RANDOM NOTES

Dominion, Volume 29, Issue 93, 14 January 1936, Page 8

RANDOM NOTES

Sidelights on Current

Events

(By

Kickshaws.)

No film magnate, it is said, has ever reproduced the Flood. Some pictures, though, have been quite emotionalenough.

The first move in Empire migration, it is stated, must be from the Do minions. That doesn’t seem to be th-* way to fill the empty spaces.

A medical expert says that it is very foolish to restrain a yawn. Unless, of course, the man who is telling the story is quick tempered.

“In Thursday’s ’Dominion’ a Southlander couple stated they have two children born on December 15 with five years between ages. I can go one better. I have two sons, one born 7.30 a.m., Tuesday, July 2, 1912, at Ruahine, North Island. The other sou was born 7.30 a.m., Tuesday, July 2, 1918. at Havelock, South Island, six years separating their ages. Can anyone beat that?’’

The situation iu Abyssinia has reached a stage at which both sides might well consider the situation. Tins refers especially to Mussolini. He barwaged war now for several mouths. He can wage war for perhaps another two months, or possibly less. He is then confronted with the rainy season. Mussolini’s problems arc complicated by the fact that he has so many troops. Indeed, Mussolini has made so many mistakes that one can but wonder if he has taken the advice of his military experts or flouted their advice. His first error seems to ffitve arisen from some ridiculous idea that he could wage a quick war. Almost any military expert' with a knowledge of the Abyssinians and their country could have told him that he was being rather absurd. The distances alone are too great for quick decisions to be obtained. It would take an Italian force the best part of three months, if not longer, to penetrate into the heart'of Abyssinia if there were no' resistance. It took British forces some six months to march 400 miles to Magdala almost unopposed.

The military experts when they were considering the problem of an Abyssinian war cannot but have warned Mussolini that he was taking on a military operation that must fie very slow. Quick decisions in similar country on Britain’s Indian frontier are most unusual. Another factor that has contributed to the Italian failure is undoubtedly the nature of the country. It is little use throwing men by the hundred thousand into the fray if their fighting power cannot be developed. The nature of the country in Abyssinia is such that the military machine cannot develop its strength on a wide front. Under those conditions masses of men are a nuisance rather than a help. They must be fed without contributing anything. Too many men get in the way in mountain warfare. Moreover, their very presence makes possible a debacle on a large scale. Admittedly Mussolini permitted his forces to come into action on three fronts. This plan would have succeeded if all the forces had succeeded. The fact that the advance in Ogaden and that from Assab were almost complete failures has made the further progress of the northern army a futile adventure, and a very risky one.

The result of Mussolini's mistakes in Abyssinia are now becoming apparent, if not to him, at least to his military experts. They have been set an almost hopeless task of extricating their armies from increasingly difficult situations. Those are not conditions for a glorious advance. It is one thing to penetrate into an enemy’s terrain and it is quite another to get out. It is probably no exaggeration to say that Mussolini could not get his forces out of Abyssinia intact in the face of a hostile enemy skilled in guerrilla tactics. There they are and there the Italian soldiers will have to remain unless .Mussolini is prepared to cry for peace terms. The difficulties of retiring from Gallipoli were nothing to the difficulties of retiring a force nearly 100,000 strong from a. mountain fastness. The result of such a difficult retirement could not be anything but chaos, even if there were no enemy. Retirement, moreover, has a psychological effect on the troops. It has a further psychological effect ou those at home. Efforts to stick out the rainy season will probably be disastrous. It is an awkward position.

When-one compares the strategy of the Abyssinians with that of ' the Italians, there, is little doubt that the former have made fewer mistakes. In war it is the side that makes the few.est mistakes that is successful, Hailie Selassie’s tactics will surely be lauded by all the military experts of the world. It is one thing to decide to permit au enemy to extend his communications and penetrate into one's own country. It is another thing to carry out the plan satisfactorily. In this ease Mussolini’s overwhelming impetuosity and vanity have assisted, as did Napoleon’s when en route for Moscow. No nation likes to see an enemy marching into its lands. A nation only half armed, with few communications and little equipment, must indeed be selfcontrolled to allow such a scheme to develop. Those who have felt the pangs of retirement know the difficulties. The Abyssinian generals developed their scheme in a manner that would have been a credit to any general—Napoleon not excepted. The scheme was made all the more difficult owing to the enemy having tanks and aeroplanes. The combination can save many a bad piece of generalship when, by the rules of old-time warfare, the victory should have gone to the other side.

The military situation in Abyssinia at the moment has reached a stage at which, in the case of manoeuvres, a wise umpire blows the cease-fire and tells both sides what he thinks of their effort. There is little doubt that if such a thing were done Hallie Selassie would come out with considerable credit. Meanwhile the situation must continue to develop. Having proved that it is impossible to produce their total manpower, the Italians must either advance or retire. At the moment they are hanging on. It is a very dangerous interlude. An advance would be desirable. Difficulties of communication will probably make that most unwise. Indeed, one can well believe that Hnille Selassie prays that they will make the attempt. The tactics of the Abyssinians will probably consist of an increased aggressiveness.