The Dominion. MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1937. NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Dominion, Volume 31, Issue 73, 20 December 1937, Page 8

The Dominion. MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1937. NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Out of the events in the Far East has developed a highly promising degree of collaboration between Britain-and the United States. Recent happenings, it is stated in a cablegram to-day, have demonstiated their similarity of outlook. To quote the American Secretary of State, the two nations, “having common interests, purposes, and objectives, have worked on parallel lines, are exchanging information, and acting concurrently.” It is further stated that this collaboration has caused some concern to the Tokio Administration who can see beyond the immediate prosecution of hostilities.” What if a sudden emergency raised the question of translating this collaboration into active intervention. Would naval co-operation be feasible ? Hardly at present In the first place the Japanese operations in China have placed no strain on their naval resources. The campaign is largely territoria and the naval forces employed comparatively insignificant. me Japanese Navy, therefore, is free to meet attacks from other directions. Since the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty the navy can be expanded without limits, and has been greatly augmented and strengthened with new fighting ships. Further, the ban on the fortification of certain islands in the Western Pacific imposed on all three signatories—Britain, the United States and Japan—by that treaty, no longer applies. In a pamphlet issued by the Japanese Navy Department the advent of the “non-treaty era” was stated to be of profound significance to the nation. “A naval construction race during the nontreaty era,” it said, “may, from one point of view, be regarded as a stage in the process of the rapid expansion of our national str ength. We therefore, must be firmly resolved to overcome any sort ot dilticulties that may arise ahead of us so that the glorious position in which our Empire notv finds itself may increase in glory. Added to this freedom to augment her naval forces and strengthen the fortifications of the outer islands Japan has the great advantage of being in a position to plan her naval strategy on a defensive basis on comparatively short lines of communications to supp y depots radiating in all directions. Her fleet can quite well afford to await the arrival of hostile naval forces. This was the strategy adoptee in the Russo-Japanese War,'when Admiral Togo bided his time ti.l the Russian fleet appeared, and-then sallied forth and destroyed it. A fleet that is in a position to choose its own battle-ground is vet y favourably placed, and it is fairly certain that this strategy would be adopted again. American naval forces operating against Japan wou.d be based principally at Honolulu, and would be under the great disadvantage of having to guard long lines of communications, the same would apply to a British fleet based at Singapore, even with supply depots on the Australian coast. -d-GcL In the opinion of Mr. Winston Churchill, “neither the British nor the American Navy is strong enough to attack Japan. Even i to-day they were united, it would take three or four years of immense effort and expenditure by the whole of the English-speaking peoples to bring predominating naval power into the Yellow oeas. , Willard Price, writing in the Fortnightly, declares that Japan s sea power is nearly, if not quite, as strong to-day as Great Britain s oi America’s. “The Japanese Navy,” he says, “is. not only equal but vastly superior to any opponent fleet if the fighting is to be done in Japanese waters.” The position of the Japanese fleet in its home waters has been described by a naval authority as comparable in strength to the Hindenburg Line.” The point of this comparison is> tna it was not the Hindenburg Line that collapsed but the morale of the Germans behind it. To, reach a similar situation with Japan would demand, as Mr. Churchill warns us, years of immense effort and expenditure by her opponents. The foregoing remarks are based oh the assumption that a Anglo-American war on Japan would be seriously entertained. At the moment this is extremely doubtful. Britain’s naval resources are by the exigencies of international politics pinned to her own and European waters, Singapore being simply a base for an emergency, squadron detached for service with the Australian and New Zealand squadrons in defensive operations in the Pacific. Would the United States declare war in these circumstances? It seems improbable. For the reasons above stated Japanese naval strategy probably would not contemplate major operations at any great distance, from home waters. Hence naval operations would be confined to raiding attac s and commerce destroying on the high seas.. These would get. nowhere in determining the main issue. Only a decisive battle, with major forces engaged would effect that. To add to the complexities of the general situation, Japan has the moral support, and might conceivably be assured of the active assistance, of both Italy and Germany. Russia has an agreement with China, and another with France, while Britain is definitely committed to the assistance of France if that nation is attacked. In the face of these entanglements it is hardly likely that the United States would be willing to risk a war in the Pacific in winch she might have to play a lone hand.