VERDICT SET ASIDE

Dominion, Volume 29, Issue 224, 18 June 1936, Page 11

VERDICT SET ASIDE

Woman Appeals Against Judge’s Order

APPEAL COURT HEARING

Au appeal against the decision of Mr. Justice Ostler in the Supreme Court in setting aside the verdict of a jury on the ground that the personal damages awarded a woman in a motor accident were excessive and unreasonable was beard before the Court of Appeal, Wellington, yesterday. The hearing took place at Palmerston North, atoll the jur.V awarded plaintiff there. £2606/12/-. In sotting aside the verdict Mr. Justice Ostler held the ease was not one tn which vindictive damages might be given, and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeal, which consisted of the Acting-Chief Justice (Mr. Justice Reed), Mr. Justice Smith, Mr. Justice Johnston, Mr. Justice Fair, and Mr. Justice Northcroft, reserved its judgment. Appellant was Edith Matilda Hodgson, a married woman, of Whakaranga, and respondents were Catherine Orr-Craig, of Takapati, and the Hawke’s Bay Farmers' Meat Company, Ltd. Mr. F. W. Ongley, with him Mr. A. M. Ongley, appeared for appellant and Mr. W. E. Leicester for respondent.

Mrs. Hodgson was riding a bicycle on December 15 last when she was knocked down at the intersection of the Stoney Creek and Napier roads, at Whakaranga, near Palmerstpn North. It was alleged that the car was under bailment to Mrs. Orr-Craig from the Hawke's Bay Farmers’ Meat Company, Ltd., and was driven by E. F. Stubbs, an agent of Mrs. Orr-Craig. Mrs. Hodgson brought a claim for £2500 general and £lO9/6/- special damages, alleging that she was permanently deformed as a result of multiple injuries to the pelvic girdle. The defendant company denied that the car was under bailment to Mrs. OrrCraig, and admitted liability. The jury awarded £2500 general damages and £lO6 12/- special damages, but his Honour set aside the judgment and ordered a new trial. Function of Jury. Air. F. W. Ongley submitted that the verdict could have been set aside only if the jury failed in its function of assessing damages, due to the consideration of irrelevant matters; or if the verdict was such as no twelve sensible men could reasonably give. In claims for personal damages there was no defined measure of general damages. The basis was such an amount as a jury, using reasonable common sense, assessed as full fair compensation for the injury, remembering that they compensated once and for all. _ Counsel submitted that his Honour's decision overlooked that the jury's estimate was a proper basis unless it could be shown to be improperly made, and that in fixing £2OOO as the limit, Mr. Justice Ostler had attempted to fix a precise measure of damage, of which personal injury claims were not capable. In reply, Mr. Leicester submitted that twelve sensible men could not reasonably have awarded the damages because: (1) They failed to consider right matters (or considered wrong matters) and (2) they applied a wrong measure of damages. The jury had attte.mpted to give Airs. Hodgson damages on the basis of permanent deformity, and the sum contemplated was a form of maintenance for life. In answer to the Acting-Chief Justice. Mr. Leicester said there was no reported case in New Zealand where a judge had previously exercised the jurisdiction to set aside a jury’s award in a case for personal damages. The case was important because if in cases of personal injury where pain and suffering were involved, juries were entitled to assess damages at any figure they chose, then the function of a judge to intervene on the ground that the verdict was excessive, would be meaningless and nugatory, submitted Mr. Leicester. . In this case the judge had considered the jury had ignored his direction ns to the measure of damages and the appellant ought to satisfy the Court of Appeal that the trial judge’s view was wrong, concluded Mr. Leicester.

Air. Ongley replied briefly, and the court reserved its decision.