A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 112, 5 February 1941, Page 8

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Mediterranean Scene GERMANY AND VICHY There can be little doubt that the renewal of German pressure ou Marshal Petain and his Vichy Government is au important aspect of the Nazis reaction to the serious and continuing reverses to the fortunes of the Mediterranean partner in the Axis. The attempted Italian stroke against Greece in November has had many unfortunate and grave results for the enemv. The Greeks, powerfully aided bv British aviation and military supplies, have pushed the Italians tar back into the Albanian mountains and are threatening completely to break their hold on that country. Italy’s Mistake Coming as it did when the British preparations for the Libyan offensive were all but complete, the Italian move against Greece was a bad miscalculation in that it gave the British naval and air forces the quickly-seized opportunity to establish forward bases in Crete and elsewhere in Greek territorv These bases are some 400 miles nearer to Italy’s lines of communication with Albania and Libya than Alexandria. . Since November, therefore, the British naval forces have had the use of Greek harbours, many of which are among the best in the world. A circle of 500 miles radius from Suda Bay, on the north-west coast of Crete, passes through, or close to, Brindisi, Tarauto Messina, Catania and Syracuse in Sicilv, and Malta. Benghazi in Libya is about 300 miles and Tripoli about 600 miles from Suda Bay. The vital areas for Italy are those of the Central Mediterranean through which run her communications between the mainland and the two areas in which her armies are operating overseas—Libva and Albania. From the one Sir Andrew Cunninghams mam base at Alexandria was distant some 800 miles; from the other, slightly more. British Fleet’s Gain The fuel endurance of warships is limited and the enemy always knew when the British Fleet had been operating for some days in the central part of the Mediterranean, that it must steam 800 miles to Alexandria and back before its operations could lie resumed. It had no surplus strength to enable it to refuel by relays, except at the cost of dangerously depleting the strength of the force in or near ’ enemy waters. The Italian naval com- ' tn ami were thus assured periodically of intervals in which their movements ■ in and across the central area would : be immune from interruption. All these factors have greatly ad- , vantaged the British naval and air ■ forces in the Mediterranean in their : close co-operation with the British I Army of the Nile during the brilli- : antly successful campaign in Libya. Eritrea and elsewhere in North-east Africa. The Italians have been able to do little to reinforce their Libyan forces and not a few transports have : been sunk at sea or badly damaged in harbour at Benghazi and Tripoli. The most Germany appears to have donein support of her unfortunate ally has been the establishment of powerful dive-bombing aud tighter air squadrons in Sicily to harry Aialta and British sea transport in the central area of the Mediterranean. A Decisive Battlefield

It might have been, bad the Italian coup against Greece succeeded, that Germany would have launched a campaign in the Balkans through Rumania. The latter country was occupied without fighting and. gave Germany the whole of its output of oil. A successful Axis drive in the Balkans would have brought Germany and Italy immeasurably nearer greater prizes—the oilfields of Iraq and Persia, and control of the Eastern Mediterranean. A successful defence of the whole Mediterranean area is for Britain as vital as the defence of her own islands. As one authoritative writer well puts it, the Mediterranean is one strategic whole, for without command of the Western Mediterranean, the eastern part of that sea becomes inaccessible and is therefore lost, while without command of the Eastern Mediterranean. the command of the western half becomes pointless. The Mediterranean is, therefore, the decisive battlefield. The war can be won or lost in the Mediterranean. Hitler’s Next Move

Hitler undoubtedly suffered a major defeat in his air operations against Britain during the autumn. In recent weeks there has been a revival of reports and rumours of an impending invasion of Britain. There are many good reasons to believe that any attempt at invasion is foredoomed to failure. Great Britain is now in an immensely better position to defeat such an attempt than she was last autumn. One well-informed writer insists that Hitler’s defeat last autumn “is decisive ia so far as it has not only denied him command of the air, but has shown that he can never hope to secure the command of the air (and, for thav matter, the provisional command of the sea) so that the attempt to invade England will have to be abandoned, if it has not been abandoned already... Germany’s only hope of defeating Britain is to break her on the sea. The utmost the Nazis have been able to do from the air has failed to break the resistance or the will to resistance of the British people. Hence we find Hitler and Admiral Raeder assuring the German people that they are goirt? to defeat Britain on the sea, an “all-in” U-boat campaign being cited as the principal means to this end. The German people were promised victory in six months by this means in 1917-18. Back To The Mediterranean But U-boats alone will not suffice. There must be some decisive blow at Britain’s sea communications. _ The renewal of Nazi intrigue in France and pressure on the men of Vichy indicates that Hitler and his generals and admirals have become seriously alarmed about the situation iu the Mediterranean and northern Africa. It may be they imagine that if they could secure possession of the French Fleet in that sea. they could do much to redress the adverse balance of naval strength due to Italian losses. . Although Germany and Italy tried hard last autumn they were not able to secure a promise of Spain’s active intervention in the war, it may be that there is some secret arrangement for the passage of German troops through that country in a future campaign against Gibraltar. In Algeria and Morocco, General Weygand is maintaining a sphinx-like attitude. The final overthrow of Italy in northern Africa may be a turningpoint. Hitler senses that a change in attitude will probably be unfavourable to the Nazi cause.— (S.D.W.)