LIQUOR NEAR DANCE

Dominion, Volume 35, Issue 43, 14 November 1941, Page 10

LIQUOR NEAR DANCE

Man Who Pleaded He Was Leaving

CONVICTION UPHELD

An interpretation of the law prohibiting the, drinking of intoxicants at dance halls was given in the Supreme Court, Wellington, yestc-rday. when Noel Murray Blake, clerk. Wellington, appealed against his conviction by Mr. Goulding, S.AI-, who lined him £1 and costs for having liquor in his possession in the vicinity of St. Francis Hall, where a dance was being held. The appeal was dismissed. Air. F. IV. Ungley, who appeared for appellant, submitted that section 50, sub-section 3, of rhe Statutes Amendment Act, 1030, under which appellant had been convicted, aimed at the maintenance of sobriety in dance halls and not at the consumption .of liquor. The words used in the Act were "attending a hall” and "proceeding to attend a dance.” A person had to be doing either of those two things to be liable, and the Statute was not concerned with persons who were leaving a dance, such as appellant. lie submitted that there must be a stage at which a person was no longer proceeding to attend or attending a dance. Mr. Justice Ostler, who was on the Bench, remarked that if a man left a dance, drove to a city hotel and had a drink it could not be said he had consumed liquor in the vicinity of a dance hail. Under the statute, continued Mr. Ongley. if a man 50 miles away were proceeding to a dance hall with liquor in his possession he was liable. The whole Act was aimed at a person taking liquor to a dance, and a person leaving a dance must be excluded from liability under the Act in some manner. Appellant was in a. right of way near Parliament Buildings when he was found. Counsel submitted that if a person with liquor were within 10 yards of a dance hall but was leaving the dance he could not be convicted under that section, which limited liability to a person attending or proceeding to attend the hall. Mr. W. R. Birks, who appeared for the Crown, said appellant admitted he had been at the dance, and he submitted that there was sufficient evi-i dence for the magistrate to find that he bad been still attending the dance. He was in the vicinity of the hall within the ordinarily accepted meaning of the word. A prima facie case had been made out, and in th,e absence of any reasonable explanation a conviction was justified.

His Honour said it was his opinion that the appeal must fail. In the circumstances of the case the magistrate was entitled to infer in the absence of evidence to the contrary that appellant was attending the dance. He had evidence that appellant paid for his ticket, attended the dance and, long before it ceased, was drinking and in possession of liquor. It was apparent that ho was attending the dance' still from the absence of evidence that he had formed the intention to leave. The interpretation Mr. Ongley had sought to put on the section would largely frustrate the intention of the law.