FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COMMONS

Dominion, Volume 32, Issue 262, 3 August 1939, Page 8

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COMMONS

It is clear front the tenor of the House of Commons debate on the Government’s foreign policy that there exists some uneasiness on the score of its apparent uncertain course. How far would Germany be allowed to go in Danzig before the British guarantee to Poland became operative? At what point would it become necessary for Britain to make a definite stand in the Far East to safeguard her interests in China and also to keep faith with the Chinese Republic. Is it prudent in present circumstances to have a lengthy adjournment of Parliament for the summer recess? These and other questions addressed to the Prime Minister reflect, to some extent at least, the general state of the public mind. With the shadow of war hanging so persistently over the nation, and the feeling that at any time the storm might break, it is natural that people should wonder at what stage, and in what circumstances, the breaking point would be reached. Mr. Chamberlain’s reply leaves the impression that he will not resort to extreme measures except under the strongest provocation. He still pins his faith in the virtue of peace by negotiation, and hopes, almost against hope, that some action may yet be possible that would “tend to restore the confidence of the people in the peaceful intentions of all States of Europe.” That such action cannot be hoped for as long as the accumulation of armaments and “poisonous propaganda” is allowed to continue, he sadly admits. These sentiments have the appearance of a last desperate gesture to the enemies of peace. Coming from the bead of a State now powerfully armed and prepared for eventualities, reinforced by alliances of great strategic value, and unquestionably assured of at least the moral support of the United States, it may have the effect of causing the dictators to pause and reflect. But this appears to be a very faint possibility. The German Press outburst which greeted Mr. Chamberlain’s speech makes that very clear. The references to Danzig amount in effect to a defiance and a challenge.

There may be a danger that Mr. Chamberlain’s almost passionate desire for peace may tempt him to a policy of restraint which might be exploited by Britain’s enemies as a sign of weakness and vacillation. The time has clearly gone past for any further concessions to aggression. What is now required is some definite action that will convince aggressive nations that Britain really is in earnest.