The Dominion. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1941. THE WAR AT SEA

Dominion, Volume 35, Issue 43, 14 November 1941, Page 6

The Dominion. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1941. THE WAR AT SEA

In the Great War of 1914-18 the size and potential of the German High Seas Fleet gave to the situation at sea a character essentially in accordance with naval tradition—warfare and battles between rival ships, squadrons, and fleets. It was only when the enemy’s battle fleet after Jutland went into retirement till the end of the, war that he changed his tactics and attempted by unrestricted submarine piracy to reduce Britain to starvation. The attempt failed, but at the peak of the U-boat sinkings the British shipping position, and the shortage of food supplies, had become very grave. In the present war, the situation has been reversed. With surface fighting forces incomparable in strength to Britain’s the enemy has concentrated from the first upon unrestricted war on merchant shipping, both allied and neutral, by submarines and bombing aircraft, in an attempt to cut Britain s lifelines, and by reducing her to impotence and starvation, compel her submission. These tactics have cost us grave losses, especially in the Atlantic, where the struggle has resolved itself into one of the crucial issues of the war. This issue, as the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, warns us today, has still to be determined, but there is evidence in the figures he has given the House of Commons that the tide, for the present at least, is in our favour. There has been, on comparisons, a substantial diminution of shipping losses, a ponderable increase in the capacity and resources for tonnage replacements, and an impressive increase in the tonnage of enemy shipping sent to the bottom by our naval forces and aircraft. But German submarines and bombers are still active in menacing strength, and there can be no relaxing of vigilance and effort until his forces have been so weakened that he must turn to other means of offence in his attempt to vanquish Britain. Mr. Churchill steadily refuses to optimist. He recognizes, as we must all do, the enemy’s strength in resources, and his skill and ruthlessness in devising new tactics. Though he does not say so in as many words, it is still, and must be for some time, a question of holding our own. Mark this sentence, and its implications : If (he says) we are able to get through this year, we shall certainly find ourselves in good supply of ships for 1942, and if the war against U-boats and enemy aircraft should continue to prosper as it has done —about which, of course, there can be no guarantee—it seems to me that the freedom Powers will be possessed of large quantities of ships in 1943 which will enable overseas operations to take place utterly beyond the British resources at the present time. This is the critical year. The promise is brighter for 1942, and brighter still for 1943. It is Mr. Churchill’s way of telling his public that they can look for no early termination of the war, no relaxing of effort, of unwearying vigilance. It is also his answer to those who are contending for land operations in Western Europe. There is, at present, not the tonnage available. The Middle East, so far as land operations are concerned, represents in the meantime' the limit of our commitments, a limit based on the capacity of our sea-power and merchant tonnage for maintaining communications and supplies. Mr. Churchill’s speech, most heartening in its reference to the shipping position, is nevertheless a masterpiece of realism in its refusal to gloss over the dangerous possibilities of the situation as it stands at present, the most menacing of which are attempts at an invasion of Britain and to gain control of the Suez Canal aiea. It is a timely blow at indulgence in complacency wherever it exists.