The Dominion. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1938. BERLIN-VIENNA-ROME

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 124, 19 February 1938, Page 8

The Dominion. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1938. BERLIN-VIENNA-ROME

Now that the excitement over the latest developments in AustroGerman relationships has subsided somewhat, it is possible to study their implications in a clearer perspective. In restrained language the London Times observes that the agreement can only be judged by what it contributes to the stability of Europe. That is really the whole point. As far as Austria is concerned her sovereignty does not appear to be at stake. It was specifically affirmed in the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936, together with the acceptance by Austria of the fundamental idea that she is a German State — German, that is, in the Teutonic sense rather than in the sense that she is under the tutelage of Germany. The agreement also provided that “each government considers the inner political developments existing in the other country, including Austrian Nazism, as the internal affair of the other country, in which they will not interfere directly or indirectly.” The latest development, in which has been involved a reshuffling of the Austrian Cabinet with a strong flavouring of- the Nazi element suggests a violation of the principle of this provision under pressure from Germany which the Austrian Chancellor has been unable to resist. ... Fact and propaganda appear to be so inextricably mixed in the spate of reports and rumours that have reached this country that it would seem desirable to study The repercussions from the. 1936 agreement at the time its terms were announced. In the opinion of a Round Table writer (September, 1936), “the Austro-German agreement, concluded with Mussolini’s blessing, has established a modus vivendi on the basis of which Italy and Germany will doubtless move closer together in European diplomacy.” That was a shrewd prophecy, conveying, as subsequent events in Europe have proved, a sound appreciation of the situation. -Austria in political turmoil, and with no clearly-defined picture of her future, was at once an embariassment and a hindrance to the European diplomacy of Italy and Germany. The agreement was an attempt to settle these troubles on a basis that would be advantageous to Austria’s neighbours. In actual effect it has enabled Germany immensely to strengthen her position in Europe, while, at the same time, relieving Italy of a tactical responsibility she had previously assumed but manifestly had found burdensome. . / The cause for uneasiness lies in the fact that Austria, to all intents and purposes, has been forced into an alignment significantly reminiscent of the Triple Alliance that existed before ,1914 of Italy, Austria-Hungary and Germany, with Turkey added later. That alliance enabled the Central Powers to co-ordinate their North Sea and Mediterranean strategy The defection of Italy upset their plans, and completely changed the whole aspect of naval strategy in the Mediterranean after war broke out. Whether this new arrangement is aimed at the future domination of the Danubian States, or looks westward to the possibility of a conflict either of arms or of interests in that region, the fact remains that it is strategically well placed for action either way. “The dangers of a renewed alliance of the Central Powers,” observes the write! - above quoted-, “are fob the League, for France, for Great Britain and the whole Commonwealth too obvious to need elaboration.” Mr. C. F. Melville, an acknowledged authority on European affairs, considered that the agreement of 1936 placed Herr von Schuschnigg in a stronger position in country than before, because it eliminated the “private armies” which were keeping it in an unsettled condition. It also meant, however, “a more marked German orientation in Austrian policy externally.” . This reading of the situation has been substantiated by the subsequent course of events. The present and future concern of the ,Western / Powers —Britain, France, and the United States. —should be to see that this new combination does not apply the. strategical strength it has acquired to improper or tyrannical purposes in the Danubian basin, or in the Mediterranean. It must be frankly admitted that for the time being, at all events, the Berlin-Rome axis has captured the initiative in the diplomatic strategy of European politics.. From this point of-view the situation is off equilibrium, and the position can only be restored by an alignment of democracies sufficiently strong and united to impress opponent ideologies with the need for acting with due restraint.