THE STRUGGLE AHEAD

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 164, 6 April 1940, Page 9

THE STRUGGLE AHEAD

Full Use Of All Resources Needed For Victory

ECONOMIC WARFARE

LONDON, Marcli 15.

The Allies do not let themselves be deceived by the comparatively bloodless course of Hie into imagining that they will automatically and without further exertion on their part achieve their war aims, writes }lajorGeneral Sir Charles Gwynn, in his weekly commentary on the war by land and in the air. They are piling up war material ami training more and more mon. But that by itself, as they well know, will not bring victory. The German Army and Air Force are not less strong today Ilian they were when the war started. Sooner or later, Allied men and material must be employed to help to shatter their strength. Except on the sea, where the Royal Navy, the Merchant Service, and the fishing licet, in co-operation with coastal aircraft, have gallantly and efficiently been carrying out their role, the British Fighting Services have so far not been called upon lo make a major positive contribution toward winning the war. For war cannot be won solely by pressure of the blockade. It cannot be won merely by holding tlie Maginot Line. It cannot be won by reconnaissance Hights and showers of leaflets over Germany.

Internal revolt in Germany will not he caused by such means, however much the weakness and immorality of the Nazi regime may ultimately provide a soil in which revolt may spring up. For the time being, while they are building up their strength, the Allies may be content to launch no offensive on land or in the air, leaving it to their sea ipower to exercise its pressure. That, however, is only a preliminary attitude. The end to be aimed at is •full and well co-ordinated use of all our instruments of force to wear down the German power of resistance. It needs to be insisted that German power is certainly such that it cannot be overthrown except by the complete employment of all resources, moral, material, and military, of all the Allies. Tlie Economic Factor. The word attrition awakens unhappy memories of the last war. And it is too widely believed that a war of attrition is the last resort of leaders not competent to win by other means. But though in tlie last war the word was given a specific and limited meaning, yet almost every war has been won by a process of attrition. There is nothing new in the idea. Sometimes tlie process of attrition has been slow, as in the American Civil AYar or in the Peninsula War. Sometimes it has been made rapid by great tactical victories, as in the Prussian wars of last century. In modern wars between great nations commanding forces of approximately equal strength, decisive tactical victories are rarely achieved. Attrition, resulting from destruction of life, is necessarily a slow process. On the other hand,' the immense supplies of war material required by armed forces has enormously added to the importance of economic factors in the process of attrition. In this war the economic pressure of blockade imposes an urge on Germany to resort to offensive action which, if successful, might enable her to escape the effects of economic pressure. If unsuccessful, it would on the other hand increase the effects of economic pressure which, limits the replacement, of the enormous expenditure of supplies entailed by offensive action. Attack or Defence? The improbability of achieving decisive tactical success is fully appreciated by the German leaders, and accounts for their hesitation to take offensive action. . If economic pressure compels tlie Germans to take the risk, the Allies will fight defensively in strong positions. Allied troops, however, would have no easy task. The'advantages of the defence can be over-rated. Morally and physically, troops on the defensive arc subjected to an even greater strain than the attackers, so long as the latter have fresh troops and unlimited munitions at their command. The Allies may have confidence, however, that they have resources which would enable them to bear tlie strain, and that they would eventually be able to take counter-offensive action. If, on the other hand, the Germans were to decide that the risk of offensive action proving unsuccessful was too great, and decided to stand on the defensive, what course would be imposed on the Allies? One cannot suppose that economic pressure of the blockade would, by it-* self, compel tlie Germans to relinquish their ill-gotten gains. The effect of the blockade would have to be intensified. That can only be done by forcing the Germans to expend their resources. That is to say, they would have to be attacked. Forces’ Part In Economic War. I do not believe that the Allies would be able to achieve quick and decisive victories over the German Army and Air Force, but they could subject them to immense strain and force them to expend irreplaceable supplies. It would be a war of attrition, deliberately conducted. It would require immense exertions. But, as I see it, it would be, to an even greater extent than the last, an economic war in which all our lighting Services would play their part. The Navy shuts off supplies. Lhe Army forces the enemy to expend supplies'. The Air Force attacks establishments and communications which produce supplies. In addition, it assists the Navy and the Army to cut off the enemy’s supplies and forces him to expend them. The great advantage the Allies hold is that they have free access to the world’s resources, and that the Germans have not. They must exploit that advantage by positive action.