A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 298, 13 September 1941, Page 8

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Food Supplies From , Ukraine LAST WAR’S LESSON The close of the twelfth week of Hitler’s campaign against Russia sees the opposing armies still locked, in a series of deadly battles along the whole front from the White Sea to the Black Sea. The Nazi hordes have torn large provinces out.of Russia, but the decision of the struggle is yet a groat way off. Twenty-four years ago the front of the Russian armies against the invaders had collapsed in the throes of the Revolution and the Germans were rushing troops to the Western Front in preparation for the great offensive of March, 1018. But the exaggerated hopes of the Germans that great supplies of grain aud other foodstuffs would be looted from Russia -were disappointed in 1917-18. There is much in the present situation in Russia to warrant the belief that the Nazis will be disappointed once more. False Hopes Of 1917 To Germany and Austria in 1917 the cessation of hostilities against Russia came as a new lease of life in the economic as well as in the military sphere. Just as, in 1916-17, the conquest of Rumania had enabled them to struggle through the critical months preceding the gathering of the 1917 harvest, so the collapse of Russian resistance enabled them to make good temporarily, a deficit in their food suuplies which otherwise might have been fatal. As with the Rumanian supplies in 1917, the total relief ultimately Obtained was small in comparison with the extravagant hopes originally held; but the gap between the 1917 and 1918 harvests was' just bridged, and the hope of further relief, coupled with the military successes in the West in the spring of 1918, enabled the German and Austrian Governments to appeal once more to their peoples to hold out a little longer in the expectation of final victory. In December, 1917, when the armistice whs concluded between the Bolsheviks and. the Central Rowers, the Germans were already in possession or the greater part of Russian Poland and had advanced far along the Baltic coast. From these regions, however, no great quantity of foodstuffs could be wrung and. it was toward the wheatlands of the Ukraine that attention was turned. But the Ukraine was no longer a part of Russia, so called, On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed, A week later Esthonia declared its independence, and on December 8 Finland followed suit. The Central Powers were quick to seize their opportunity, and on February 9, 1918, they concluded with the Ukraine Republic a treaty ojj peace, and a supplementary commercial treaty which provided for tire supply by the Ukraine of 1,000,000 tons of foodstuffs, Plunder From Ukraine

To Austria- the prospect of supplies from the Ukraine promised deliverance from absolute disaster. To Germany it promised an amelioration of conditions not yet wholly insupportable. The Ukrainian Government had promised to deliver before the end of April, 1918, 300,000 tons of grain and considerable quantities of other foodstuffs, r ' ’ A strong reaction set in against the pessimism which had been growing in Germany. Concealed hoards of food came into the market and the Government lifted the official food rations to a level higher than was justified by the existing stocks. At the same time they made every preparation to lift the Ukrainian grain by rail, by steamer from Odessa and by barges up the Danube. This extreme optimism was shortlived. Transport of the supplies presented grave difficulties. The peasants refused to accept Russian, German or Austrian currency, Above all, the actual stocks of grain were much smaller than had beeu believed. The disorganization caused by the war and the chaos of revolution bad combined to reduce the harvest, and the peasants were loth to see grain which they might urgently need for themselves, sent to Germany and Austria. The Ukrainian Government was unable to carry out its undertaking, and the Germans decided forcibly to exploit the resources of the country. On March 2, 1918, they occupied Kiev and ou March 13 Odessa. On April 29 they proclaimed a military die-, tatorsbip. Their difficulties were far from ended. Although they devoted themselves with ruthless energy aud Teutonic thoroughness to the plundering of the Ukraine, the Germans found their tasK of wringing supplies from the stuborn and cunning peasants more difficult than they had expetced. In the first flush of their triumph they had been lavish in their promises to neutrals, Specially Sweden and Holland, of grain which would render those countries independent of the United States; but the promised supplies dwindled to nothin"- and it soon became clear that the utmost for which Germany and Austria could, hope was a bare sufficiency of grain for their own consumption to enable them to last out till their own harvests were ready.

Bitter Disappointment Meanwhile the German stocks had been depleted by increased consumption during the initial wave of optimism ; the expected supplies which would have justified the maintenance of the rations had not been received; and it was necessary to afford some relief to Austria where the whole system of food administration had broken down. On May 17 the German Food Controller announced a reduction of the flour ration from 7 to 5i ounces. This was the lowest level it had reached during the war, and the contrast between this reduction and the hoped-for increase created bitter disappointment throughout Germany. To make matters worse, the outlook for the future was equally unsatisfactory. The Ukrainian peasants were disinclined to make any efforts on behalf of their new masters; the standing crops in many districts were destroyed, and a drought had told heavily on the new harvest. Reports from Rumania indicated that the 1918 harvest would be a complete failure, and it was clear that the amount of grain to be drawn from the conquered territories during 1918-19 would be small. The Germans learned to their cost that a country disorganized and ravaged by war cannot produce surpluses, and today the problem is not markedly different. The Nazis will secure some part of this year’s harvest as well as other supplies from the provinces thej have overrum in Russia, but tne Ukraine and any other parts of the Soviet Union within their reach will be of use economically only if agricultural and industrial production can be continued on the level that has been reached during recent years.—(S.D.W.),