Sir,— ls it any harm to enquire as to the truth of the following statement ! *. c., when the City Council was snuffed out, there was a considerable amount of cash to its credit (£700) in the Bank, and that public money is now being expended in supporting its ex-officials, such as the frantic Town Surveyor, &c, if it is the case I imagine hjs Honor with the aid of his Law Officer might intterfere, in order that it may be spent in any manner more bepelicial to the community. I am, sir, A NO 'WORK, NO PAY. June 27, 1865.

[From the Sydney Herald, June 12.J The intended visit of Louis Napoleon to the camp of the beseigeis at Sebastopol has excited considerable astonishment and alarm among the friends and advisers of the French Emperor, in whose eyes the project is fraught with so much danger to the Western Powers, and to the stability of their alliance. " The divinity that doth hedge a king" is so recent an attribute of the Bonapartes, that it is not believed to be a sufficient security against the storms of the Euxine and the shot of Sebastopol. The English and Austrian cabinets have united with the Emperor's own ministers in denouncing the expedition as something quixotic and foolhardy, andha\e been puzzled to account for it on the principles usually supposed to influence the policy ofLruis Napoleon. But a little reflection will convince those who have taken the pains to study the character of this remai liable man who, by God's grace and the will of himself, sways the destinies of the French people, that the s ep he n")w meditates is not altogether without motive or jusiiieation. General Pelissier, sent forth to report upon the condition of affairs in the allied camp, declares Sebastopol is not to be taken by the ordinary rules of war, and that its investment by the allies is impossible, and should not, have been attempted. The credit ot Raglan and Canrobert is, by implication, impugned. What shall be done, then, to bring matters to a crisis, before the army has actually faded away in the trenches ?— Theie is nothing for it but the cold steel. By an assault only can the city be taken, if taken it is to be— yet the step is too perilous, and, if successful, the honour is too great for a simple General of Division, who has done nothing heretofore to deserve it. The harvest of glory being ripe, shall it be reaped by any but the Inipei idl hand ? Not so deemed the craftiest adept in kingcraft among the Bourbons, Louis le Grand, with whom it was a favourite custom, as historians tell, to allow his generals to do the dirty work of a siege, and, when success was secured, to come in at the consummation of the victory, returning triumphant and covered with laurels to his ladies at Versailles. The Bonapartes have been fond of copying their more legitimate predecessors in the tricks of kingship ; and it may bo believed that it is some euch policy as the above that sends Louis Napoleon a-campaigning to the Crimea. To him the favor of the aimy is the breath of life, which he must do his best to su&tain and confirm. As yet, he has not been distinguished for soldiership, and it is important that he shou d, by some means, e-.tablish a military prestige for himself. But what better opportunity than the present could offer ? Shru d the assault be successful, the enthi sasm of the armj' tor its victorious leader will know no bounds. The heaa & o£ the soldiero mil \e secured, and «U Fiance will ring with acclamation at hiai who achieved the difficult enterprise which well nigh defied the joint forces of the Western Powers. The ascending star of Bonaparte -will reach its culminating point, and the nations of Europe will bow down in submissive admiration to the new Taker of Cities. Should the attempt be a failure— the alternative is not to be conceived, with calmness and equanimity. Not only the throne of Louis Napoleon, but the power and reputation of both nations, will be so shaken by that disaster, as to be almost beyond reparation. On the success of the assault on Sebastopol, there hang all the hopes of Exirope— nil the fortunes of England and France. And it is impossible to disguise the fact that, by the apathy and mismanagement of our leaders, the event of success has been made much more doubtful and precarious since the commencement of the campaign. By attempting to apply the technical' rules of war to the attack of a fortress such as Seba<ropol -ill-provided as we were

in men and means requisite for the undertaking — we have frittered away the best part of our strength in the useless labour of* the trenches, without being a step nearer to the accomplishment of our purpose, than when we were a gallant,' healthy, and well-equipped army on the heights of Alma. To invest ,* strong and well -tor titied place upon the one side only, while full liberty of communication with its resources was left open to it upon other Hides, is now acknowledged to have been a grave and fatal blunder — a blunder into which we had no excuse for falling. Had it been, the intention of the allied commanders at first to take Sebtstopol by a formal investiture, according to tl.e .rules ot* Vauban, they should have been provided with a force at least twice as numerous as that with which they attempted the task, and should have taken measures to occupy the northern face of the city as well as the southern. Had an assault been contemplated, it would have better taken place immediately after the victory ac Alma, than have been deferred to « time 'when the armies have been reduced one-half in numbers, and exhausted in strength and spirits by the arduous labour in the trenches. ' Let us hope, however, that whatever have been our errors and deficiencies in the prosecution of this Illstarred enterprise, the ultimate success of the Allied arms will, vindicate the process of the two nation*, and convince the foe that the conquerors of Alma and Inkermann are not to be foiled m the great object of the campaign— the capture of SebasMp'ol. Since science and generalship have foiled us, let us trust ancp more to that which has never yet been" unequal tp ife> ddutyy — v to British valour and haidihood. Let 'the, content be decided as one between man- and* man,, and we are confident that our national qualities will bens pre-eminent in the deadly breach of SebastopoL as they .have been | upon every fair field of battle.