A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 35, Issue 6, 2 October 1941, Page 6

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Battle Of The Atlantic SHIP LOSSES DOWN The Battle of the Atlantic —and of the other oceans—is not yet won. It will continue as long as the war lasts and the enemy can operate his U-boats, raiders and aircraft. Yet during the last three months a very important victory has been won at sea by the Royal Navy. Mr. Churchill’s good news is that losses caused by enemy action to British Allied and neutral mer- x chant ships in July-August-September were only one-third of those tor the previous three months, despite the operation by the Germans of ever larger forces of U-boats and long-range aircraft against shipping. One-third-of the Aprll-May-June losses gives a figure of less than 500,000 tons for the last three months. Put another way, nearly 1,000,000 tons of merchant shipping was saved from destruction during the quarter. Survey Of Losses The importance of Mr. Churchill’s statement can 'be gauged by a study ( of the official figures. Merchant shipping losses during the quarter April-May-June totalled 1,416,416 tons. Onethird of this figure gives 472,138 tons as the total loss for the July-August-September quarter. This works out at an average of 157,379 tons a month, which is easily the lowest monthly figure since March, 1940. The following table gives a comprehensive ‘survey of merchant shipping losses—British, Allied and neutral; from the beginning of the war to the end of June of this year, when publication of the figures was discontinued: Monthly Shipping Losses. British, Allied and'Neutral. Ships. Tonnage.

Average, June, 1940June, 1941 97 421,230 Average, Juiy-Aug.-Sept, 1941 — 157,380 A Black Year

The table shows that the average monthly loss from the beginning of the war to the end of May, when France collapsed, was 182,400 tons, i The total for June, 1940, was swelled by losses due to the evacuation of troops and civilians from Frqhce. Thereafter, Germany had the use of aircraft and U-boat bases all along the European coasts from Norway to the Bay of Biscay, and was employing surface raiders in the Atlantic and elsewhere. With the loss of French naval aid and the entry of Italy into the war, the situation was complicated and worsened to the grave disadvantage of Great Britain. The defection of France and the demands of the Mediterranean created a grave shortage of the types of naval craft needed for the protection of shipping and for offensive operations against U-boats. At the same time Germany’s possession of the Channel and Atlantic coasts of France, as well as bases in Norway, enabled her to use bombing and minelaying aircraft as an> additional weapon against shipping in the western approaches to Britain, The Germans were thus able to concentrate their naval energies on an “all-out” campaign against merchant shipping. They did not hesitate to use their most powerful warships, including capital ships, to co-operate with the U-boats and aircraft in attacks on convoys in the Atlantic, while other raiders cruised with more or less success in the outer seas.

Serious Position Apart from numerous vessels damaged more or less and thus out of action while under repairs, the actual destruction of merchant ships mounted to high figures. As the table shows, 1200 ships totalling 5,476,000 tons were sunk by enemy action during the 13 months from June, 1940, to June of this year, an average of 97 ships of 421,230 tons a month, compared with the average of 182,400 tons for the first nine mouths of the war. Thus, during the second half of 1940 aud the first half of this year, the destruction of merchant shipping by enemy action was proceeding at the rate of 5,000,000 tons a year, which was well in excess of the combined capacities of British and United States shipyards to replace. “After all,” as Mr. Churchill reminded us last April, “everything turns upon the Battle ot the Atlantic, which is proceeding with growing intensity on both sides. Our losses in ships and tonnage are very heavy, and, vast as are our shipping resources which we control, these losses cannot continue indefinitely without seriously affecting our war effort and our means of subsistence." Moreover, there was not only the grave loss of carrying power at sea, but an immense loss of cargoes of vita', foodstuffs, raw materials and, supplies of all kinds, amounting to some millions of tons a year. Great Improvement

But, as Mr. Churchill points out, counter-measures against the enemy’s offensive which were undertaken m good time are proving successful. The shipping losses for June at 329,296 tons were the lowest for six months, and since then there has been an extraordinary improvement in the position. The losses for July-August-September at around 472,000 tons (one-third ot those for the previous quarter), were actually less than those for the month of May. . It may not be possible to keep.Wt losses down to the latest monthly low level of 157,380 tons. As Mr. Churchill says, large numbers of üboats supported by ever larger numbeis of bombers must be expected. facts he had stated were “not entirely satisfactory." The enemy’s efforts would only be beaten by a corresponding intensification of counter-measure.'. There will be times when the enemy will “pull off’’ some coup that will swell the shipping losses. Nevertheless, the fact that for three months the rate of shipping losses has been kept down to a remarkably low level is of considerable significance and importance, as is Mr. Churchill s statement that Britain’s food reserves are higher than ever before, and that an improvement in the basic ration for the whole country is now about to be made. — (S.D.W.)

Average, Sept.-, 1939May, 1940 — 182,400 June, 1940 128 533,902 July 104 400,353 88 387,471 September ........ 93 439,637 October 96 November 87 372,617 December 74 January, 1941 59 309,731 February 89 350,884 March. ............ 124 . 515,763 April, .... 135 589,273 May 104 497,847 June * 79 329,296 Thirteen months '. 1260 5,476,006