BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE CRISIS

Dominion, Volume 29, Issue 5, 1 October 1935, Page 8

BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE CRISIS

’ The French are a realistic and logical people, and it is not suiprising that they should have requested of the British Government a clear and specific statement as to what extent, in regard to the ItaloAbyssinian dispute, they may be assured in future of the immediate and effective application by Great Britain of all the sanctions provided in Article 16 of the Covenant in the event of its violation, and resort to force in Europe. Article 16 deals with the sanctions that may be invoked in restraint of an aggressor nation. In effect these amount to an economic boycott of the offender, and it was clearly contemplated by the authors of the Covenant that force might be required to make it effective. “It shall be the duty of the Council in such case (runs the second paragraph) to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the' Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.”

On a cursory reading the British Foreign Secretary s reply to the French Government’s question in this connection may seem vague and evasive. A closer analysis will show that it is not so. Sir Samuel Hoare emphasises not once but frequently the fact that the ruling principle of British policy in regard to international disputes is collective action. “The League stands, and this country with it,” he says, “for collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.” He draws particular attention to this sentence. “Each word in that sentence,” he emphasises, “must have its full value.’ Later, he reiterates the condition laid down by him in his speech at Geneva: “If the risks for peace are to be run, they must be run by all.” The inference from this is plain. The British Government and, behind it, British public opinion, are not prepared to enter into any commitments as to the employment of sanctions, economic or military,"'unless the League is unanimously in favour of such action, and the Members of the League are co-participants, the reactions of this statement at Geneva may be twofold. I'irst, it may encourage Signor Mussolini to gamble on the chance of at least one dissentient vole on the question of invoking the sanctions and the withdrawal in that event of Britain from the scene,. Secondly, the smaller nations, fearful of their own security in the future, may be driven into unanimity.

■Having dealt with the first essential point of the question arising from Article 16, the Foreign Secretary discusses the second: What is a positive act of unprovoked aggression? The Article is not applicable, he says, “as regards the negative act of failure to fulfil the terms of a treaty.” Furthermore, there may be in acts to which it does apply “degrees of culpability and degrees of aggression. Hence the nature of the disciplinary action to be taken must be determined by the circumstances of the case. Here is a straw at which Signor Mussolini may clutch with some hope. He may argue that the mobilisation of Italian forces in East Africa is not a “positive” act of aggression. He may argue, and has already done so, that Abyssinia has supplied ample provocation for his warlike preparations. It is thus apparent that Britain’s assurance of active support, for the vindication of the League Covenant is qualified by the condition that the punishment must fit the crime. Hence the two factors influencing British policy are the question of unanimity, and the determination of the degree of culpability involved in any act of aggression which may occur. The latter obviously is importantly relevant to any decision involving the possibility of recourse to war. The very nature of modern warfare demands that there should be the fullest justification for it, that, in a word, the flesh and blood of civilised nations should not be precipitated into the arena of a ghastly conflict because, for example, of an “incident” between frontier outposts.