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A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Wartime Oil Supplies AXIS ANXIETIES

All naval ships, most merchant ships

nil air forces and mechanized armies

are vitally dependent upon oil. While

Great Britain holds command of the

sea and has tankers to carry supplies

she can draw oil from many sources. It would be interesting to know how many tanker-loads of motor spirit and oil have been consumed already in her campaign in Northern Africa. The position of the Axis Powers in respect, of oil supplies is very different. Exactly how is Germany situated today with respect to petroleum supplies? To answer that is most difficult, even for the best experts outside the Reich. Germany’s Needs

According to recent estimates by one oil authority of international repute Greater Germany’s annual oil requirements, including the Protectorate, in September, 1939, stood at approximately 9.000,000 tons. Of this total, civilian needs, consisting largely of motor fuel, accounted for about 30 per cent., or 3,000,000 tons. Demand for the balance came from industry and the military establishment.

However, consideration must be given to the estimated 8,200.000 tons normally required by the conquered nations of France, Holland. Belgium, Norway and Denmark. Even if these normal demands are drastically reduced, it is pointed out., the strictly civil requirements for all territory within the present Reich frontiers is at the very least 5,000.000 tons a year. On the other hand. German production from all sources, including synthetic and crude oil output, is estimated at 4,280,000 tons. Thus domestic output would be short approximately 720.000 tons in servicing restricted domestic wartime demand. There are only two other source' available to tbe Nazis, Soviet Russia and Rumania. Nazi Sources

Both because of the growth ot Russia’s industrial and military machine and the fact that the Soviet oil industry is now falling considerably behind the scheduled plan, 'Russia has little petroleum to spare. Nevertheless, she may still continue to send from 200.000 to 300.000 tons annually to the Reich, largely in the form of lubricating oil. Rumania produced, in 1939 some 6,240,000 tons, of which she exported 4,178,000, mostly in the form of finished products. During that year the Reich and former Czechoslovakia received 1,285.153 tons, or 31 per cent, of total exports. Now that Rumania’s oil policy has been taken over by the Nazis it seems safe to say that exports to Germany will be increased, while Rumania s own domestic consumption will be forcibly reduced. Therefore it appears likely that German imports from this source alone may reach 3,000,000 tons, if transportation equipment is equal to the task.

Thus, granting that Germany succeeds in all her endeavours to obtain oil, these figures clearly indicate her inability to wage an intensive and long-drawn-out conflict. Maximum estimates place German oil reserves held in storage at the start of war at 4,500,000 tons. Add this figure to expected imports from Rumania (3.000.000 tons i and allow for the domestic shortage (720,000 tons) and there remain 6.780.000 tons annually available for purely military purposes.

Since about 120 German divisions took part in the Holland-Belgian-French offensive, with roughly 3000 aeroplanes in action from four to six hours daily, the estimated oil require ments of this force, according to Hubest available sources, were 1,500.000 tons in its six weeks’ operation. Even ar a somewhat lower average this would mean an annual consumption of over 10.000.000 tons a year. Italy’s Difficulty

But the Nazis have other difficult problems to face. One of these is the extremely weak petroleum position of their Italian ally. Under normal conditions Italy consumes approximately 2,500,000 tons of petroleum products annually. Not more than 10,000 tons annually are produced in Italy. Albania supplied small quantities which have probably been cut off recently. In 1939 Italy got 636,760 tons from Rumania and fiUed the remainder of her needs through imports from the United States, Venezuela, the Dutch West Indies, Mexico, and to a lesser extent Colombia. These latter sources are no longer available because of the British blockade. Moreover, Italy’s storage facilities, believed to cover not more than seven months’ requirements at the time of her entry into the war iu June, are all above ground and therefore specially vulnerable to air attack by the British. Intensification of counter-attacks by British bombers and their reported concentration on the destruction of German refineries, oil depots and synthetic plants tend further to complicate any attempt at accurate estimates. According to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the R.A.F. has bombed 90 per cent, of Germany's synthetic-oil properties and <BO }>or cent, of her mineraloil refineries. Rumania has stopped petroleum shipments to Turkey. These amounted in the first half of H‘'H» to 702.475 barrels, a SSO per eent. gain over the same part. of 1939. This large increase was due to Turkey’s inability to obtain supplies from North America atiil Russia. It is easy for Turkey to get supplies from Iraq. Japan’s Oil Supplies

In tile Far East. Germany's Axis partner, Japan, produces less than 10 per cent, of her ever-growing oil requirements. Almost the only sources of oil supply iu the Far East are in the Netherlands Indies, which exported 48,300,000 barrels during 1939. In contrast to this, according to rough estimates, stand Japan’s requirements of 25,000,000 barrels for civilian needs alone. The distance from Yokohama to Palembang, Sumatran terminal ami refining port on the eastern coast of Borneo, is 2700 miles, while the distance from Yokohama to San Francisco is 4536 miles. The reason for Japan's interest in this area is therefore obvious.

Till recently some two-thirds of Japan’s petroleum needs were filled from the United States. The decision of the United States Government to add petroleum to its list of commodities requiring export licences, and the banning of the export of aviation spirit, except to nations of the Western Hemisphere, has gone far toward accentuating Japan’s petroleum problem. More important than this, however. is the United States ban on the export of tetraethyl lead, which is indispensable for the production ot high grade gasoline having a high octane number.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19410215.2.56

Bibliographic details

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 121, 15 February 1941, Page 10

Word Count
1,003

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 121, 15 February 1941, Page 10

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 121, 15 February 1941, Page 10

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