CORRIDOR TACTICS

Dominion, Volume 38, Issue 1, 26 September 1944, Page 5

CORRIDOR TACTICS

Daring Military Plan STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE (By E.A.A.) The British Second Army is reported to be linking up with airborne forces in the Arnhem area. This has been done via a corridor nearly 70 miles long and up to 20 miles wide at its base. There is no denying that this method is rare in large-scale military operations, largely on account of the attendant dangers. Nevertheless, corridor tactics are but a specialized case of the famous pincers with one pincer removed. Xt is a type of tactics made possible on the big scale, thanks to the internal combustion engine. In olden days corridor tactics were out of favour. Armies marched as isolated units for some particular operation, returning before their supplies -were used up completely. Both Marlborough and Napoleon carried their corridors with them in this manner. During the operations troops lived largely on biscuits and bread baked _ beforehand. Curiously enough, in 1705 Marlborough used embryonic corridor tactics in his operations from Coblenz to Treves iu the opposite direction to Allied movements today in that area. Except for relief expeditions, corridor tactics have been rarely used because they demand a risk so great the objective can be more safely attained in some other way. The creation of a corridor is virtually a march across an enemy’s front, always a dangerous movement. Actually a corridor demands a march with two ever-growing flanks on cither side. This requires the highest degree of staff work to insure ample protection and adequate supplies, ft includes that almost impossible demand—that the advancing army shall be strong everywhere. The enemy has the choice of attack anywhere along the flanks of the corridor. He has the ability to reinforce his attack direct to the point selected. The corridor defenders must get their reinforcements through the narrow, roundabout, congested routes. The chances therefore are greatly in favour of the enemy cutting the corridor into several parts. Those parts can then be dealt with at leisure. The Allied armies have now successfully averted this danger. Limit to Advance.

Ibero is, moreover, a limit to the distance a force can advance through a corridor. There comes a time when the defence of the corridor itself absorbs all available troops. It is for that reason that corridor tactics deal usually with short distances. The internal combustion engine has speeded up movement, the mobile gun and the tank have enabled areas to be defended quickly, and the lorry has aided supply problems. Added to this, aeroplane reconnaissance can give away the enemy’s intentions almost as' soon as. they are put in practical form. lor those reasons the Allies have got away with what must go down to history as the perfect example of corridor tactics. W hen the Allies forced the Albert and Eseaut Canals there lay ahead three vital rivers—-the Maas and the two branches of the Rhine. These rivers are several hundred yards wide. Sledgehammer advances would have gained the objectives in time. The Germans, however, would linvo , /* DRmty of time to destroy these vital bridges. The problem was to gain these river crossings with the bridges intact. Airborne landings enabled the vital bridges to he gained. But airborne troops cannot fight an indefinite action. It was imperative for land-based forces to rush forward to their relief. The result was the corridor. All its attendant risks had to be assessed and equated with the l.'ict that if these three bridges were gained the Allies would speedily turn the entire Rhino defence area at a critical moment. The whole of northern Germany would thus he threatened. Organized resistance would then probably end before Christmas. It was an attractive prize worthy of considerable risks. ( A similar line of thought caused the Germans to introduce corridor tactics in the spring of 1940. Their corridor gave them the Channel ports. Our corridor gives us Germany. It should be appreciated, however, that a corridor is not a permanent battle structure. Either it introduces a significant now strategical situation or the corridor withers away under enemy action. The next week will decide whether our corridor will conduct our armies to that significant strategic situation, for which ex> much.was risked.