POSITION OF WIDOW WHO REMARRIES

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 3, 28 September 1939, Page 6

POSITION OF WIDOW WHO REMARRIES

Succession Duty Levy The question of whether the remarriage of a woman who was daught.er-in-iaw of a testatrix under a will, being at the time of the making of the will the widow of testatrix’s son, destroyed the relationship with the testatrix created by the first marriage, was argued recently before the Chief Justice, Sir Michael Myers, in the Supreme Court, Wellington, and was the subject of a reserved judgment delivered yesterday. The case was an appeal against the assessment of succession duty whereby the woman concerned was treated as a stranger by the Commissioner of Stamp Duties and duty assessed at 10 per cent. It was contended at the hearing on her behalf that the remarriage did not destroy her relationship with testatrix and that for duty purposes she should have been treated as a child of testatrix, in which case the duty would have been 1 per cent.

Appellants were Ruby Mabel Furey (the testatrix’s son’s widow) and Arthur James Luke and William Henry Cunningham, as administrators of the estate of the late Charlotte Coleman. Respondent was the Commissioner of Stamp Duties. In his judgment the Chief Justice

stated that the will of the testatrix was made four days after the death of her son, Percy Edward Coleman. Consequently at the date of the will Ruby Mabel Coleman (now Mrs. Furey) was correctly described as a “widow,” and she was the widow of the son of the testatrix. After the date of the execution of the will and before the death of the testatrix the daughter-in-law remarried and became Mrs. John. George Furey.

His opinion was that the contention of the appellants could not be supported. He based this view upon, the short ground that at the crucial point of time in this case, namely, the.date of the death of the testatrix, Mrs. Furey was not “the widow of a son of the testatrix” and therefore was not a “child” within tlie meaning of the Act. She was at that time not the widow of the testatrix’s son, having lost that status and acquired upon, her remarriage a new status as the wife of Mr. Furey. He did not see how she could be said to take as “the widow of a son.” Whether or not the result would be the- same if “child” had been defined as including “daughter-in-law” need not be considered. The term was not in fact so defined. What it did include was the “widow of a son,” and Mrs. Furey did not at the crucial point of time come within that description.

The appeal was dismissed with £5/5/- costs.

Mr. }V. H. Cunningham appeared for appellant, Mrs. Furey, and Mr. H, P. Broad for respondent, the Commissioner of Stamp Duties.