FULL REINFORCEMENTS IN SOUTH IMPOSSIBLE

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 187, 4 May 1940, Page 11

FULL REINFORCEMENTS IN SOUTH IMPOSSIBLE

(British Official Wireless.)

RUGBY, May 2. The statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons on the situation in Norway was repeatedly punctuated by cheers from all sides of the House. The main interest in the statement attached to the announcement of the skilful withdrawal of the British troops from south of Trondheim. Mr. Chamberlain prefaced his story of the landings of the expeditionary force in Norway by recalling the preparation of forces for Finland and of other forces to go to the assistance of Norway and Sweden in the event of an invasion of those countries by Germany if they had acquiesced in the passage of troops to Finland. “It did not escape our attention,”.he said, “that in such a case Trondheim and other western ports of Norway, as well as the aerodrome at Stavanger, might well be the subject of attack by Germans and accordingly further forces again were made ready to occupy these places. But when the question of assistance to Finland lapsed the greater part of all those forces was dispersed, with their transport. About a month ago, however, it was decided that certain small forces should be kept in readiness to occupy Norwegian western ports at short notice in case of an act of aggression by Germany against south Norway.

“It will 'be noted again that any action contemplated on Norwegian soil was conditional upon prior violation of Norwegian neutrality by Germany. It has been asked how it was that in spite of these preparations Germany was able to forestall us. The answer is simple. It was by long-planned and carefully elaborated treachery against an unsuspecting and almost unarmed people. “We had been aware for many months that Germans were accumulating transports and troops in Baltic ports and that these troops were constantly being practised in embarkation and disembarkation. It was evident ithat some act of aggression was in contemplation, but these forces were equally available for attack upon Finland, Sweden, Norway, Holland, or this country, and it was impossible to tell 'beforehand where the blow would fall. “Even if we had known that Denmark and Norway were to be victims, we could not have prevented what happened without the co-operation of those countries. But in the belief that their neutrality would save them they took no precautions, and they gave, us no warning of the attack, which, indeed, they never suspected.”

Curious Coincidence. The Premier then referred to the “curious chance” by which the date of April 8, chosen by the British for the minor operations of mine-laying across the long communication trench of Norwegian territorial waters along which Germany could obtain supplies of iron ore, should have coincided almost exactly with that chosen by the Nazi Government for their long-prepared invasion of Norway. Stating, “We were informed on April 7 that a large German naval force was moving along the west coast of Norway. That evening the Main Battle Elect and the Second Cruiser Squadron sailed in the hope of engaging the enemy,” Mr. Chamberlain proceeded to review the opening of the naval phase of the Norwegian campaign, of which details are already known. Later, “in view of the obscurity of the situation in central Norway and the importance of securing Narvik, the first Allied military forces which. had been promptly assembled sailed direct to the Narvik area, arriving there on April 15. In the meantime, the very successful naval attack on April 13 completely destroyed the enemy’s naval forces at that port and made it unnecessary to utilise for the capture of Narvik all the forces originally earmarked for that operation.” Hazardous Attempt. This brought the Premier to a description of the operations north and south of Trondheim, and an explanation of the reasons for the attempt to capture Trondheim after, ensuring the eventual capture of Narvik, and to the recent decision to withdraw from the south. ~ 1 Mr. Chamberlain drew a parallel between this highly successful operation at Andalsnes, accomplished without loss, and the “action of Sir John Moore at Corunna, which, though, accompanied by heavy loss of life, including the commander, has taken its place among the classic examples of British military skill.”

.The objectives were, first, to give all the support and assistance in their power to the Norwegians; secondly, to resist or delay the German advance from the south; and, thirdly, to facilitate the rescue and protection of the Norwegian King and Government. It was obvious that these objectives could be most speedilv attained if it was possible to capture Trondheim, and despite the hazardous nature of the operation, with the Germans in possession and in occupation of the only really efficient aerodrome in south-west Norway at Stavanger, they had resolved to make the effort.

Two lauding places were selected, respectively north and. south of Trondheim. At Namsos, in the north, naval forces landed on April 14, and they were followed by British troops from April 16 to IS. A few days later French chasseurs alpins landed, and the arrival of these staunch and experienced troops was a welcome support to the British. Part of this force advanced rapidly to the neighbourhood of Stenkjaar to support the Norwegians who were known to bo holding that place. South- of Trondheim a naval party landed at Andalsnes on April 17. followed by troops on April 18 and 19.

These advanced to the important railway junction of Dombas, and a contingent went on south and joined the Norwegians who were opposing at Lillehammer the main German advance from the south. Supplies Hampered. “Our troops fought with gallantry and determination, and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy,” he said. “Nevertheless, the enemy occupied the aerodromes and prevented the operation of our fighters. The local German air superiority precluded the landing of necessary artillery and tanks to withstand the enemy drive from the south. The Germans, disregarding loss of life, were always able to send reinforcements at a much greater rate than, we could. The German losses,_land,j>ea

and air, were much greater thau ours. 1 ' Turning to the wider strategy of the war, the Premier assured the Commons:— “We are not going to be trapped into such a dispersal of our forces as would leave us dangerously weak at a vital centre. We know our enemy holds a central position. They have immense forces always mounted ready for attack, and an attack can be launched with lightning rapidity in any one of many fields. We know they are prepared and would not scruple to invade Holland or Belgium or both. They might well do more than one of these tilings in preparation for an attempt at a large-scale attack on the Western Front or even a lightning swoop on this country. “We must not so disperse or tie up our forces as to weaken our freedom of action in vital emrgencies whicu may at any moment arise. We must seize every chance, as we have done, and shall continue to do, in Norway, to inflict damage upon the enemy, but we must not allow ourselves to forget the long-term strategy which will win the war.” After Mr. Chamberlain had sat down, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Attlee, and the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, announced that they would not comment or ask questions today.