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A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

The Deciding Factor

COMING EVENTS

it is becoming increasingly plain that the war is now entering its third, and what nitty well be its final and decisive

stage. “We may be sure,” said Mr. Churchill in his review, “that the war is

going to enter upon a phase of greater violence." The collapse of France was a colossal military disaster; but it is certain that from the day of the capitulation of France Hitler's expectations, and his original war plan, went awry, owing to the unexpected failure of the Nazi triumphs in Europe to ‘‘frighten Britain out of the war” and compel her to seek a negotiated peace. The second stage of the war is all but past. The “Battle of Britain" launched by air and sea six months or more ago was definitely defeated. What Mr. Churchill calls the “decline and fall of the Italian Empire” is the disastrous sequel to Mussolini’s effort to break Britain's Hold on the eastern Mediterranean and its approaches. A Maritime War

More than ever it is clear that the war is, fundamentally, a maritime struggle. As was pointed out recently by Captain B. Ackworth, R.N., there are three outstanding pronouncements of Hitler which give the key to his final aims. “Germany must export or die” was the first of them. The second was his outburst against what be called the “accident of Britain’s geographical position”; and the third was his vow that he would, once and for all, put a stop to the fantastic state of affairs by which England, owing to her geographical advantages, could blockade Europe. Hitler has learned, to his cost, much of what Britain’s Sea-Power means. It is doubtful that lie lias ever read writings of Mahan concerning the influence of sea-power upon history. It may seem remarkable, as Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon says, “that Hitler, who prepared Germany for war with such intense foresight and energy, should have omitted to build an adequate navy, and thus failed to profit by tile major lesson afforded by the Great War.” It was Hitler himself who once described battleships us the "luxury toys of the democracies.” He must know by now that battleships are the foundation on which Britain’s Sea-Power rests.

Undoubtedly, the German lack of seainstinct blurred the outlook of Hitler, who knows little or nothing of the sea. He probably was told how near Germany’s U-boats came to success in 1917, and thought that if large and everincreasing numbers of submarines could strike at Britain’s sea traffic, the chance of mastery at seat and a "total blockade” of the British Isles, in conjunction with a great "air-blitz,” would bring him victory. Britain’s Advantage

But Britain still stands undefeateu athwart the sea routes to western and northern Europe. Her losses of merchantships have been grievously heavy, but every week she is increasing her naval power to protect her argosies and defeat the U-boat. Hitler has threatened. a supreme effort to break Britain’s blockade of Europe, but his lack of naval strength foredooms his attempt to failure. As long ago as last August Germany declared u "total blockade’ of Britain, but its totality has not emerged. Britain's other geographical advantages which make her blockade possible and eventually fatal to Hitlers plans are her control of the "three great sea-gates of the Eastern hemisphere—Gibraltar, Aden and Singapore. With Gibraltar and Aden in her hands and her Navy dominant. Europe is cut off from the outside world and from the all-important tropical products."

In The Mediterranean

The Axis conquest of Egypt and Palestine and thus the expulsion of the British Fleet from tlie Eastern Mediterranean by depriving it of its buses at Alexandria and Haifa and the army of disembarkation facilities would have given Germany and Italy access to ample oil and other essentia: resources. It would have decisively affected Britain’s position in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific and definitely influenced Japan tv enter the struggle. The nearly complete overthrow of Italy in Northern Africa lias completely changed the situation lo Hitler’s disadvantage. Egypt and the Suez Canal are now safe, Mr. Churchill assures us, and "the port, the base, and the airfield al Benghazi constitute a strong point with high consequence to the whole of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Mr. Churchill was careful not to "encourage false hopes or prophesy smooth things.” but he might well have added that the port, the base and the airfield at Tripoli will most assuredly soon pass into British hands with high consequence to the war in the Central Mediterranean. It also appears certain that the whole of tlie Red Sea coast and the “horn of Africa” projecting far out into the Indian Ocean beyond Aden will soon be cleared of the enemy. The Decisive Theatre

All these happenings in tlie .Middie East must have a profound iullueuee upon the "men of Vicby” and, what is equally important, upon the Freiicli military and naval authorities in Algeria. 'i'uiiis and Syria. They can see the "writing ou the wall” iu the Mediterranean where events must have stiffened their resolution to hold out against Axis threats.

The threats of an invasion of Britain and German manoeuvres in the Balkans are indications that the war is “going to enter upon a phase of greater violence." Britain must make "her war,” as it has now become, essentially a maritime war, the roles of the Air Force and Army being to buttress and sustain her sea-power in all their activities.

Britain’s sea power dominates that of Germany and Italy though she still lacks sufficient of tlie Tight kind of warships lo make her blockade absolutely "watertight.” Britain is waging this war in her traditional way. She does not need any United States soldiers "Hiis year, nor next year nor any year that I. can foresee.” says Mr. Churchill. But site does need, to supplement her own vast production, “an immense and continuous supply of war materials and technical apparatus.” She will need a great mass of shipping in 1942, “far more than we can build ourselves" if she is to “maintain and augment her war effort in the East.” There is much authority in Mr. Churchill's masterly survey of the situation for the view that the decisive theatre will be in and about the Mediterranean and that. British Sea-Bower will be the decisive factor.—(S.D.W.)

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19410212.2.44

Bibliographic details

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 118, 12 February 1941, Page 6

Word Count
1,061

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 118, 12 February 1941, Page 6

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 118, 12 February 1941, Page 6

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