RANDOM NOTES

Dominion, Volume 39, Issue 29, 29 October 1945, Page 6

RANDOM NOTES

(By Kickshaws.) Mr Churchill has been sworn in as a Permanent Member of the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights. His experience with the Ship of State no doubt carried -weight, '• • ,

It is said that a lot of hot money is floating around America. Seems as it a sinking fund .pool would cool it off. ’.The importation of .petrol from Egypt, it is declared, is not .practicable. Not , many thousands, of years ago the same sort of reply was made: about corn. , have looked up dictionaries.- I have 'asked f politicians, statesmen and near statesmen to define the difference, if any, between ’Prime Minister’ and (Premier.. Can you tell me? Failing; this appeal I must abandon all hope,” says . J.E.A. There is today very little difference between the two. Prime Minister, however, . strictly speaking .is ; the official title of the first miuistei of State in Great Brittain ( going back to the, 17th century, x’ne term has been extended this century to the seif-governibg Dominions and even to the Colonies of the British Empire. The term ’-’Premisr” is more widely applicable, dates back -to 1470, and refers to the chief minister of any country, including Britain. '

“Bituition” on- the part of Hitler, it is said, stopped a Nazi three-prouged drive into Africa. One, prong was to have thrust through Spain to Gibraltar, a secoud across die central Mediterranean. and a third via Turkey and Syria to Palestine; It is just as well that Hitler's “intuition” continued to work so steadfastly for the Allies. There is very little doubt that if the Nazis bad been able to mount a three-pronged drive into Africa on this scale they would have succeeded. Even without it they very •nearly succeeded. Britain was fighting desperately for time all through the Libyan campaigns. Her commitments, even so, were far greater than the forces or equipment at her disposal. ,For that reason some of the most brilliant staff work in the history of war enabled her forces to be used exactly where required at the correct moment to effect the maximum delays to the Germans. . This was all the more remarkable in view ot tne fact that British equipment was out of date and inferior. One gigantic Nazi operation, involving the whole of Lie Mediterranean, would hate been too -much. As it was the delays just—but only just—managed to bridge the gap and enable modern equipment and reinforcements to turn the balance te.Ei Alamein. Thank you, Hitler —Bn tains most effective secret, weapon.

The truth is that intuition rarely succeeds, except- temporarily in war, unless one calls the carefully-prepared schemes of great generals intuition, u SuaJy they are very far, from that. a fi la . r . l ' borough’s genius was based on an infiiute capacity for planning ahead. Every move was part of the greater pl - Napoleon’s success was based on stair work which at that time was_fin innovation The combination of this and Napoleon’s flair, call it intuition if you like, for assessing correctly his ecetny won him every battle but the last. Alexander the Great was successful because, like Hitler, he used ultra-modern weapons and methods for his .times i. He was always one jump ahead m reduce the enemy to impotence. He was. a military chess player of a very higo order. Hitler tried to ape these great generals and’failed. Hfs failure. was childish to a degree and was based on an incorrect interpretation of the psychological asptets of "war as well as its realities. He managed.to wtri easy a>ctories by being beyond the minute in modernity, but he had. no; ballast!to carry him throush to final,yvjctory. When his first unexpected punches failed to give him that overwhelming victory he had planned, there was nothing left but a ' very second-rate strategist usmg a very third-rate intuition. Hitler will never take a place among the wor I .s “eat generals. He was in fact what almost any army would call a poor type.” , ♦ * Official figures for New!Zealand casualtie« in the two Great Wars show that he proportion of killed in Great War I was nearly 17 per cent, and in Gieat War II just under 8 per cent. the numbers involved were roushly' comparable Thus do the casualty rates mdi cate in a siirprisingly correct manner the difference between the methods of th two wars. Great sVar I was a war ot massed massacres. Men quite inadequately protected, in fact with no pro tSion a? all. were asked to face massed machinegun fire at r - an ®t".„ s f O rv casualtv percentages tell their own story. It was the same for all armies Casualties of half a million were taken for granted in all the big operations At Vetdun the French lost over that toteb In tW-history of war, Great War I the last of the cannon-fodder methods of eouductiug war b<£>re the S' Great War II were better protteted than Junk/ which arrived only ioward the of Great War I, the sobers o Great War II were more mobile, i s meant that massed bodies of troops were , W nermanent. Movements eou d be ,«■" o S k dl S. a i' v Tfe and the striking force could dissolve xn result is also bj tte co t w? 7 r fhe cost was about £30)0; in I 'about £12,000. In the Napoleonic wars it had been about £ooo to £lOOO. t # From the point of view stf ategy and tactics eat . Var JUSicai ’onof movement involving . strategical con captious almost world wide an d ceitaimy involving vast land masses. respects but on a grander scale, the re eont- war was very similar to the otoer wars when knights on armoured horses were used. Indeed the correct answer to Hitler’s methods preceding the fall of France was almost an exact return t fhe days when knights were bold. The div of the thin reJ line had gone. Ihe tank made that, sort of impossible The static Waf-Ot 1914-18 was beniwsiblc Eltons to introduce it .cd o disaster for Britain and France. Even the Maginot line was no security, fhe tank and it* adjuncts sto , od . la ., h c t lo ®f relationship to the armoured knight. ot old. When Great War. II began Britain had neither the equipment nor the training to light a large-scale war uuu„ these methods. French expelts vere stilt arguing the point. PQtain wtis against ft n de Gaulle for it- It is probaole that had Britain and France employed an adequate force ef armoured divisions, the' “Buttle of the Bulge would have ended tu disaster t<>r the Germans. . I hat battle embodied tactical and strata gical errors on the part, of the Germans. They succeeded because the Allies knew the right answers but had not the men or the equipment to put them tuto effect It has never been disclosed how the blame for this error should be shared. It would seem that it was about W per cent, short-sightedness on the pait of leading British Statesmen and 40 per cent, innate military conservatism foi the old methods and the old.ways. Let us hope we have learned our lesson, but it is unlikely. * * *

A storm has arisen regarding General Blamev’s decision to institute an inqii,r.s regarding the escape of General EcniteU from Singapore. There are no rules laid down for the conduct of Generals lakeu prisoner, but there are customs 01 the service A general's hrSt thought under those conditions ili'tsl be lor his troops ■is fir us It n possible tor »nn to Hate their plight. His simultaneous thought, is to destroy all documents which may be of value to the enemy. It is his duty to decide whether to surrender or not unless orders have come troin higher authority on the .point Until the surrender is effected it is desertion for any soldier to escape,, including a general. ' However, there may be special provisions on this point. General MacArthur had definite instructions to get out of the Philippines, lie did so and no blame ean be placed on him. He carried out orders. Except for provisions of that nature a general should be present during the surrender and subsequently until everything had been done. Technically a prisoner is free to escape the moment he becomes a prisoner. Technically General Bennett committed no breach of any law or custom. It mav be that facts at present undigclosedTiave come to light. Unless they have there is no justification for General Blarney's decision